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TITI LUCRETI CARI

DE RERUM NATURA

LIBER III

London: C. J. CLAY AND SONS,
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,
AVE MARIA LANE.
Glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.

Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS.
New York: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.

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T. LUCRETI CARI

DE RERUM NATURA

LIBER TERTIUS

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND INDEX

BY

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CAMBRIDGE:

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1903

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AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

PREFACE.

WHEN the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press suggested that I should edit another book of Lucretius for their Latin series, the third book seemed for several reasons the most suitable for the purpose. In it all the different powers of Lucretius are seen at their highest; it suffers little, if at all, by separation from the rest of the poem; and it seems to me to have gained more than other parts of the poem from recent criticism.

The reader, who wishes to know the main points in which the text and interpretation here put forward differ from those of Munro, should consult the critical notes and the references given in the Index under the headings, 'Giussani,' 'Heinze,' 'Lachmann,' 'Munro.'

Of the two last it is needless to speak: their reputation is fixed, and their editions are classics. The edition of Richard Heinze (Leipzig, 1897) is a careful and learned study of this book, in which much is done to elucidate and illustrate the philosophy, and several passages of importance are for the first time rightly explained. The edition of Lucretius by Carlo Giussani (Turin, 1896—1898), together with his 'Note Lucreziane' published shortly

before his death in 1900, deserves even higher praise. Of all the scholars who have devoted themselves to Lucretius, none has excelled Giussani in acuteness of intellect and independence of judgment; and it is certain that his influence will long be felt in this department of study.

To all these scholars, and especially to Munro and Giussani, I am deeply indebted, and that not only on passages where their names are cited. The points on which original views are put forward are few and unimportant.

I have again to thank Mr W. T. Lendrum of Gonville and Caius College for much valuable assistance, given both in revision of the proof-sheets and in previous discussion of difficult passages in a writer whom we both revere as one of the choice and master spirits of antiquity.

J. D. D.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
December, 1902.

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INTRODUCTION.

I. DE RERUM NATURA: ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ.

He past
To turn and ponder those three hundred scrolls
Left by the Teacher, whom he held divine.
TENNYSON: *Lucretius.*

AT the beginning of the whole poem Lucretius explains that he has three main subjects to treat of: these are the Atomic Theory, the Cosmology, and the Psychology, of the Epicurean system. He gives us to understand that of these three the last is the most important[1]. These three subjects cover the ground of the Physics, or, as we should say, Natural Science, of Epicurus.

The Epicurean system of philosophy, like that of the Stoics, may be divided into three parts, Logic, Physics, and Ethics. But Logic or, as Epicurus preferred to call it, Canonic[2], plays a very subordinate part in the system. Its chief business is to lay down the general principles on which we are entitled to assert anything as true. As Lucretius often refers to these principles, they may be stated here: (1) the senses are the ultimate court of appeal, and sensation is the only guarantee of reality[3]; (2) in reasoning

[1] i 127–131.
[2] *τὸ κανονικόν*, from *κανών* the rule, or criterion, of truth.
[3] Lucr. i 423 foll.; 699 foll.; iv 379–521.

about things which our senses cannot perceive (atoms, for example), we must proceed by inference from the things which we can perceive[1]. A third rule is included in Canonic: this is, that words must not be used metaphorically but in their primary sense[2]. Such is the rudimentary form in which Epicurus admitted Logic as a part of philosophy.

Of the other two parts of the system, Ethics was to Epicurus of paramount importance, and Physics was studied only for the sake of Ethics. The former is a theory of the universe and of man, explaining his place therein, his constitution, and natural powers. This knowledge must be combined with the practical or ethical part of the system, because men are by nature, to use the striking figure of Lucretius[3], like children frightened in the dark: as the sunlight banishes their terrors, so a scientific knowledge of the laws of nature sets us free from the two chief scourges of life, fear of the gods, and fear of hell, and renders a theory of conduct possible. The Physics of Epicurus serves only as a basis of Ethics.

Now, it was this Physics, or Natural Science, which Lucretius sets forth in his poem, *De Rerum Natura*: of Ethics or Canonic he only treats incidentally, though, from the nature of the subject, it happens that in the third book there is a good deal of ethical discussion. His first two books deal with the Atomic Theory, his last two with Cosmology: in the middle he places the Epicurean explanation of the mind and soul of man, adding in the fourth book an account of the way in which sight and the other senses are supposed to operate. In this central part of the poem, the nucleus of the whole work, he seeks to exorcise the fear of death and, still more, the fear of everlasting punishment after death.

[1] Lucr. i 424, 750 foll.

[2] See n. to l. 133.

[3] See n. to l. 87.

II. DIVISIONS OF THE THIRD BOOK.

The third book begins, like the other books, with some prefatory matter. First comes an address to Epicurus (ll. 1—30), and then a statement of the subject, which is followed by an ethical digression (ll. 31—93) before the subject itself is begun.

The rest of the book falls into three main divisions: first, an account of the nature and composition of the soul (ll. 94—416); secondly a long series of arguments to prove that the soul is mortal (ll. 417—829); and thirdly, a kind of sermon in which Lucretius argues that man's fear of death is unreasonable (ll. 830—1094).

A.

Nature and Composition of the Soul.

This is perhaps the most difficult part of the book. Let us begin by stating in order the chief propositions which Lucretius lays down and endeavours to prove.

(i) The soul is an actual part of a man, and not a mere relation between the parts of his body (ll. 94—135).

(ii) The soul has two parts, the *animus* and the *anima*, the mind and soul[1]: the former is superior and is localised in the breast, the latter diffused through the whole body. But the two combine to form a single substance (ll. 136—160).

(iii) The soul is material, i.e. formed of atoms, which are very small, smooth, and round (ll. 161—230).

(iv) The soul is a compound substance: there are in it atoms of wind, atoms of heat, atoms of air, and atoms of a fourth nameless substance in which all sensation begins (ll. 231–257).

(v) These four substances are inextricably mixed up together so as to form a single substance. Yet one of them may

[1] There is here a difficulty of terminology. In Greek ψυχή is divided into τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον: but Lucretius has to divide *anima* (the whole soul) into *animus* and *anima*. To avoid confusion I have often retained the Latin names to denote the divisions of the soul.

preponderate occasionally, or normally, which accounts for different states of mind and different temperaments (ll. 258—322).

(vi) The soul is most closely related to the body: in fact, neither can exist without the other (ll. 323—349).

(vii) The bodily organs have sensation in themselves: e.g. the eyes themselves see and are not merely windows through which the soul looks forth (ll. 350—369).

(viii) The atoms of soul are fewer than the atoms of body; hence atoms of the body may be touched without atoms of the soul perceiving it (ll. 370—395).

(ix) The *animus* is of more importance to life than the *anima*: a good deal of the latter may be lost without death following, but the least injury to the *animus* is fatal (ll. 396—416).

In the doctrine thus laid down, there are two points which are difficult and obscure: first, the division of the soul into two parts; secondly, the operation of the fourth nameless substance. It will be most convenient to consider these two points together.

Animus and Anima: Quarta Natura.

In his extant account of the soul[1], which is only a brief summary, Epicurus says nothing either of this division, or of the nameless substance: he treats the soul as one and undivided, and discusses chiefly its relation to the body, a subject to which Lucretius devotes only three propositions out of nine. Further, Lucretius himself tells us at l. 421 that he will ignore the distinction in future and treat *animus* and *anima* as synonyms; and in the very paragraph in which he first distinguishes the two, he insists that they together form a single substance. Yet it is clear from Lucretius himself and from other sources[2], that

[1] This comes in his letter to Herodotus, a summary account of his Physics, one of the three letters preserved by Diogenes Laertius: see Diog. Laert. x 63–73, Usener *Epicurea* p. 19 foll. (I have generally quoted Epicurean texts from Usener's book.)

[2] Especially a Scholium on Diog. Laert. x 67 (Usener *l. l.* p. 21) which quotes Epicurus himself: *καὶ τόδε λέγει ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων*

Epicurus did distinguish two parts of the soul, a rational part localised in the breast, and an irrational part diffused throughout the body; these correspond to the *animus* and *anima* of Lucretius.

Epicurus found this distinction in the systems of Plato and Aristotle, in both of which the soul consists of a higher or rational principle and a lower or vital principle; and this distinction he maintained, though it seems to serve little purpose in his system. It is clear that he based the distinction, like every other point of his philosophy, upon facts of experience. The heart beats fast in fear or joy; therefore the *animus*, which is the seat of the passions, is in or near the heart[1]. Again, a severed limb may be seen to quiver for a time upon the ground; therefore the *anima* or life is diffused throughout the body[2]. Yet the emphatic statements of Lucretius[3] show that Epicurus insisted upon some sort of identity between the two parts.

In what then does the difference consist? We notice first that all intellectual operations are confined to the *animus*: it is the seat of the reason, of the passions, and of the will. In sensation, on the other hand, the *anima* plays the important part. Suppose I burn my finger, Epicurus would explain the process of sensation as follows. The external heat may touch a large number of atoms of body without producing sensation, which these cannot initiate[4]; but, if severe enough to be felt at all, it touches also atoms of the *anima* which are present in the finger as in every part and particle of the body. These atoms are, as we have seen (in proposition iv), of four kinds. The first to feel are atoms of the fourth nameless substance; their motions produce, or rather are, the sensation, which is

αὐτὴν (i.e. *τὴν ψυχὴν*) *συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων,...κα τὸ μέν τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐι τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς.*

[1] See preceding n., and Lucr. iii 141, 142. [2] Lucr. iii 644–656.

[3] *ibid.* 137, 159, 424. It is noticeable that Lucr. never speaks of these divisions as *partes* of the soul.

[4] *Cf. ibid.* 391–393.

then transmitted, in this order, to the atoms of heat, wind, and air, and finally to the atoms of the body[1]. Unless the burn is exceptionally severe, the sensation is confined to the finger; but the *animus* in its central position, because of its close connexion with the *anima*, is aware of the burn.

It has been stated above that there are atoms of the fourth nameless substance in the *anima*. This view has not been held generally[2]: Munro, for instance (Notes II p. 194), supposes sensation to begin with the *animus*, and apparently denies the presence of the fourth substance in the *anima* at all. Others have identified the fourth substance with the *animus*, while supposing the *anima* to be composed of the other three. But neither of these views can be made good, unless we suppose that Lucretius was grossly ignorant on a point of primary importance[3]. For he expressly states: (1) that the *animus* and *anima* form a single thing (*natura*)[4]; (2) that no local separation of the four elements of soul is possible[5]; (3) that every sensation begins with the fourth nameless element[6]; (and this must be taken in connexion with the dogma of Epicurus stated above, that sensation takes place in the part affected, and not in the *animus*[7]).

We must assume, then, that the *animus* and *anima* are identical in substance, and differ only in function. This difference may be illustrated by comparing the whole soul to a swarm of bees. The swarm consists of a nucleus where the bees are closely packed together, and of outlying parts where the congregation is not so dense; yet all parts consist of bees and nothing but bees. So the *animus* is the nucleus of the soul-atoms,

[1] Lucr. iii 246–251.

[2] Both Giussani and Heinze state it independently. I doubt if anyone will gainsay it in future.

[3] It is out of the question to suppose that Lucr. purposely diverged from the teaching of Epicurus.

[4] See n. to l. 160. [5] iii 264. [6] *ibid.* 245, 272.

[7] [illegible] καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὸ [illegible] [illegible]ch quoted by Usener l. l. p. 220).

which are assembled in greater numbers in the breast; and the *anima*, diffused through the whole body, consists of atoms exactly like the others but less closely compressed. The greater condensation of atoms at the nucleus gives rise to a greater complexity and variety of atomic motions; and from these are derived passion, will, thought, and consciousness itself[1].

B.

Proofs of the soul's mortality.

The simple senses crown'd his head:
'Omega! thou art lord,' they said:
'We find no motion in the dead.'
TENNYSON: *The Two Voices.*

In the second division of the book Munro counts twenty-eight arguments against the immortality of the soul. As the arguments are generally not isolated but arranged in groups containing several similar arguments, it is sometimes difficult to decide where one proof ends and another begins. But I believe that no argument of importance is omitted in the following summary.

(i) The atoms of which the soul is formed are very small and therefore lack cohesion. Consequently, when the body is destroyed by death, the soul is at once dissolved into its atoms and dies too (ll. 425—444).

(ii) The rational soul (*animus*) keeps pace with the body at every stage of development: it is therefore natural to suppose that it dies with the body (ll. 445—448).

(iii) The soul, like the body, has diseases of its own, and also is affected by diseases of the body. Even within the body the soul is liable to violent assaults, which would be still more formidable, when it had lost the shelter of the body. The fact

[1] It is remarkable that neither Epicurus nor Lucretius gives any account of the intellectual operations of the soul. If they did, it would be possible to speak more positively.

that the rational soul (*animus*) can be cured of mental disease, is itself a proof of mortality (ll. 459—525).

(iv) As the organs of sensation cannot exist apart from the body, the rational soul (*animus*), which is practically an organ of sensation, cannot do so either (ll. 548—557).

(v) As the functions of the soul depend entirely upon its union with the body, they must cease when this union is dissolved (ll. 558—594).

(vi) As the departure of the soul is followed by the utter collapse of the body, we must suppose that the soul was rent in pieces even before it left the body (ll. 595—614).

(vii) It is a law of nature that every organism must exist in its own environment: therefore the rational soul (*animus*) can exist nowhere except in the body and in a fixed part of it (ll. 615—623).

(viii) If the soul is to exist and have sensation apart from the body, it must have the organs of sensation also; but eyes and ears cannot exist apart from a body (ll. 624—633).

(ix) If a living body is suddenly cut in two, the soul also is divided; but that which is cut into parts, cannot be immortal (ll. 634—669).

(x) In a case of natural death we often see the same thing, that the bodily parts die one by one, as the soul within them dies. Thus the soul is divided and cannot be immortal (ll. 526—547[1]).

(xi) The soul cannot have existed before the body, or it would remember its past existence (ll. 670—678).

(xii) The close connexion between soul and body, which we see in sensation, would never be established if the body were formed first and the soul then introduced. Therefore the soul did not exist before the body (ll. 679—712).

(xiii) The living creatures that swarm in a decaying body, prove that particles of the soul remain behind after death. But if the soul that went forth, went forth diminished, it cannot be immortal (ll. 713—740).

[1] of this argument, see n. to l. 526.

(xiv) If the soul passed for ever from one body to another, the soul of a sheep might be found in a lion, but this is contrary to experience. The different kinds of animals have permanent characteristics: this proves that the soul, as well as the body, is transmitted by the parents. But, if so, the soul was born, and must therefore die (ll. 741—775).

(xv) It is absurd to suppose that there is a fierce competition between souls for the shelter of each new-born body (ll. 776—783).

(xvi) A law of nature requires all things to grow in their proper environment: the soul requires the environment of the body, and cannot be supposed to be produced or exist outside the body (ll. 784—805).

(xvii) Four things only are immortal, atoms, void, the universe, and the gods[1]. But the soul is not like any of these, and is therefore mortal (ll. 806—829).

With regard to these arguments, it should be noted, first, that there is a marked division before l. 670. The first ten arguments are intended to prove that the soul cannot survive the death of the body: the five which follow deny the pre-existence of the soul. The ancient thinkers who maintained the immortality of the soul, generally understood by this doctrine, not only that the soul would never die but also that it had always existed. Lucretius seeks to disprove both parts of the theory[2]. There is a second division after l. 783, the two final arguments being of a more general character.

Secondly, it cannot be denied that there is a certain amount of confusion and repetition. Indeed one argument (x) is so entirely out of place where it stands, that I have followed Giussani in transposing it, not thinking it possible that Lucretius can have placed it where we find it in the MSS. But, further, notice how argument (vi) is separated by two irrelevant paragraphs from argument (ix), to which it is closely related. Again (vii) has a strong resemblance to (xvi): indeed the argument

[1] This is *Giussani's* explanation of this passage: see n. to l. 819.

[2] *See also n. to l. 417.*

is the same but is applied in the latter place to the *anima* as well as to the *animus*.

Heinze is of opinion (p. 44) that repetition of this kind, as serving to make the argument more imposing and impressive, was the deliberate intention of Lucretius; he also holds that the avoidance of a strictly logical order is here an effective artifice of composition. I am more inclined to believe that, if Lucretius had lived to finish and revise his poem; we should not now find all these arguments in their present shape and order. And the same applies to the other parts of the book.

C.

Lucretius as a Preacher.

'No voice like his has ever proclaimed the nothingness of "momentary man," no prophet so convincing has ever thundered in our ears the appalling Gospel of Death. Few minds, perhaps, that were not stiffly cased in foregone conclusions have ever met the storm of his passionate eloquence without bending before the blast, without doubting for an hour of their inmost instincts, and half believing that "as we felt no woe in times long gone when from all the earth to battle the Carthaginians came," so now it may be man's best and only hope to quench in annihilation his unsated longings and his deep despair.'

MYERS: *Classical Essays*, p. 167.

The third and last section was described (p. xi) as a kind of sermon. It is in fact what the Romans called a *consolatio*, such as it was the recognised business of philosophy to provide in time of trouble. Some works of this kind by professed philosophers are still extant: there is, for example, the treatise addressed by Plutarch to Apollonius who had lost a son[1], and the *consolatio* of Seneca, addressed to Marcia, a daughter of the historian Cremutius Cordus, who had suffered the same bereavement. As a matter of course, such consolation was not in general administered in a book but by means of personal intercourse. When

[1] παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον (*Moralia* 1 p. 248 foll. Teubner).

Livia, the consort of Augustus, lost her son Drusus, she sought and found comfort in the reasonings of Areius, a philosopher who lived in the palace in the closest intimacy with Augustus[1]. Nor was it the bereaved only who had recourse to philosophers in their trouble. When Julius Kanus was condemned to death by Caligula, he was accompanied to the place of execution by 'his philosopher,' who questioned him as to the state of his mind[2]. Thus the philosopher played a part which in modern times has generally been filled by ministers of religion: it was his business to comfort the bereaved, to console the sorrowful, and to encourage the dying.

Of these three tasks Lucretius here undertakes the last: all men must die, and his purpose is to rob death of its sting and to enable his fellow-men to face the inevitable end without fear For this purpose scientific demonstration is not enough. He has already heaped proof upon proof to show that the soul does not survive death; but he has now to appeal to the heart as well as to the intellect. For some men, who profess to accept the scientific proof, do not really believe it[3]; and others, who do believe it, still repine at the 'stern doom of every mortal lot.' These are the two classes of men whom Lucretius has especially in mind.

It is a remarkable fact that this missionary of an optimistic creed has a considerable element of pessimism in himself. Epicurus took a cheerful view of life; but the tone of his disciple is not cheerful: where it is not sad, it is at least solemn.

[1] Seneca *ad Marciam* iv: *non dubito quin Iuliae Augustae, quam familiariter coluisti, magis tibi placeat exemplum.....illa in primo fervore, cum maxime inpatientes ferocesque sunt miseriae, consolatori se Areio, philosopho viri sui, praebuit, et multum eam rem profuisse sibi professa est.*

[2] Seneca *Dial.* ix 14, 9: *prosequebatur illum philosophus suus, nec iam procul erat tumulus, in quo Caesari deo nostro fiebat cotidianum sacrum* (i.e. the daily execution of his subjects). *is 'quid' inquit, 'Kane, nunc cogitas? aut quae tibi mens est?'*

[3] *Cf. 1. 876.*

Lucretius is no cynic: with many other great qualities he has a manly tenderness of heart; but he is never light-hearted. This may be due to temperament, to misadventures in life, to anxiety for the future of his country. But it can hardly be doubted that he was thus led to exaggerate immensely the effect produced on men in general by the terrors of death and the unseen world. There is little evidence, either in the literature or the sepulchral inscriptions of the Romans, to show that such forebodings had power to overshadow the whole of life and darken every pleasure[1]. Yet this is what Lucretius expressly says; and it is from this fear that he seeks to set men free.

It should be noticed that Lucretius was prevented by his philosophic creed from using two arguments which are generally prominent in appeals of this kind. Seneca was a Stoic[2], and Plutarch a Platonist; so that both of them can speak confidently of a future life of far greater happiness, awaiting the souls of the wise and good[3]. Again, they both insist upon the miseries of this mortal life, in the spirit of the Greek saying, that the shortest life is the best, and better still not to have been born at all[4]. But Epicurus not only denied the future existence of the soul, but also repudiated with horror the pessimistic view of life[5]. As was said above, in Lucretius himself there is a vein of pessimism: yet he nowhere says that life is in itself an evil, and dismisses in two lines[6] the thought which Juvenal expands

[1] See Sellar, *Roman Poets of the Republic*, p. 378.

[2] The Stoics held that the individual soul would survive until the destruction of the world: as the world's life was calculated at 6,570,000 years, Stoicism offered a fair imitation of immortality.

[3] Sen. *ad Marc.* xxv; Plut. *ad Apoll.* 120 B foll.

[4] Cf. Sen. *l. l.* xi *tota flebilis vita est*; xx *mors optimum inventum naturae*; Plutarch *l. l.* 115 B πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν οὐ νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι κέκλαυσται τἀνθρώπινα, τιμωρίαν ἡγουμένοις εἶναι τὸν βίον καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸ γενέσθαι ἀνθρωπον συμφορὰν τὴν μεγίστην.

[5] πολὺ δὲ χεῖρον καὶ ὁ λέγων καλὸν μὲν μὴ φῦναι, 'φύντα δ' ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἅιδαο περῆσαι' (Usener *l. l.* p. 61).

[6] *1085, 1086*: see n. there.

into a hundred, that by death we escape from calamities which might befal us in the future.

There is another argument which might seem natural in the mouth of an Epicurean—the argument of Horace,

Huc vina et unguenta et nimium breves
Flores amoenae ferre iube rosae,
Dum res et aetas et sororum
Fila trium patiuntur atra[1],

and of Omar,

'Ah, make the most of what remains to spend,
Before we too into the Dust descend,
Dust unto Dust, and under Dust to lie,
Sans Wine, sans Song, sans Singer, and—sans End.'

But Lucretius does not believe that the only serious business of life is sensual pleasure, and will not say, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' To his austere and noble nature this argument made no appeal, and he only mentions it to dismiss it with contempt[2].

What then does Lucretius say? He can promise no heaven hereafter; but he tells men that if they have nothing to hope, they have also nothing to fear, beyond the grave.

It cannot be doubted that in the life-time of Lucretius the great majority of his countrymen believed in some form of future existence[3]. Nor was this belief confined to the simple and ignorant. Cicero, for example, though, like Seneca and Juvenal in a later age, he ridicules the terrors of the Greek mythology[4], is firmly convinced of the soul's immortality. But

[1] *Carm.* ii 3, 13.

[2] ll. 912—919.

[3] A mass of evidence is given in Friedländer's *Sittengeschichte* (1871) iii p. 615 foll.

[4] Cf. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i 48 *quae est anus tam delira quae timeat ista, quae vos videlicet, si physica non didicissetis, timeretis, 'Acherusia templa alta Orci'?*; Sen. *ad Marc.* xix 4 *cogita illa, quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulam esse*; Juv. 2, 149 *Esse aliquos Manes et subterranea regna...Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum aere lavantur.*

Lucretius uses all his powers to destroy this belief, which in his view has no foundation and is productive only of unhappiness. His own gospel he does not regard as a message of despair: on the contrary, he believes that it will bring peace into the world, and that it alone can cure that strange disease of the mind, which prevents even health and wealth from making life happy[1]. He is conscious, however, that he is fighting against something deeply rooted in human nature: that even those who do not believe in the punishments of hell, cannot tear out of their hearts the instinct which makes us cling to life. In order to convince such doubters, he brings Nature herself upon the scene and makes her remonstrate with her disobedient children[2]. Then he speaks of kings and captains, poets and philosophers, none of whom escaped death, and asks what pretensions has a mere ordinary man to be more highly favoured than the choicest specimens of our race[3]. Put shortly, his message is this: it is a fact, scientifically proved, that existence depends upon the union of body and soul, and ceases when they are separated: once believe this sincerely, and you will be indifferent to the fate of your dead body; you will cease to regard death as a state of pain or privation; you will not sorrow over-much for the dead; you will be content yourself to die and make room for a new generation; and you will be able to concentrate your thoughts on this life, and live it well. Seeley has characterised Natural Religion as follows: 'As described here religion does not brood over a future life, but is intensely occupied with the present; it does not surmise something behind nature, but contemplates nature itself; it does not worship a Power which suspends natural laws, but the Power which is exhibited in these laws; it does not damp enjoyment, but is itself the principle of all rich enjoyment; it is not self-conscious or self-absorbed and does not make us anxious about our own fate, but is the principle which destroys self and gives us strength to rise above our anxieties.' Every word of this description Lucretius would have declared to be true of his own creed.

[1] *ll. 1060 foll.* [2] ll. 931 foll. [3] ll. 1024 foll.

There is another Roman writer whose treatment of this question may be quoted here, as it bears a strong resemblance to the view of Lucretius. When Pliny published his Natural History, Lucretius had been dead for nearly a century and a half[1]. It is probable that Pliny was not a professed Epicurean: he was more interested in the acquisition of facts than in philosophic theories: but in this matter he states the Epicurean view. The subject of his seventh book is Anthropology: he deals with man from his birth to his burial, and then disposes thus of his claim to immortality:

'After their last day on earth, all men are exactly as they were before their first: neither body nor soul has any more power of sensation after death than before birth. But proud man extends his date to the future too, and invents a life for the very time when he shall be dead. Some suppose the soul to be immortal, others that it changes its habitation; others believe in conscious inhabitants of a world below, and worship the spirits of the dead, making a god of him who has ceased even to be a man! Nay: man draws the breath of life exactly as all other animals do; and you may find many creatures that live longer upon earth; yet no one prophesies a like immortality for them. Further, what substance or matter has the soul, apart from the body? how does it think? how has it sight, or hearing, or power of touch? But without these things there is no use or advantage in it. Again, where do the souls abide? and what multitudes of shadow-like souls there must be, after so many ages! All this is the invention of childish folly, of mortal creatures eager to live for ever.... How insane is this desire that death should make life begin anew! Once born, we should never rest, if the soul retains consciousness on high, and shades exist in the world below. Death is nature's best boon to man; but this fond and foolish belief robs us utterly of its value, and doubles the pain of facing death, because we must take into

[1] The Natural History appeared 77 A.D. and was dedicated to Vespasian's elder son and successor, Titus.

account the future too. Granted that to live is sweet—to have lived can be sweet to none. How much simpler and safer, to trust our own experience, and believe that, as we were at rest before our birth, so we shall be at rest after our death[1].'

But the instincts of humanity are, in this matter, opposed to Lucretius and Pliny: men will not buy immunity from their fears by the sacrifice of all their hopes.

[1] Pliny *Nat. Hist.* vii 188–190.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CRITICAL NOTES.

MSS. denotes the reading of the Leyden MSS., the A and B of Munro;

L denotes the reading of Lachmann's edition (1850),

M the reading of Munro's fourth edition (1886).

N.B. The purpose of these notes is not to supply an *apparatus criticus* but to indicate deviations, except of spelling and punctuation, from Munro's text.

T. LUCRETI CARI

DE RERUM NATURA

LIBER TERTIUS.

E tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
Qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae,
Te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
Ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis,
Non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem 5
Quod te imitari aveo; quid enim contendat hirundo
Cycnis, aut quidnam tremulis facere artubus haedi
Consimile in cursu possint et fortis equi vis?
Tu, pater, es rerum inventor, tu patria nobis
Suppeditas praecepta, tuisque ex, inclute, chartis, 10
Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant,
Omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta,
Aurea, perpetua semper dignissima vita.
Nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari
Naturam rerum, divina mente coorta, 15
Diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi
Discedunt, totum video per inane geri res.
Apparet divum numen sedesque quietae,
Quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis

Aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina
Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilus aether
Integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet.
Omnia suppeditat porro natura, neque ulla
Res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo.
At contra nusquam apparent Acherusia templa,
Nec tellus obstat quin omnia dispiciantur,
Sub pedibus quaecumque infra per inane geruntur.
His ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas
Percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi
Tam manifesta patens ex omni parte retecta est.
  Et quoniam docui, cunctarum exordia rerum
Qualia sint, et quam variis distantia formis
Sponte sua volitent aeterno percita motu,
Quove modo possint res ex his quaeque creari,
Hasce secundum res animi natura videtur
Atque animae claranda meis iam versibus esse,
Et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus,
Funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo
Omnia suffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam
Esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.
Nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timenc
Infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara Leti,
Et se scire animae naturam sanguinis esse
Aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas,
Nec prorsum quicquam nostrae rationis egere,
Hinc licet advertas animum magis omnia laudis
Iactari causa quam quod res ipsa probetur.
Extorres idem patria longeque fugati
Conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi,
Omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique, vivunt,
Et quocumque tamen miseri venere parentant

22 ridet *MSS.*: rident *LM*

Et nigras mactant pecudes et manibu' divis
Inferias mittunt, multoque in rebus acerbis
Acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.
Quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 55
Convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit;
Nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Eliciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet res.
Denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido,
Quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines 60
Iuris, et interdum socios scelerum atque ministros
Noctes atque dies niti praestante labore
Ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae
Non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur.
Turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas 65
Semota ab dulci vita stabilique videntur
Et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante;
Unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti
Effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse,
Sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque 70
Conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes;
Crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris
Et consanguineum mensas odere timentque.
Consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore
Macerat invidia. Ante oculos illum esse potentem, 75
Illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore,
Ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur.
Intereunt partim statuarum et nominis ergo.
Et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae
Percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae, 80
Ut sibi consciscant maerenti pectore letum,

58 Eliciuntur *MSS.*: Eiciuntur *M* *After* 82 *M supposes a verse to be lost, such as* Qui miseros homines cogens scelus omne *patrare*

Obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem.
Hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai
Rumpere et in summa pietatem evertere suadet.
Nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis
Prodiderunt, vitare Acherusia templa petentes.
Nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
In tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
Interdum, nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam
Quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura.
Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
Non radii solis neque lucida tela diei
Discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

Primum animum dico, mentem quam saepe vocamı
In quo consilium vitae regimenque locatum est,
Esse hominis partem nilo minus ac manus et pes
Atque oculi partes animantis totius extant.

. . . . . .

Sensum animi certa non esse in parte locatum,
Verum habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse,
Harmoniam Grai quam dicunt, quod faciat nos
Vivere cum sensu, nulla cum in parte siet mens.
Ut bona saepe valetudo cum dicitur esse
Corporis, et non est tamen haec pars ulla valentis,
Sic animi sensum non certa parte reponunt;
Magno opere in quo mi diversi errare videntur.
Saepe itaque, in promptu corpus quod cernitur, aegre
Cum tamen ex alia laetamur parte latenti;
Et retro fit uti contra sit saepe vicissim,
Cum miser ex animo laetatur corpore toto;
Non alio pacto quam si, pes cum dolet aegri,
In nullo caput interea sit forte dolore.

After 97 a verse is lost, such as Quamquam magna quidem saı *tum turba putarunt*

Praeterea molli cum somno dedita membra
Effusumque iacet sine sensu corpus onustum,
Est aliud tamen in nobis, quod tempore in illo
Multimodis agitatur et omnis accipit in se 115
Laetitiae motus et curas cordis inanis.
Nunc animam quoque ut in membris cognoscere possis
Esse, neque harmonia corpus sentire solere,
Principio fit uti detracto corpore multo
Saepe tamen nobis in membris vita moretur; 120
Atque eadem rursum, cum corpora pauca caloris
Diffugere forasque per os est editus aer,
Deserit extemplo venas atque ossa relinquit;
Noscere ut hinc possis non aequas omnia partis
Corpora habere neque ex aequo fulcire salutem, 125
Sed magis haec, venti quae sunt calidique vaporis
Semina, curare in membris ut vita moretur.
Est igitur calor ac ventus vitalis in ipso
Corpore, qui nobis moribundos deserit artus.
Quapropter quoniam est animi natura reperta 130
Atque animae quasi pars hominis, redde harmoniai
Nomen, ad organicos alto delatum Heliconi;
Sive aliunde ipsi porro traxere et in illam
Transtulerunt, proprio quae tum res nomine egebat.
Quidquid id est, habeant: tu cetera percipe dicta. 135
Nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri
Inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se,
Sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto
Consilium, quod nos animum mentemque vocamus.
Idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. 140
Hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum
Laetitiae mulcent; hic ergo mens animusquest.
Cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus
Paret, et ad numen mentis momenque movetur.

Idque sibi solum per se sapit, id sibi gaudet, 145
Cum neque res animam neque corpus commovet una;
Et quasi, cum caput aut oculus temptante dolore
Laeditur in nobis, non omni concruciamur
Corpore, sic animus nonnumquam laeditur ipse
Laetitiaque viget, cum cetera pars animai 150
Per membra atque artus nulla novitate cietur:
Verum ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens,
Consentire animam totam per membra videmus,
Sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto
Corpore, et infringi linguam vocemque aboriri, 155
Caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus,
Denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus
Saepe homines; facile ut quivis hinc noscere possit
Esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi vi
Percussast, exim corpus propellit et icit. 160
Haec eadem ratio naturam animi atque animai
Corpoream docet esse. ubi enim propellere membra,
Corripere ex somno corpus mutareque vultum
Atque hominem totum regere ac versare videtur,
Quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus 165
Nec tactum porro sine corpore, nonne fatendumst
Corporea natura animum constare animamque?
Praeterea pariter fungi cum corpore et una
Consentire animum nobis in corpore cernis.
Si minus offendit vitam vis horrida teli 170
Ossibus ac nervis disclusis intus adacta,
At tamen insequitur languor terraeque petitus
Suavis, et in terra mentis qui gignitur aestus,
Interdumque quasi exsurgendi incerta voluntas.
Ergo corpoream naturam animi esse necessest, 175
Corporeis quoniam telis ictuque laborat.

173 **Suavis** ***MSS.*** **:** **Segnis** ***M*** **:** **Suppus** L

Is tibi nunc animus quali sit corpore et unde
Constiterit, pergam rationem reddere dictis.
Principio esse aio persuptilem atque minutis
Perquam corporibus factum constare. Id ita esse 180
Hinc licet advertas animum, ut pernoscere possis.
Nil adeo fieri celeri ratione videtur,
Quam sibi mens fieri proponit et inchoat ipsa.
Ocius ergo animus quam res se perciet ulla,
Ante oculos quorum in promptu natura videtur. 185
At quod mobile tanto operest, constare rotundis
Perquam seminibus debet perquamque minutis,
Momine uti parvo possint inpulsa moveri.
Namque movetur aqua et tantillo momine flutat,
Quippe volubilibus parvisque creata figuris. 190
At contra mellis constantior est natura
Et pigri latices magis et cunctantior actus;
Haeret enim inter se magis omnis materiai
Copia, nimirum quia non tam levibus extat
Corporibus neque tam suptilibus atque rotundis. 195
Namque, papaveris, aura potest suspensa levisque
Cogere ut ab summo tibi diffluat altus acervus.
At contra lapidum conlectum spicarumque
Noenu potest. Igitur parvissima corpora proquam
Et levissima sunt, ita mobilitate fruuntur. 200
At contra quaecumque magis cum pondere magno
Asperaque inveniuntur, eo stabilita magis sunt.
Nunc igitur quoniam est animi natura reperta
Mobilis egregie, perquam constare necessest
Corporibus parvis et levibus atque rotundis. 205
Quae tibi cognita res in multis, o bone, rebus
Utilis invenietur et opportuna cluebit.
Haec quoque res etiam naturam dedicat eius,

198 *spicarumque MSS.*: ipse Eurui movere M

Quam tenui constet textura, quamque loco se
Contineat parvo, si possit conglomerari, 210
Quod simul atque hominem leti secura quies est
Indepta, atque animi natura animaeque recessit,
Nil ibi libatum de toto corpore cernas
Ad speciem, nil ad pondus: mors omnia praestat
Vitalem praeter sensum calidumque vaporem. 215
Ergo animam totam perparvis esse necessest
Seminibus, nexam per venas, viscera, nervos;
Quatenus, omnis ubi e toto iam corpore cessit,
Extima membrorum circumcaesura tamen se
Incolumem praestat, nec defit ponderis hilum. 220
Quod genus est, Bacchi cum flos evanuit, aut cum
Spiritus unguenti suavis diffugit in auras,
Aut aliquo cum iam sucus de corpore cessit;
Nil oculis tamen esse minor res ipsa videtur
Propterea, neque detractum de pondere quicquam, 225
Nimirum quia multa minutaque semina sucos
Efficiunt et odorem in toto corpore rerum.
Quare etiam atque etiam mentis naturam animaeque
Scire licet perquam pauxillis esse creatam
Seminibus, quoniam fugiens nil ponderis aufert. 230
Nec tamen haec simplex nobis natura putanda est.
Tenvis enim quaedam moribundos deserit aura
Mixta vapore, vapor porro trahit aera secum.
Nec calor est quisquam, cui non sit mixtus et aer.
Rara quod eius enim constat natura, necessest 235
Aeris inter eum primordia multa moveri.
Iam triplex animi est igitur natura reperta;
Nec tamen haec sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum,
Nil horum quoniam recipit mens posse creare

239 mens *MSS.*: res *M*

Sensiferos motus, nedum quae mente volutat. 240
Quarta quoque his igitur quaedam natura necessest
Adtribuatur. East omnino nominis expers;
Qua neque mobilius quicquam neque tenvius exstat,
Nec magis e parvis et levibus est elementis;
Sensiferos motus quae didit prima per artus. 245
Prima cietur enim, parvis perfecta figuris;
Inde calor motus et venti caeca potestas
Accipit, inde aer; inde omnia mobilitantur,
Concutitur sanguis, tum viscera persentiscunt
Omnia, postremis datur ossibus atque medullis 250
Sive voluptas est sive est contrarius ardor.
Nec temere huc dolor usque potest penetrare neque acre
Permanare malum, quin omnia perturbentur
Usque adeo ut vitae desit locus atque animai
Diffugiant partes per caulas corporis omnis. 255
Sed plerumque fit in summo quasi corpore finis
Motibus: hanc ob rem vitam retinere valemus.
Nunc ea quo pacto inter sese mixta quibusque
Compta modis vigeant, rationem reddere aventem
Abstrahit invitum patrii sermonis egestas; 260
Sed tamen, ut potero summatim attingere, tangam.
Inter enim cursant primordia principiorum
Motibus inter se, nil ut secernier unum
Possit nec spatio fieri divisa potestas,
Sed quasi multae vis unius corporis extant. 265
Quod genus in quovis animantum viscere volgo
Est odor et quidam color et sapor, et tamen ex his
Omnibus est unum perfectum corporis augmen,
Sic calor atque aer et venti caeca potestas
Mixta creant unam naturam et mobilis illa 270

240 *nedum Polle:* quaedam *MSS.*; et homo M

Vis, initum motus ab se quae dividit ollis,
Sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus.
Nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque,
Nec magis hac infra quicquam est in corpore nostro,
Atque anima est animae proporro totius ipsa. 275
Quod genus in nostris membris et corpore toto
Mixta latens animi vis est animaeque potestas,
Corporibus quia de parvis paucisque creatast,
Sic tibi nominis haec expers vis facta minutis
Corporibus latet, atque animae quasi totius ipsa 280
Proporrost anima et dominatur corpore toto.
Consimili ratione necessest ventus et aer
Et calor inter se vigeant commixta per artus,
Atque aliis aliud subsit magis emineatque,
Ut quiddam fieri videatur ab omnibus unum, 285
Ni calor ac ventus seorsum seorsumque potestas
Aeris interemant sensum diductaque solvant.
Est etiam calor ille animo, quem sumit, in ira
Cum fervescit, et ex oculis micat acribus ardor.
Est et frigida multa, comes formidinis, aura, 290
Quae ciet horrorem membris et concitat artus.
Est etiam quoque pacati status aeris ille,
Pectore tranquillo qui fit voltuque sereno.
Sed calidi plus est illis, quibus acria corda
Iracundaque mens facile effervescit in ira. 295
Quo genere in primis vis est violenta leonum,
Pectora qui fremitu rumpunt plerumque gementes,
Nec capere irarum fluctus in pectore possunt.
At ventosa magis cervorum frigida mens est
Et gelidas citius per viscera concitat auras, 300
Quae tremulum faciunt membris existere motum.

288 etiam *MSS.*: etenim *M*
293 qui fit *L*: fit qui *MSS.*, *M*

At natura boum placido magis aere vivit,
Nec nimis irai fax umquam subdita percit
Fumida, suffundens caecae caliginis umbra,
Nec gelidis torpet telis perfixa pavoris: 305
Inter utrosque sitast, cervos saevosque leones.
Sic hominum genus est. Quamvis doctrina politos
Constituat pariter quosdam, tamen illa relinquit
Naturae cuiusque animi vestigia prima.
Nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst, 310
Quin proclivius hic iras decurrat ad acris,
Ille metu citius paulo temptetur, at ille
Tertius accipiat quaedam clementius aequo.
Inque aliis rebus multis differre necessest
Naturas hominum varias moresque sequacis; 315
Quorum ego nunc nequeo caecas exponere causas,
Nec reperire figurarum tot nomina quot sunt
Principiis, unde haec oritur variantia rerum.
Illud in his rebus videor firmare potesse,
Usque adeo naturarum vestigia linqui 320
Parvula, quae nequeat ratio depellere nobis,
Ut nil inpediat dignam dis degere vitam.
Haec igitur natura tenetur corpore ab omni,
Ipsaque corporis est custos et causa salutis;
Nam communibus inter se radicibus haerent, 325
Nec sine pernicie divelli posse videntur.
Quod genus e thuris glaebis evellere odorem
Haud facile est quin intereat natura quoque eius,
Sic animi atque animae naturam corpore toto
Extrahere haud facile est quin omnia dissoluantur. 330
Inplexis ita principiis ab origine prima
Inter se fiunt, consorti praedita vita,
Nec sibi quaeque sine alterius vi posse videtur
Corporis atque animi seorsum sentire potestas,

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Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilus aether
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Effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse,
Sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque 70
Conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes;
Crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris
Et consanguineum mensas odere timentque.
Consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore
Macerat invidia. Ante oculos illum esse potentem, 75
Illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore,
Ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur.
Intereunt partim statuarum et nominis ergo.
Et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae
Percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae, 80
Ut sibi consciscant maerenti pectore letum,

58 Eliciuntur *MSS.*: Eiciuntur *M* *After* 82 *M supposes a verse to be lost, such as* Qui miseros homines cogens scelus omne patrare

Obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem.
Hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai
Rumpere et in summa pietatem evertere suadet.
Nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis 85
Prodiderunt, vitare Acherusia templa petentes.
Nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
In tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
Interdum, nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam
Quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura. 90
Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
Non radii solis neque lucida tela diei
Discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

Primum animum dico, mentem quam saepe vocamus,
In quo consilium vitae regimenque locatum est, 95
Esse hominis partem nilo minus ac manus et pes
Atque oculi partes animantis totius extant.

. . . . . .

Sensum animi certa non esse in parte locatum,
Verum habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse,
Harmoniam Grai quam dicunt, quod faciat nos 100
Vivere cum sensu, nulla cum in parte siet mens.
Ut bona saepe valetudo cum dicitur esse
Corporis, et non est tamen haec pars ulla valentis,
Sic animi sensum non certa parte reponunt;
Magno opere in quo mi diversi errare videntur. 105
Saepe itaque, in promptu corpus quod cernitur, aegret,
Cum tamen ex alia laetamur parte latenti;
Et retro fit uti contra sit saepe vicissim,
Cum miser ex animo laetatur corpore toto;
Non alio pacto quam si, pes cum dolet aegri, 110
In nullo caput interea sit forte dolore.

After 97 a verse is lost, such as Quamquam magna quidem sapientum turba putarunt

Praeterea molli cum somno dedita membra
Effusumque iacet sine sensu corpus onustum,
Est aliud tamen in nobis, quod tempore in illo
Multimodis agitatur et omnis accipit in se 115
Laetitiae motus et curas cordis inanis.
Nunc animam quoque ut in membris cognoscere possis
Esse, neque harmonia corpus sentire solere,
Principio fit uti detracto corpore multo
Saepe tamen nobis in membris vita moretur; 120
Atque eadem rursum, cum corpora pauca caloris
Diffugere forasque per os est editus aer,
Deserit extemplo venas atque ossa relinquit;
Noscere ut hinc possis non aequas omnia partis
Corpora habere neque ex aequo fulcire salutem, 125
Sed magis haec, venti quae sunt calidique vaporis
Semina, curare in membris ut vita moretur.
Est igitur calor ac ventus vitalis in ipso
Corpore, qui nobis moribundos deserit artus.
Quapropter quoniam est animi natura reperta 130
Atque animae quasi pars hominis, redde harmoniai
Nomen, ad organicos alto delatum Heliconi;
Sive aliunde ipsi porro traxere et in illam
Transtulerunt, proprio quae tum res nomine egebat.
Quidquid id est, habeant: tu cetera percipe dicta. 135
Nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri
Inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se,
Sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto
Consilium, quod nos animum mentemque vocamus.
Idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. 140
Hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum
Laetitiae mulcent; hic ergo mens animusquest.
Cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus
Paret, et ad numen mentis momenque movetur.

Idque sibi solum per se sapit, id sibi gaudet, 145
Cum neque res animam neque corpus commovet una;
Et quasi, cum caput aut oculus temptante dolore
Laeditur in nobis, non omni concruciamur
Corpore, sic animus nonnumquam laeditur ipse
Laetitiaque viget, cum cetera pars animai 150
Per membra atque artus nulla novitate cietur:
Verum ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens,
Consentire animam totam per membra videmus,
Sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto
Corpore, et infringi linguam vocemque aboriri, 155
Caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus,
Denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus
Saepe homines; facile ut quivis hinc noscere possit
Esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi vi
Percussast, exim corpus propellit et icit. 160
Haec eadem ratio naturam animi atque animai
Corpoream docet esse. ubi enim propellere membra,
Corripere ex somno corpus mutareque vultum
Atque hominem totum regere ac versare videtur,
Quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus 165
Nec tactum porro sine corpore, nonne fatendumst
Corporea natura animum constare animamque?
Praeterea pariter fungi cum corpore et una
Consentire animum nobis in corpore cernis.
Si minus offendit vitam vis horrida teli 170
Ossibus ac nervis disclusis intus adacta,
At tamen insequitur languor terraeque petitus
Suavis, et in terra mentis qui gignitur aestus,
Interdumque quasi exsurgendi incerta voluntas.
Ergo corpoream naturam animi esse necessest, 17
Corporeis quoniam telis ictuque laborat.

173 Suavis *MSS.*: Segnis *M*: Suppus L

Turbat, agens animam spumat, quasi in aequore salso
Ventorum validis fervescunt viribus undae.
Exprimitur porro gemitus, quia membra dolore 495
Adficiuntur, et omnino quod semina vocis
Eiciuntur et ore foras glomerata feruntur,
Qua quasi consuerunt et sunt munita viai.
Desipientia fit, quia vis animi atque animai
Conturbatur et, ut docui, divisa seorsum 500
Disiectatur eodem illo distracta veneno.
Inde ubi iam morbi reflexit causa, reditque
In latebras acer corrupti corporis umor,
Tum quasi vaccillans primum consurgit, et omnis
Paulatim redit in sensus animamque receptat. 505
Haec igitur tantis ubi morbis corpore in ipso
Iactentur miserisque modis distracta laborent,
Cur eadem credis sine corpore in aere aperto
Cum validis ventis aetatem degere posse?
Et quoniam mentem sanari, corpus ut aegrum, 510
Cernimus, et flecti medicina posse videmus,
Id quoque praesagit mortalem vivere mentem.
Addere enim partis aut ordine traicere aequumst
Aut aliquid prorsum de summa detrahere hilum,
Commutare animum quicumque adoritur et infit, 515
Aut aliam quamvis naturam flectere quaerit.
At neque transferri sibi partis nec tribui vult
Inmortale quod est quicquam neque defluere hilum.
Nam quodcumque suis mutatum finibus exit,
Continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante. 520
Ergo animus sive aegrescit, mortalia signa
Mittit, uti docui, seu flectitur a medicina.
Usque adeo falsae rationi vera videtur
Res occurrere et effugium praecludere eunti,

Ancipitique refutatu convincere falsum. 525
Et quoniam mens est hominis pars una, loco quae 548
Fixa manet certo, velut aures atque oculi sunt
Atque alii sensus, qui vitam cumque gubernant, 550
Et veluti manus atque oculus naresve seorsum
Secreta ab nobis nequeunt sentire neque esse,
Sed tamen in parvo liquuntur tempore tabe,
Sic animus per se non quit sine corpore et ipso
Esse homine, illius quasi quod vas esse videtur, 555
Sive aliud quid vis potius coniunctius ei
Fingere, quandoquidem conexu corpus adhaeret.
Denique corporis atque animi vivata potestas
Inter se coniuncta valent vitaque fruuntur;
Nec sine corpore enim vitalis edere motus 560
Sola potest animi per se natura, nec autem
Cassum anima corpus durare et sensibus uti.
Scilicet avolsus radicibus ut nequit ullam
Dispicere ipse oculus rem seorsum corpore toto,
Sic anima atque animus per se nil posse videtur. 565
Nimirum quia per venas et viscera mixtim,
Per nervos atque ossa, tenentur corpore ab omni,
Nec magnis intervallis primordia possunt
Libera dissultare, ideo conclusa moventur
Sensiferos motus, quos extra corpus in auras 570
Aeris haud possunt post mortem eiecta moveri,
Propterea quia non simili ratione tenentur.
Corpus enim atque animans erit aer, si cohibere
Sese anima atque in eo poterit concludere motus,
Quos ante in nervis et in ipso corpore agebat. 575
Quin etiam finis dum vitae vertitur intra, 592

592—606 are placed here by M, after 579 *by Christ, after* 614 *by Giussani*

Saepe aliqua tamen e causa labefacta videtur
Ire anima ac toto solui de corpore velle,
Et quasi supremo languescere tempore voltus, 595
Molliaque exsangui trunco cadere omnia membra.
Quod genus est, animo male factum cum perhibetur
Aut animam liquisse; ubi iam trepidatur, et omnes
Extremum cupiunt vitae reprehendere vinclum.
Conquassatur enim tum mens animaeque potestas 600
Omnis, et haec ipso cum corpore conlabefiunt;
Ut gravior paulo possit dissolvere causa.
Quid dubitas tandem quin extra prodita corpus,
Inbecilla, foras, in aperto, tegmine dempto,
Non modo non omnem possit durare per aevom,
Sed minimum quodvis nequeat consistere tempus? 606
Quare etiam atque etiam, resoluto corporis omni 576
Tegmine et eiectis extra vitâlibus auris,
Dissolui sensus animi fateare necessest
Atque animam, quoniam coniunctast causa duobus.
Denique cum corpus nequeat perferre animai 580
Discidium quin in taetro tabescat odore,
Quid dubitas quin ex imo penitusque coorta
Emanarit uti fumus diffusa animae vis,
Atque ideo tanta mutatum putre ruina
Conciderit corpus, penitus quia mota loco sunt 585
Fundamenta, foras anima emanante per artus
Perque viarum omnis flexus, in corpore qui sunt,
Atque foramina? multimodis ut noscere possis
Dispertitam animae naturam exisse per artus,
Et prius esse sibi distractam corpore in ipso,
Quam prolapsa foras enaret in aeris auras. 591
Nec sibi enim quisquam moriens sentire videtur 607
Ire foras animam incolumem de corpore toto,
Nec prius ad iugulum et supera succedere fauces,

Verum deficere in certa regione locatam; 610
Ut sensus alios in parti quemque sua scit
Dissolui. Quod si inmortalis nostra foret mens,
Non tam se moriens dissolvi conquereretur,
Sed magis ire foras vestemque relinquere, ut anguis.
Denique cur animi numquam mens consiliumque 615
Gignitur in capite aut pedibus manibusve, sed unis
Sedibus et certis regionibus omnibus haeret,
Si non certa loca ad nascendum reddita cuique
Sunt, et ubi quicquid possit durare creatum,
Atque ita multimodis partitis artubus esse, 620
Membrorum ut numquam existat praeposterus ordo?
Usque adeo sequitur res rem, neque flamma creari
Fluminibus solitast neque in igni gignier algor.
Praeterea si inmortalis natura animaist
Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro, 625
Quinque, ut opinor, eam faciendum est sensibus auctam.
Nec ratione alia nosmet proponere nobis
Possumus infernas animas Acherunte vagari.
Pictores itaque et scriptorum saecla priora
Sic animas intro duxerunt sensibus auctas. 630
At neque sorsum oculi neque nares nec manus ipsa
Esse potest animae neque sorsum lingua, neque aures;
Haud igitur per se possunt sentire neque esse.
Et quoniam toto sentimus corpore inesse
Vitalem sensum, et totum esse animale videmus, 635
Si subito medium celeri praeciderit ictu
Vis aliqua, ut sorsum partem secernat utramque,
Dispertita procul dubio quoque vis animai

After 619 *M supposes some verses lost, such as* Certum ac dispositum naturae legibu' constat. Hoc fieri nostrum quoque corpus foedere *debet,* 632, 633 aures; Haud igitur *L:* aures Auditum *MSS.:* *aures Auditu M*

Et discissa simul cum corpore dissicietur.
At quod scinditur et partis discedit in ullas, 640
Scilicet aeternam sibi naturam abnuit esse.
Falciferos memorant currus abscidere membra
Saepe ita de subito, permixta caede calentis,
Ut tremere in terra videatur ab artubus id quod
Decidit abscisum, cum mens tamen atque hominis vis 645
Mobilitate mali non quit sentire dolorem;
Et semel in pugnae studio quod dedita mens est,
Corpore rellicuo pugnam caedesque petessit,
Nec tenet amissam laevam cum tegmine saepe
Inter equos abstraxe rotas falcesque rapaces, 650
Nec cecidisse alius dextram, cum scandit et instat.
Inde alius conatur adempto surgere crure,
Cum digitos agitat propter moribundus humi pes.
Et caput, abscisum calido viventeque trunco,
Servat humi voltum vitalem oculosque patentis, 655
Donec relliquias animai reddidit omnes.
Quin etiam tibi si lingua vibrante, micanti
Serpentis cauda, procero corpore, truncum
Sit libitum in multas partis discidere ferro,
Omnia iam sorsum cernes ancisa recenti 660
Volnere tortari et terram conspargere tabo,
Ipsam seque retro partem petere ore priorem,
Volneris ardenti ut morsu premat icta dolorem.
Omnibus esse igitur totas dicemus in illis
Particulis animas? at ea ratione sequetur 665
Unam animantem animas habuisse in corpore multas.
Ergo divisast ea quae fuit una simul cum
Corpore; quapropter mortale utrumque putandumst,

658 e procero *M* truncum *Giussani*: utrumque MSS., M
After 658 M supposes a verse to be lost, such as Et caudam et molem
otius corporis omnem,

In multas quoniam partis disciditur aeque.
Denique saepe hominem paulatim cernimus ire 526
Et membratim vitalem deperdere sensum;
In pedibus primum digitos livescere et unguis,
Inde pedes et crura mori, post inde per artus
Ire alios tractim gelidi vestigia leti. 530
Scinditur itque animae hoc quoniam natura nec uno
Tempore sincera existit, mortalis habendast.
Quod si forte putas ipsam se posse per artus
Introrsum trahere et partis conducere in unum,
Atque ideo cunctis sensum deducere membris, 535
At locus ille tamen, quo copia tanta animai
Cogitur, in sensu debet maiore videri;
Qui quoniam nusquamst, nimirum ut diximus ante,
Dilaniata foras dispargitur, interit ergo.
Quin etiam si iam libeat concedere falsum, 540
Et dare posse animam glomerari in corpore eorum,
Lumina qui linquunt moribundi particulatim,
Mortalem tamen esse animam fateare necesse,
Nec refert utrum pereat dispersa per auras
An contracta suis e partibus obbrutescat, 545
Quando hominem totum magis ac magis undique sensus
Deficit, et vitae minus et minus undique restat.
Praeterea si inmortalis natura animai 670
Constat et in corpus nascentibus insinuatur,
Cur super anteactam aetatem meminisse nequimus,
Nec vestigia gestarum rerum ulla tenemus?
Nam si tanto operest animi mutata potestas,
Omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum, 675

526—547 are placed here by Giussani 531 Scinditur itque *animae hoc M:* Scinditur atque animo haec *MSS.*: Scinditur usque *adeo haec L* 544 per auras] *I propose* per artus

Non, ut opinor, id a leto iam longiter errat;
Quapropter fateare necessest, quae fuit ante
Interiisse et quae nunc est nunc esse creatam.
  Praeterea si iam perfecto corpore nobis
Inferri solitast animi vivata potestas 680
Tum cum gignimur et vitae cum limen inimus,
Haud ita conveniebat, uti cum corpore et una
Cum membris videatur in ipso sanguine cresse,
Sed velut in cavea per se sibi vivere solam
Convenit, (ut sensu corpus tamen affluat omne), 685
Quod fieri totum contra manifesta docet res.
Namque ita conexa est per venas, viscera, nervos
Ossaque, uti dentes quoque sensu participentur;
Morbus ut indicat et gelidai stringor aquai
Et lapis oppressus, subiit si e frugibus, asper. 690
Quare etiam atque etiam neque originis esse putandumst
Expertis animas nec leti lege solutas.
Nam neque tanto opere adnecti potuisse putandumst
Corporibus nostris, extrinsecus insinuatas,
Nec, tam contextae cum sint, exire videntur 695
Incolumes posse et salvas exsolvere sese
Omnibus e nervis atque ossibus articulisque.
Quod si forte putas extrinsecus insinuatam
Permanare animam nobis per membra solere,
Tanto quique magis cum corpore fusa peribit. 700
Quod permanat enim dissolvitur, interit ergo.
Dispertitus enim per caulas corporis omnis
Ut cibus, in membra atque artus cum diditur omnis,
Disperit atque aliam naturam sufficit ex se,
Sic anima atque animus quamvis integra recens in 705
Corpus eunt, tamen in manando dissoluuntur,
Dum quasi per caulas omnis diduntur in artus

685 is rejected by M 690 subiit si *Bernays*, M: subitis MSS.

Particulae, quibus haec animi natura creatur,
Quae nunc in nostro dominatur corpore, nata
Ex illa quae tum periit partita per artus. 710
Quapropter neque natali privata videtur
Esse die natura animae nec funeris expers.
Semina praeterea linquuntur necne animai
Corpore in exanimo? quod si linquuntur et insunt,
Haud erit ut merito inmortalis possit haberi, 715
Partibus amissis quoniam libata recessit.
Sin ita sinceris membris ablata profugit
Ut nullas partis in corpore liquerit ex se,
Unde cadavera rancenti iam viscere vermes
Expirant, atque unde animantum copia tanta 720
Exos et exsanguis tumidos perfluctuat artus?
Quod si forte animas extrinsecus insinuari
Vermibus et privas in corpora posse venire
Credis, nec reputas cur milia multa animarum
Conveniant unde una recesserit, hoc tamen est ut 725
Quaerendum videatur et in discrimen agendum,
Utrum tandem animae venentur semina quaeque
Vermiculorum, ipsaeque sibi fabricentur ubi sint,
An quasi corporibus perfectis insinuentur.
At neque cur faciant ipsae quareve laborent, 730
Dicere suppeditat. Neque enim, sine corpore cum sunt,
Sollicitae volitant morbis alguque fameque.
Corpus enim magis his vitiis adfine laborat,
Et mala multa animus contage fungitur eius.
Sed tamen his esto quamvis facere utile corpus 735
Cui subeant; at qua possint via nulla videtur.
Haud igitur faciunt animae sibi corpora et artus.
Nec tamen est utqui perfectis insinuentur

736 Cui subeant Bernays: Cum subeant *MSS., M* 738 utqui *M:* ut quicum *MSS.*

Corporibus; neque enim poterunt suptiliter esse
Conexae, neque consensus contagia fient. 740
Denique cur acris violentia triste leonum
Seminium sequitur, volpes dolus, et fuga cervis
A patribus datur et patrius pavor incitat artus,
Et iam cetera de genere hoc cur omnia membris
Ex ineunte aevo generascunt ingenioque, 745
Si non, certa suo quia semine seminioque
Vis animi pariter crescit cum corpore toto?
Quod si inmortalis foret et mutare soleret
Corpora, permixtis animantes moribus essent:
Effugeret canis Hyrcano de semine saepe 750
Cornigeri incursum cervi, tremeretque per auras
Aeris accipiter fugiens veniente columba,
Desiperent homines, saperent fera saecla ferarum.
Illud enim falsa fertur ratione, quod aiunt
Inmortalem animam mutato corpore flecti. 755
Quod mutatur enim dissolvitur, interit ergo.
Traiciuntur enim partes atque ordine migrant;
Quare dissolui quoque debent posse per artus,
Denique ut intereant una cum corpore cunctae.
Sin animas hominum dicent in corpora semper 760
Ire humana, tamen quaeram cur e sapienti
Stulta queat fieri, nec prudens sit puer ullus,
Nec tam doctus equae pullus quam fortis equi vis? 764
Scilicet in tenero tenerascere corpore mentem
Confugient. Quod si iam fit, fateare necessest
Mortalem esse animam, quoniam mutata per artus
Tanto opere amittit vitam sensumque priorem.
Quove modo poterit pariter cum corpore quoque
Confirmata cupitum aetatis tangere florem 770
Vis *animi, nisi* erit consors in origine prima?

742 cervis : cervos *MSS.*, *M* 743 is rejected by M

Quidve foras sibi vult membris exire senectis?
An metuit conclusa manere in corpore putri,
Et domus aetatis spatio ne fessa vetusto
Obruat? at non sunt immortali ulla pericla. 775
Denique conubia ad Veneris partusque ferarum
Esse animas praesto deridiculum esse videtur,
Expectare immortalis mortalia membra
Innumero numero, certareque praeproperanter
Inter se quae prima potissimaque insinuetur; 780
Si non forte ita sunt animarum foedera pacta,
Ut quae prima volans advenerit insinuetur
Prima, neque inter se contendant viribus hilum.
Denique in aethere non arbor, non aequore in alto
Nubes esse queunt nec pisces vivere in arvis 785
Nec cruor in lignis neque saxis sucus inesse.
Certum ac dispositumst ubi quicquid crescat et insit.
Sic animi natura nequit sine corpore oriri
Sola, neque a nervis et sanguine longiter esse.
Quod si posset enim, multo prius ipsa animi vis 790
In capite aut umeris aut imis calcibus esse
Posset et innasci quavis in parte soleret,
Tandem in eodem homine atque in eodem vase manere.
Quod quoniam nostro quoque constat corpore certum
Dispositumque videtur, ubi esse et crescere possit 795
Sorsum anima atque animus, tanto magis infitiandum
Totum posse extra corpus durare genique.
Quare, corpus ubi interiit, periisse necessest
Confiteare animam distractam in corpore toto.
Quippe etenim mortale aeterno iungere et una 800
Consentire putare et fungi mutua posse,
Desiperest. Quid enim diversius esse putandumst
Aut magis inter se disiunctum discrepitansque,

790 *Quod si* (posset enim multo prius) *M* 792 parte, soleret M

Quam mortale quod est inmortali atque perenni
Iunctum in concilio saevas tolerare procellas? 805
Praeterea quaecumque manent aeterna, necessest,
Aut quia sunt solido cum corpore, respuere ictus,
Nec penetrare pati sibi quicquam quod queat artas
Dissociare intus partis, ut materiai
Corpora sunt, quorum naturam ostendimus ante; 810
Aut ideo durare aetatem posse per omnem
Plagarum quia sunt expertia, sicut inanest,
Quod manet intactum neque ab ictu fungitur hilum;
Aut etiam quia nulla loci sit copia circum,
Quo quasi res possint discedere dissoluique, 815
Sicut summarum summast aeterna, neque extra
Qui locus est quo diffugiant, neque corpora sunt quae
Possint incidere et valida dissolvere plaga.

*

Quod si forte ideo magis immortalis habendast,
Quod vitalibus ab rebus munita tenetur, 820
Aut quia non veniunt omnino aliena salutis,
Aut quia quae veniunt aliqua ratione recedunt
Pulsa prius quam quid noceant sentire queamus,

. . . . . .

Praeter enim quam quod morbis cum corporis aegret,
Advenit id quod eam de rebus saepe futuris 825
Macerat, inque metu male habet curisque fatigat,
Praeteritisque male admissis peccata remordent.
Adde furorem animi proprium atque oblivia rerum,
Adde quod in nigras lethargi mergitur undas.
Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, 830

806—818 *are rejected by M* *After* 818 *Giussani supposes some verses to be lost* 820 vitalibus *MSS.*: letalibus *M* After 823 *L supposes a verse to be lost, such as* Multa tamen tangunt animam mala, multa pericla.

Quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur.
Et velut anteacto nil tempore sensimus aegri,
Ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis,
Omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu
Horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris oris, 835
In dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum
Omnibus humanis esset terraque marique,
Sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai
Discidium fuerit quibus e sumus uniter apti,
Scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum, 840
Accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere,
Non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo.
(Et si iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam
Distractast animi natura animaeque potestas,
Nil tamen est ad nos, qui comptu coniugioque 845
Corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti.
Nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas
Post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est,
Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae,
Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, 850
Interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri.
Et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante
Qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor.
Nam cum respicias inmensi temporis omne
Praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai 855
Multimodis quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis,
Semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta
Haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse.
Nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente;
Inter enim iectast vitai pausa, vageque 860
Deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes.)
Debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst,

843—861 are placed in the bracket by Brieger

Ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, cui male possit
Accidere. Id quoniam mors eximit, esseque probet
Illum cui possint incommoda conciliari, 865
Scire licet nobis nil esse in morte timendum,
Nec miserum fieri qui non est posse, neque hilum
Differre an nullo fuerit iam tempore natus,
Mortalem vitam mors cum inmortalis ademit.
Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum, 870
Post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto
Aut flammis interfiat malisve ferarum,
Scire licet non sincerum sonere, atque subesse
Caecum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse
Credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum. 875
Non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde,
Nec radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit,
Sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse.
Vivus enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum,
Corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque, 880
Ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim
Nec removet satis a proiecto corpore, et illum
Se fingit sensuque suo contaminat astans.
Hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum,
Nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se, 885
Qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum
Stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere.
Nam si in morte malumst malis morsuque ferarum
Tractari, non invenio qui non sit acerbum
Ignibus inpositum calidis torrescere flammis, 890
Aut in melle situm suffocari, atque rigere
Frigore, cum summo gelidi cubat aequore saxi,
Urgerive superne obtritum pondere terrae.
'Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor

868 *an nullo Pontanus:* annullo *and* anullo MSS.: anne ullo M

Optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati 895
Praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent.
Non poteris factis florentibus esse, tuisque
Praesidium. Misero misere' aiunt 'omnia ademit
Una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae.'
Illud in his rebus non addunt: 'nec tibi earum 900
Iam desiderium rerum super insidet una.'
Quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur,
Dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque.
'Tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris, aevi
Quod superest, cunctis privatu' doloribus aegris. 905
At nos horrifico cinefactum te prope busto
Insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque
Nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet.'
Illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari
Tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem,
Cur quisquam aeterno possit tabescere luctu. 911
Nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requirit, 919
Cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt. 920
Nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem,
Nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum.
Et tamen haudquaquam nostros tunc illa per artus
Longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant,
Cum correptus homo ex somno se colligit ipse. 925
Multo igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandumst,
Si minus esse potest quam quod nil esse videmus;
Maior enim turbae disiectus materiai
Consequitur leto, nec quisquam expergitus exstat,
Frigida quem semel est vitai pausa secuta. 930
Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque 912
Pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis,
Ex animo ut dicant: 'brevis hic est fructus homullis;

919—930 are placed here by Susemihl

Iam fuerit, neque post umquam revocare licebit.' 915
Tamquam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum,
Quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torres,
Aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei.
Denique si vocem rerum natura repente 931
Mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa:
'Quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris
Luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles?
Nam si grata anteacta fuit tibi vita priorque 935
Et non omnia, pertusum congesta quasi in vas,
Commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere,
Cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis
Aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem?
Sin ea quae fructus cumque es, periere profusa 940
Vitaque in offensust, cur amplius addere quaeris,
Rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne,
Non potius vitae finem facis atque laboris?
Nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque,
Quod placeat, nil est: eadem sunt omnia semper. 945
Si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus
Confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant,
Omnia si pergas vivendo vincere saecla,
Atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus':
Quid respondemus, nisi iustam intendere litem 950
Naturam et veram verbis exponere causam?
Grandior hic vero si iam seniorque queratur
Atque obitum lamentetur miser amplius aequo,
Non merito inclamet magis et voce increpet acri?
'Aufer abhinc lacrimas, balatro, et compesce querellas. 955
Omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces.
Sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis,

935 si grata fuit t. v. a. p. *Naugerius*: gratis anteacta fuit t. v. p. *M*: *grata fuit tibi* vita a. p. *MSS*.

Inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita,
Et necopinanti mors ad caput adstitit ante
Quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum. 960
Nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte,
Aequo animoque agedum gnatis concede: necessest.'
Iure, ut opinor, agat, iure increpet inciletque.
Cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas
Semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest, 965
Nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra.
Materies opus est ut crescant postera saecla;
Quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur;
Nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere, cadentque.
Sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri, 970
Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.
Respice item quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas
Temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.
Hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri
Temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram. 975
Numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur
Quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat?
Atque ea nimirum quaecumque Acherunte profundo
Prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis.
Nec miser inpendens magnum timet aere saxum 980
Tantalus, ut famast, cassa formidine torpens;
Sed magis in vita divom metus urget inanis
Mortalis, casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors:
Nec Tityon volucres ineunt Acherunte iacentem,
Nec quod sub magno scrutentur pectore quicquam 985
Perpetuam aetatem possunt reperire profecto.
Quamlibet immani proiectu corporis exstet,
Qui non sola novem dispessis iugera membris

962 gnatis *Bernays:* magnis *MSS.*: magnus *M* *After* 971 *a new paragraph is marked by Giussani*

Optineat, sed qui terrai totius orbem,
Non tamen aeternum poterit perferre dolorem 990
Nec praebere cibum proprio de corpore semper.
Sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem
Quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor,
Aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae.
Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 995
Qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures
Imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit.
Nam petere imperium, quod inanest nec datur umquam,
Atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem,
Hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 1000
Saxum, quod tamen e summo iam vertice rursum
Volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi.
Deinde animi ingratam naturam pascere semper,
Atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam,
Quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 1005
Cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores,
Nec tamen explemur vitai fructibus umquam,
Hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas
Quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas,
Quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. 1010
Cerberus et Furiae iam vero et lucis egestas

*

Tartarus horriferos eructans faucibus aestus,
Qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto.
Sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis
Est insignibus insignis, scelerisque luella, 1015
Carcer et horribilis de saxo iactu' deorsum,
Verbera, carnifices, robur, pix, lammina, taedae;
Quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis
Praemetuens adhibet stimulos terretque flagellis,

After 1011 *M supposes some verses to be lost*

Nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum 1020
Possit, nec quae sit poenarum denique finis,
Atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant.
Hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita.
Hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis:
'Lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancu' reliquit, 1025
Qui melior multis quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus.
Inde alii multi reges rerumque potentes
Occiderunt, magnis qui gentibus imperitarunt.
Ille quoque ipse, viam qui quondam per mare magnum
Stravit iterque dedit legionibus ire per altum 1030
Ac pedibus salsas docuit super ire lucunas
Et contempsit equis insultans murmura ponti,
Lumine adempto animam moribundo corpore fudit.
Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror,
Ossa dedit terrae proinde ac famul infimus esset. 1035
Adde repertores doctrinarum atque leporum,
Adde Heliconiadum comites; quorum unus Homerus
Sceptra potitus eadem aliis sopitu' quietest.
Denique Democritum postquam matura vetustas
Admonuit memores motus languescere mentis, 1040
Sponte sua leto caput obvius optulit ipse.
Ipse EPICURUS obit decurso lumine vitae,
Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis
Restinxit stellas, exortus ut aetherius sol.
Tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire? 1045
Mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti,
Qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi
Et vigilans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas,
Sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem
Nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum 1050
Ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis

1031 super ire *MSS.*: superare M

Atque animi incerto fluitans errore vagaris.'
  Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur
Pondus inesse animo quod se gravitate fatiget,
E quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde 1055
Tanta mali tamquam moles in pectore constet,
Haud ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus
Quid sibi quisque velit nescire, et quaerere semper
Commutare locum quasi onus deponere possit.
Exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 1060
Esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit,
Quippe foris nilo melius qui sentiat esse.
Currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter,
Auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans;
Oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae; 1065
Aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit,
Aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit.
Hoc se quisque modo fugit; at quem scilicet, ut fit,
Effugere haud potis est, ingratis haeret et odit
Propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger; 1070
Quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis
Naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum,
Temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae,
Ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis
Aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque manenda. 1075
  Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis
Quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido?
Certa quidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat,
Nec devitari letum pote quin obeamus.
Praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque, 1080
Nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas.
Sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur

1068, 1069 fugitat *Madvig*: fugit (at—haeret) M

Cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus,
Et sitis aequa tenet vitai, semper hiantis.
Posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, 1085
Quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet.
Nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum
Tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus,
Quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti.
Proinde licet quot vis vivendo condere saecla; 1090
Mors aeterna tamen nilo minus illa manebit,
Nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno
Lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille,
Mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante.

NOTES.

1—30. *Epicurus, who first brought light and joy into the world, is my master and teacher and example. His philosophy first dispelled the fear of the gods and the fear of hell, proving that the first have nothing to do with man and that the second does not exist.*

This book, like the fifth and sixth, begins with a panegyric on Epicurus: the first has one also (ll. 62—79) after the invocation and dedication prefixed to the whole work.

2. **primus**: cf. i 66 *primum Graius homo*; v 9 *princeps vitae rationem invenit.* Lucr. insists upon the originality of Epicurus, because the rival schools, notably the Stoics, denied it: cf. Cic. *De Fin.* i 17 *in physicis...totus est alienus: Democritea dicit, perpauca mutans.*

commoda vitae, 'the good things of life': cf. *commoda sumit* (iv 1074): this is a translation of the technical term *συμφέροντα* which are distinguished from the *ἀγαθόν* or *summum bonum* (vi 26).

These had always existed but were not perceived till Epicurus threw light upon them.

3. **Graiae gentis decus**: Epicurus was an Athenian citizen born at Samos (where his father was a *κληροῦχος*) B.C. 342. It should be observed how Lucr. prefers not to name his master directly: cf. i 66 *Graius homo*: the name only occurs once in the poem (iii 1042) where a periphrasis is hardly possible: to Lucr. the name is too sacred for ordinary mention.

Graius is an Epic equivalent for *Graecus*, regularly used by Lucr.

4. **ficta**, an archaic form of *fic-sa*, having a different suffix.

The language used is very emphatic and seems intended to assert as strongly as possible his dependence upon Epicurus. In fact, there is no reason to believe that Lucr. made any alterations in the system which he found in Epicurus.

5. **certandi cupidus** = *quod certare cupio.*

6. **imitari** seems to mean, 'to reproduce,' almost 'to translate.'

hirundo: the twittering of the swallow is contrasted with the magnificent, if mythical, song of the swan. In view of the common use of χελιδών and χελιδονίζειν, Lucr. may intend to convey the notion that compared with Epicurus he is a foreign stammerer.

7. **tremulis**, 'staggering': because of their tender age.

8. **et**, 'as,' after *consimile*: *ac* is commoner, but even Cicero sometimes uses *et* thus: see Madvig on Cic. *De Fin.* ii 21.

9. **rerum**: the 'things' are the tenets of the philosophy: Lucr. supplies *verba*, not *res*.

patria, 'of a father': cf. i 94 *patrio nomine*, 'with the name of father.'

10. **inclute**, 'thou famous man': the same epithet is applied (v 8) to Memmius, to whom the whole poem is addressed.

chartis: Epicurus left three hundred *volumina* of philosophy; but his only extant writings are three letters, none of them long, which give a summary account of points of his system; there are also many fragments. The work most akin to the poem of Lucr. was his treatise περὶ φύσεως in 37 *volumina*. It is known that he left two epitomes, a larger and a smaller, of his system; and it is generally believed that the μεγάλη ἐπιτομή is the main authority which Lucr. followed, though his own language here surely suggests that he browsed at large upon all the writings and extracted the matter of his poem from the whole field.

13. **semper** strengthens *perpetua*: cf. v 325 *semperque aeterna fuere*.

14. **ratio**, 'system,' 'philosophy': cf. l. 45.

vociferari, 'to cry aloud': it is a clear, loud message to man, no whisper in a corner.

15. **naturam rerum**, 'the nature of things': this is an equivalent for φύσις which Epicurus explained in his φυσιολογία or account of the universe, the world, and man.

divina, 'superhuman': cf. v 8 (of Epicurus) *deus ille fuit*.

16—25. According to Epicurus, the universe (τὸ πᾶν) contains innumerable worlds (κόσμοι, *mundi*); between these worlds are spaces called μετακόσμια (*intermundia*), in which the gods live. Our world is bounded by the empyrean or upper air (*aether*); in this the stars are set, not worlds themselves, but forming quite small appendages to our world.

By his genius Epicurus was able to transcend the power of sight and discover what goes on outside our world; and the same secret is revealed to all faithful Epicureans.

16. **moenia mundi**, 'the walls of the world,' i.e. the empyrean by which our world is bounded.

17. **discedunt,** 'part asunder': a rare sense of the word.

inane=*τὸ κενόν* and is a noun. The eye of reason can see the processes of nature, i.e. the constant making and unmaking of worlds, going on (*geri*) throughout the universe, and can also see the invisible swarm of atoms flying to and fro in all directions. Though *inane* strictly means 'space where there are no atoms,' it can also be used, and is used here, for the whole of space including the atoms, and bodies formed of atoms, within it.

18. **divum numen,** 'the holy gods.' The following lines are a translation of the Homeric description of Olympus, *Od.* vi 42 *οὔτ' ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται, οὔτε ποτ' ὄμβρῳ | δεύεται, οὔτε χιὼν ἐπιπίλναται· ἀλλὰ μάλ' αἴθρη | πέπταται ἀνέφελος λευκὴ δ' ἐπιδέδρομεν αἴγλη.*

22. **ridet:** Lachmann changed this to *rident*, *sedes* being supplied as subject: he says: '*ridere* dicuntur quae illustrantur, non quae illustrant.' But the MS. reading is, I think, defended by i 9 *nitet diffuso lumine caelum.*

24. This peace of the gods, which nothing impairs at any time, is only possible on condition that they have nothing to do with the affairs of men. This is one of the most important doctrines of Epicurus.

25. **Acherusia templa,** 'the realm of Acheron,' i.e. hell, the place where the wicked suffer after death. Popular superstition represented this as beneath the earth; but Lucr., who with the mind's eye can penetrate through the earth, sees that there is no hell there.

templa is used freely in old Latin in the sense of *loca*: Lucr. has *linguai templa* (iv 624) 'the mouth,' *mentis templa* (v 103); Plautus speaks of the sea as *Neptunia templa* (*Mil. Glor.* 413).

26. **nec...obstat,** 'and *yet* the earth does not hinder.'

28. **his rebus,** 'because of these things.'

ibi refers back to l. 14: when Epicurus begins to explain the laws of Nature, thereupon Lucr. is filled with ecstasy and awe at the beatific vision thus revealed.

29. **percipit,** 'takes hold upon': again l. 80: Cicero would rather say *percipio voluptatem.*

natura here stands for the universe, perhaps also for the laws that govern it.

31—93. *The object of this book is to explain the nature of the soul and so to drive out that fear of death* and a future state which darkens *human life. Many pretend to feel no* such fear; but their conduct *disproves their words. Further the fear* of death is the cause of

avarice, ambition, and crime. Some men it has led to commit suicide, others to betray their country; there is but one remedy for it, and that is the philosophy of Epicurus.

Lucr. now states the subject of the book; but instead of beginning it at once, he goes into an ethical digression to prove the importance of it.

31. **et quoniam docui**: for this method of connecting the subject of the book with the preface, cf. i 951; iv 26; vi 43.

cunctarum exordia rerum=*primordia rerum*, the invisible atoms out of which all things are made. He explained the qualities of atoms in book i, their shapes and motions in book ii.

33. **sponte sua** is opposed to 'by divine power': for the atoms have no power of spontaneous motion: they are driven downwards by their own weight, and this downward motion is changed, first by a swerve in their line of falling and then by the blows of other atoms.

aeterno...motu: Epicurus taught that all atoms, whether free or in combination with others, move for ever at the same immense speed: the atoms which form a block of marble are moving just as fast as the atoms that form air or light. Modern physical science also teaches that the atoms of solid bodies are in constant motion.

34. **quove**: *ve* has the sense of *que*, as the composition of visible things is not an alternative but an additional topic: cf. i 57; v 71. Apparently Lucr. wishes to escape an ambiguity, as *quoque* might be a case of *quisque*.

This sense of *-ve* is common in early Latin: in Plautus it has never, except in *sive*, a disjunctive sense: cf. *Asinar.* 636 *videtin viginti minat quid pollent quidve possunt?*

35. **res**, 'topics.'

For the distinction between *animus*, 'the mind,' and *anima*, 'the soul,' cf. ll. 136—144, and see Introd. p. xii foll.

36. **iam**, 'next.'

37. There seems to be an allusion to this passage in Virg. *Georg.* ii 490 *felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas | atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum | subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.* Lucr. was the happy man.

38. **funditus** is to be taken with *ab imo*. The metaphor is from a troubled spring.

40. For the Epicurean, pleasure is the chief good; but all pleasures *are poisoned by the* fear of death; therefore a knowledge of nature is *necessary to expel this* fear: cf. Epicurus (Usener *Epicurea* p. 74) οὐκ ἔτι

ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν. All science is to Epicurus a means, not an end.

41. **quod**, 'as to the fact that,' may be translated by 'when.'

The apodosis begins at l. 46.

42. **Tartara Leti**: also Virg. *Georg.* iv 481: the gen. is possessive: Death lives in Tartarus and possesses it.

43. **animae**: dative: 'the soul has the nature of blood,' i.e. the blood is the soul. The persons here spoken of are not philosophers of any school: they profess to be free-thinkers, but they have no scientific grounds for their belief and adopt at caprice (*voluntas*), as Lucr. says with scorn, one opinion or another on this matter.

45. **nostra ratio** is the Epicurean philosophy.

46. **hinc**=*ἐκ τῶνδε*, 'from what follows' in ll. 48—54.

laudis, 'ostentation.'

47. **res**, 'the fact' that death is not the worst of evils.

48—50. A striking commentary on these lines is afforded by Cicero's correspondence during his exile. Atticus was an Epicurean; and Lucr. may have seen some of the letters addressed to him.

50. **denique**, 'in short.'

vivunt, 'they go on living,' though they ought on their own principles to put an end to their lives.

51. **tamen**, i.e. in spite of their pretended belief.

52. **nigras pecudes**: black victims were offered to the dead and to the infernal gods; the devotions of these men are paid in all three cases to personages whose existence they profess to disbelieve.

53. **mittunt**, 'offer': for *mittere*, 'to give away,' used without a dat., see n. to Juv. 3, 45.

55. **spectare**, 'to test.'

58. **res**, 'the reality,' i.e. a cowardly dread of death.

59. **denique**, 'further': so often in Lucr. This new point is not easy to follow: it is not obvious that fear of death is the cause of avarice and ambition. It has been noticed, e.g. by Thucydides, that morality is relaxed in times of epidemic disease; but Lucr. is not thinking of exceptional circumstances. He is merely reproducing the view of Epicurus, who derived these passions from an excess of prudence: e.g. a man desires money in order to escape poverty, the extreme consequence of poverty being starvation: cf. Epicurus (Usener *l. l.* p. 73) *ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν* (cf. *stabili* l. 66) *οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι.* The view seems to have more truth in a primitive, than in a civilised, state of society.

61. **socios scelerum** cet.: Lucr. is here thinking of the Mamurras and Vatiniuses of the time, of whom he may have heard much from Memmius; in the similar passage in book ii (ll. 11 foll.) he has Pompey and Caesar more directly in view.

63. **vulnera vitae,** 'sores of life.'

64. **non minimam partem**: the qualification seems to show that Lucr. was not quite convinced of the argument himself. As to the constr., the acc. is used as an adverb: cf. vi 1259 *nec minimam partem ex agris is maeror in urbem | confluxit.* *partim* is only another form of the acc.

65. **ferme,** 'as a rule,' i.e. to most men.

66. **semota,** neut. plur., agrees with the masc. and fem. subjects which precede it.

stabili: this word is the key of the whole passage: cf. Epicurus quoted above and Cic. *De Fin.* i 35 (an Epicurean is speaking) *laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu degendae praesidia firmissima.*

67. **cunctarier** is governed by *videntur*: obscurity and poverty seem, as we might say, next door to death. So Virgil (*Aen.* vi 273) makes *turpis Egestas* live at the threshold of Orcus.

68. **unde** = *a contemptu et egestate.* **dum,** 'because.'

se is subject of *effugisse*: *ea* must be supplied as object of *remosse.*

69. **effugisse...remosse**: the tense is perhaps an old Latin idiom, by which *velle* is followed, esp. in laws, by the perf. inf.: cf. Hor. *Sat.* ii 3, 187 *ne quis humasse velit Aiacem, Atrida, vetas cur?* More probably it is an imitation of the Greek aor. inf., which later Latin poets use with the exact sense of the pres. inf.; but there is no other instance in Lucr., and only one in Plautus (*Aul.* 828 *non potes probasse nugas*).

70. **rem conflant,** 'they amass wealth.'

73. **mensas odere**: i.e. they fear poison: cf. Mart. xii 91, 4 *times lagonam.*

74. **ab,** 'in consequence of.'

78. **intereunt,** 'wear themselves out,' not 'perish': by ambition they seek security but get something quite different. Here again Lucr. follows Epicurus who condemns στέφανοι καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις as pleasures which are neither natural nor necessary (Usener *l. l.* p. 78 Schol.).

partim = *nonnulli* and serves as subject to the verb.

ergo, when used in this sense as an archaic synonym of *causa,* always follows the noun.

80. **humanos** = *homines*: again l. 837: a rare use.

82. With a stop at the end of this l., the MSS. reading is fairly *satisfactory:* so Heinze.

83. **hunc,...hunc** = τὸν μέν,...τὸν δέ: *hic, ille* is commoner in this sense, but cf. Virg. *Aen.* x 9 *quis metus aut hos | aut hos arma sequi ferrumque lacessere suasit?* The personal acc. after *suadere* is rare; but cf. Virgil quoted above and Lucr. i 140 *tua me virtus...sufferre laborem | suadet.*

pudorem, 'honour.'

84. **in summa** suggests a climax: 'worst of all.'

pietas includes duty to parents and duty to country, as the next l. shows.

87—93. Lucr. has a great love for this simile: it occurs ii 55 and vi 35; part of it is found i 146, where nothing is said of the fears of children in the dark, so that the mention of the sun is really irrelevant. In each book the simile marks the end of the preface and is followed by a resumption of the argument.

91. **animi** is governed by *tenebras* as well as by *terrorem*: *radii* refers esp. to the former, *tela* to the latter.

93. **species** denotes the outward aspect of nature, **ratio** its hidden laws: the whole phrase is an equivalent of φυσιολογία.

94—135. *First, the* animus *is an actual part of a man with a definite place in the body. The belief that the* animus *has no substantial existence but is merely a harmonious relation between the parts of the body, is erroneous: for* (1) *the feeling of the* animus, *whether pleasant or painful, is often the reverse of the body's feeling;* (2) *while the body sleeps, the* animus *is awake either to pleasure or to pain. Secondly, the* anima *also is a part of the body, not a relation between the parts: for life may survive much mutilation of the body, and thus depends, not on the body as a whole but on a few particles of heat and air, which therefore form the* anima. *Consequently the notion of the soul being a 'harmony' falls to the ground.*

94. Lucr. deals first with the *animus*, the λογικόν or rational part of the soul, and then (ll. 117—129) with the *anima*, or irrational part: see Introd. p. xii foll. It is somewhat remarkable that he does not state this two-fold division of the soul until the next paragraph.

quam agrees with *mentem* by attraction: cf. l. 100: but this attraction does not always take place: e.g. l. 139 *consilium quod nos animum mentemque vocamus.* The rule, as stated by Madvig (Gramm. § 316), is, that attraction takes place when the relative clause adds a detail of a person or thing already defined, but does not take place when

relative clause itself contains the definition. We should therefore expect attraction in all the three cases. Perhaps the relative is influenced by the juxta-position of the predicate or antecedent, i.e. *mentem quam, consilium quod.*

95. **consilium vitae regimenque**, 'the principle of reason which directs our life': Lucr. seems to be translating τὸ λογικόν and τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, terms which were technically used for the rational part of the soul.

96. **hominis** is emphatic: for the rational part of the soul is not found in the lower animals.

ac has the sense of *quam*, after the comparative: cf. l. 1093.

97. A line has here fallen out of the MSS.: the sense must have been: 'yet some philosophers have held that....'

98. Whereas Epicurus taught that intellectual activity was confined to the *animus*, and that the *animus* was confined to a particular part of the body, i.e. the heart; cf. l. 140.

99. **habitum—corporis**, 'there is a condition of the body which produces life.'

100. **harmoniam**: the view that the soul was merely the result of a given state of body, was widely held in antiquity: it is stated by Simmias in Plato's *Phaedo* 85 E; it is identified especially with two pupils of Aristotle, Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus. Of these the latter said that the soul μηδὲν εἶναι παρὰ τό πως ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα: the former was a musician, and Lucr. seems (cf. l. 132) to have had him chiefly in his mind. As this theory of course implies the mortality of the soul, one might have expected Lucr. to view it with more indulgence.

101. **vivere cum sensu**, 'to possess life and sensation.'

nulla in parte, 'in no definite part' of the body: cf. l. 104.

103. **valentis**: the only instance in Lucr. where *valere* = 'to be well': elsewhere it = 'to be able.'

105. **diversi**, 'in more ways than one.'

106. **itaque** refers back to the statement in ll. 96, 97: all that comes between is parenthetical.

This is the first argument to prove that the operations of the mind are independent of those of the body; the second argument begins at l. 112.

107. The **pars latens** is the *animus.*

108. '*And* conversely (**retro**) it often happens on the other hand (*vĭcissim*) *that the* contrary is the case.'

113. **effusum**: a graphic expression: cf. Spenser Faerie Queen

i 7, 7 'Pour'd out in loosnesse on the grassy grownd'; so Carlyle said of a tramp lying on the grass in a London Park: 'he looks as if you had poured him out of a jug.'

onustum, 'wearied.'

114. The 'something else' is the *animus*, which, while the senses are asleep, continues its independent life in our dreams.

116. **motus**, 'emotions.'

cordis: as we learn in the next paragraph (l. 140), the heart is the seat of the *animus*, joy and fear being felt there.

117. **quoque**, i.e. as well as the *animus*.

118. **esse** is shown to be emphatic by its position: 'that the soul actually exists in the frame.'

corpus also is emphatic: so far he has been speaking of sensations of the mind.

sentire: *vivere* would be more exact, but life and sensation are inseparable.

119. **principio**: as only one argument follows, this seems to mean, not 'first,' but, 'above all.' But it is possible that *principio* has its ordinary meaning, and that Lucr. treats the other half of his argument (*atque eadem rursum* etc.) as a second proof.

corpore multo, 'much of the body': i.e. we may lose a limb or two and yet not die.

121. **eadem**, 'yet it,' i.e. the *anima*.

corpora, 'atoms': again l. 125: one of the many names which Lucr. uses for them. At death, breathing ceases and warmth leaves the body: it is therefore inferred that the soul is warmth and air. So Epicurus defines ψυχή as σῶμα προσεμφερέστατον πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι. A more precise account is given ll. 177 foll.

122. **aer**, 'some air.' *aer* here is identical with *ventus* (l. 126), but later on (ll. 232, 233) is distinguished from *ventus* or *aura*.

124. **non omnia corpora**, 'not every kind of atom'; *semina* below has the same sense as *corpora*.

If the soul were a mere *harmonia*, all the parts of the body, and all the kinds of atoms it contains, would contribute equally to support life (*fulcire salutem*).

128. He now tacitly assumes that these atoms of wind and warmth *are* the soul. **est** is emphatic.

130. **animi natura**=*animus*: Lucr. is extraordinarily fond of this form of periphrasis with the gen. of nouns: when we compare his phrase *omnis natura*, 'the universe' (i 419) with Plut. adv. Col. 1112

(of Epicurus) *τὸ πᾶν παντὸς φύσιν ὀνομάζειν εἴωθε*, it seems that he derived this peculiarity from his revered master.

132. **organicos**, 'musicians': the verse will not admit *musicos*.

Heliconi: for a similar abl. in *-i* of a Greek noun, cf. *tripodi* i 739.

133. **porro**, 'in turn.'

illam, sc. *rem*, which by an idiom common in Lucr. appears in the following relative clause as subject. Lucr. says ironically that the term was a present from the Muses to musicians: he then adds that as a matter of fact musicians took the word from carpentry, (*ἁρμονία* meaning 'joining' originally). Epicurus insisted on the use of words in their simple sense; and Lucr. implies that the application of this term to the soul is doubly metaphorical and therefore doubly false. For this opinion of Epicurus, see Introd. p. x, and cf. Epicurus (Usener *l. l.* p. 5) *ἀνάγκη τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα* (the original sense) *καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι*: Cic. *De Fin.* ii 6 (of Epic.) *crebro dicit, diligenter oportere exprimi, quae vis subiecta sit vocibus.*

135. **habeant** is used in the sense of *sibi habeant*, i.e. *we* don't want it: see n. to Juv. 3, 187.

tu: Memmius is addressed.

136—160. *The* animus *and* anima *are united and form a single substance. But there is this difference between them: the* animus *is the superior and is concentrated in the heart, whereas the* anima *obeys the* animus *and is diffused throughout the whole body. Though the* animus *has feelings of pleasure or pain, independently of the* anima *or the body, yet any violent emotion of the* animus *affects the* anima *and eventually the body. This proves the connexion between* animus *and* anima.

See Introd. p. xii foll. This connexion is regarded as very important; as it excludes the view that the soul may die with the body, and the mind nevertheless survive.

136. **coniuncta**, neut. plur. agreeing with the masc. and fem. nouns: cf. l. 66.

137. **inter se** goes with *coniuncta*.

naturam, 'substance.'

138. **dominari**, 'is paramount.'

140. Lucr. is translating Epicurus, who is quoted by a Scholiast (see Usener *l. l.* p. 21) as saying *τὸ μέν τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς* (i.e. *τῆς ψυχῆς*), *ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι ὡς ὅῆλον ἐκ*

τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς. He concluded this from observation of the way in which the heart beats for fear or pleasure. See Introd. p. xiii.

situm...haeret, 'is permanently placed.'

141. **exultat** denotes the 'throbbing' of the heart.

pavor, 'panic fear'; **metus,** 'apprehension.'

circum governs *haec loca.*

142. **mulcent,** 'soothe a man': cf. v 571.

143. **cetera pars animae,** i.e. the *anima*: again l. 150. The phrase is not exact, because the *animus* is not strictly part of the *anima* at all; but Lucr. has to face a great difficulty of terminology here, because he has no distinct equivalent for ψυχή which includes both the rational and vital principles. Hence he uses *anima* here as = ψυχή.

144. Action must in all cases be initiated by the *animus* where the will resides.

numen momenque = *νεῦσιν καὶ ῥοπήν,* 'the bidding and influence.' Other writers use *momentum* rather than *momen* with this meaning.

145. **id,** i.e. *consilium* l. 139.

sapit, 'has reason': the only distinct allusion in this book to the highest faculty of the mind; elsewhere Lucr. speaks of the passions, fear, joy, etc., which also are peculiar to it.

gaudet: the opposite feeling also must be understood as implied by this: cf. *laeditur* l. 149.

146. **res,** 'the impression.'

una: adv., 'together with the mind.'

147—151 is not a part of the argument: it is rather a concession; the real argument begins at *verum*: 'though in some cases the emotions of the mind may be confined to itself, the soul is affected whenever the emotion is violent: consequently the soul and mind are substantially the same thing.'

151. **novitate:** the sense of the word is neutral here, though it generally means a change for the worse.

153. **consentire,** 'feels in unison': a translation of *συμπάσχειν*: cf. Cic. *De N. D.* iii 28 *iste quasi consensus quam συμπάθειαν Graeci vocant.* All the symptoms which follow are physical; but, as the body cannot feel except through the soul, they are proofs that the soul is affected by the mind.

154. **ita,** 'in consequence.'

toto corpore: this must be due to the *anima* which is spread through the whole body: if the *animus* alone were at work, the symptoms would be confined to the breast.

155. **linguam**, 'the voice.'

156. **sonere**: again l. 873; an archaic form.

158. The summing-up shows the gist of the whole paragraph, that the *animus* and *anima* form in fact a single substance.

161—176. *These mutual relations between the soul and body prove that the* animus *and* anima *are material. For the relations are produced by contact; and nothing which is not material can either touch or be touched.*

According to Epicurus everything that exists, with the single exception of Void, is material, i.e. formed of atoms. Lucr. here reproduces the argument of Epicurus about the soul (Usener *l. l.* p. 22): οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματᾴζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη· νῦν δ' ἐναργῶς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ συμπτώματα.

161. **ratio**, 'principle': the reference is to *propellit et icit* l. 160: cf. *propellere* l. 162.

naturam animi = *animum*: see n. to l. 130.

162. **ubi**, 'since.'

163. **mutareque vultum**: cf. *Hamlet* II 2: 'this player here Could sway his soul so to his own conceit, That from her working all his visage wanned.'

164. **versare**, 'turn in different directions.'

videtur, not 'seems to,' but 'clearly does': *videor* is very often a true passive in Lucr. and refers to the φαινόμενα, or things obvious to the senses, which were to Epicurus the foundation of all knowledge and the final court of appeal in the search for truth: see Introd. p. ix.

166. Cf. i 443 *facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res*: the soul does both and therefore is body.

168. **praeterea**: the soul not only acts upon the body but is also acted upon. **fungi** = πάσχειν, and serves as a passive of *facere*. There is συμπάθεια (see n. to l. 153) between body and soul as there is between the parts of the soul.

170—174. A bodily injury will in some cases destroy life; and even when it does not actually do this, the symptoms that follow a not fatal wound, show how the soul is acted upon by the body.

171. **intus** does not go with *adacta*: for this, intro would be required: 'when the bones and sinews within are laid bare.'

adacta belongs properly to *teli* rather than to *vis*.

173. **suavis**, the MSS. reading, is retained by Heinze who supports it by two interesting quotations: Seneca *Epp.* 77, 9 *caldā subinde subfusā paulatim defecit, ut aiebat, non sine quadam voluptate, quam adferre solet lenis dissolutio, non inexperta nobis quos aliquando liquit animus*; Montaigne *Essais* ii 6 (of his fall from his horse) *il me sembloit que ma vie ne me tenoit plus qu'au bout des levres; je fermoy les yeulx pour ayder, ce me sembloit, à la poulser hors, et prenoy plaisir à m'alanguir et à me laisser aller.* Lucr. may have felt this sensation himself or heard others describe it.

in terra, i.e. when the man has reached the ground.

aestus, 'confusion.'

175. **animi** here includes *anima*: cf. l. 161.

176. **corporeis**, 'material.'

177—230. *But what is the material substance of which the soul is made? It is made of atoms which are very small and smooth and round. This is proved by the immense rapidity of thought, which is motion of the atoms of the* animus: *for the speed of atoms is exactly proportioned to their smallness, smoothness, and roundness. Secondly, the* anima *also is formed of very small atoms: this is proved by the fact that the body undergoes no apparent change and loses no weight when the whole* anima *is withdrawn at the moment of death.*

So Epicurus (Usener *l. l.* p. 19) calls the soul σῶμα λεπτομερές, and also says (*ibid.* p. 21 n.) that it is formed ἐξ ἀτόμων λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων.

Giussani points out that Lucr. is not quite accurate here. In fact he confuses atoms with molecules. A molecule of water is the smallest particle of water that has the qualities of water; any further division would resolve it into atoms. According to Epicurus, all atoms move with equal speed: the atoms of water move no faster than the atoms of a block of stone: see n. to l. 33: but water moves readily, because its *molecules* (ὄγκοι, *glomeramina*) are small and smooth and round.

177. **corpore**, 'material substance.'

unde constiterit is explained in the next paragraph: *constiterit* is pres. in meaning: cf. συνέστηκε.

180. **perquam** is used because *perminutis* is not admitted by the metre.

corporibus, 'atoms.'

181. **hinc**=ἐκ τῶνδε: cf. l. 46: 'you may notice from what follows, in order that you may be able to learn it thoroughly.'

182, 183. 'No visible action takes place as quickly as the mind imagines the action taking place and itself begins it': i.e. when a man determines on any action, his imagination of it and the act of volition which the mind must originate, are instantaneous, but the execution may take long.

sibi belongs to *proponit*. **inchoat** denotes the fact that any action begins with a mental process: cf. iv 883 *neque enim facere incipit ullam | rem quisquam quam mens providit quid velit ante*.

185. **quorum**: neut. plur. in spite of the fem. sing. antecedent. The irregularity would be impossible after any other noun than *res*.

quorum natura=*quae* (neut. plur.): see n. to l. 130.

190. **quippe**, 'because,' used with a participle, like *ἄτε*.

figuris, 'atoms': cf. ii 385: but, as is pointed out above, Lucr. ought to have said *glomeraminibus*, which is his equivalent for *ὄγκοι* or 'molecules': cf. ii 454.

191. The slow, heavy rhythm corresponds to the sense.

193. **materiai**, 'of atoms' of honey: *materies* is one of the commonest synonyms in Lucr. of *primordia*.

194. **extat** is used in the sense of *constat*.

196. **namque**: cf. l. 189: the repetition is remarkable and looks like a 'double recension,' i.e. as if Lucr. had written two alternative arguments, intending to select one for his final text. But there is this difference, that he uses invisible atoms in his first illustration, and visible bodies in his second. So the second *namque* may be subordinate to the first.

To the examples of water and honey Lucr. now adds others: a mere breath will upset a heap of poppy-seed, because the seeds are smooth and round, but will have no effect on a heap of pebbles or ears of corn, because the pebbles are heavy and the ears of corn are rough and stick together. The example of the poppy-seed occurs ii 453 in a similar context. Giussani, with great probability, refers the simile to games still played by Italian children, in which they pile up poppy-seed on the hand, and swallow it, the difficulty being to help blowing it away. It is likely that the *lapides* and *spicae* refer to similar games.

papaveris is made very emphatic by its distance from *acervus*.

aura suspensa, 'a held-in breath,' i.e. a gentle breath: cf. v 1069 *suspensis dentibus* (of a dog biting her puppies in play); *suspenso gradu*, *'on tiptoe.'*

198. The only verse in Lucr. that ends in 4 spondees. Virgil has one such in the Georgics (iii 276), and two in the Aeneid (iii 74; vii 634).

199. **noenu**: again iv 712: it is *ne unum* and is an archaic form of *non*: it is found only in Lucr., but *noenum* occurs in Plautus and other early writers.

The emphatic *noenu potest*, following *potest* l. 196, seems to prove that both verbs have the same subject; and, if so, the conjectures of Munro and others for *spicarumque* are out of place.

parvissima: Lucr. often uses this form of the superlative; he seems to reserve *minimum* for the technical notion of 'least possible.'

What he says here is true of all very small bodies with the important exception of atoms.

202. **aspera**: this refers to the *spicae* which are entangled and held together by their rough beards: *lapides* are not necessarily rough.

The ending of the l. is an echo to the sense.

206. **o bone**, 'my good friend': a personal appeal to Memmius.

207. **cluebit** means no more than *erit*.

208. **eius**: this would naturally refer to the *animus* which was the subject of the last argument; but l. 216 shows that the *anima* is now under consideration: the fact is, Lucr. feels that they are, in respect of composition, identical: so they both appear in ll. 212 and 228.

210. **conglomerari**: this is only a supposition, the fact being that the *anima* is diffused throughout the whole body.

212. **indepta**: the verb is formed by prefixing *indu* to *apiscor*: cf. *indugredi*, *indupedire*, *induperator*.

213. **nil libatum cernas**, 'one can see no diminution': the subj. is potential: see n. to l. 854.

214. **omnia praestat**, 'makes good everything,' i.e. takes away nothing.

217. **nexam—nervos**: this implies that, just because the soul-atoms are so small, some of them are found in every part of the body.

218. **quatenus**, 'since': so always in Lucr.

219. **circumcaesura**, 'contour.'

221. **quod genus est**, 'just': =*velut*.

Bacchi flos, 'the bouquet of wine.'

223. **sucus**, 'taste'; not 'juice'; for a dried fruit is lighter than a fresh one.

226. **nimirum quia**, 'surely because...': *nimirum* is very often

used, but never ironically, by Lucr.: so in Plautus *mirum ni* is never ironical, though *mirum quin* always is.

semina, 'atoms.'

227. **rerum,** i.e. all things that have smell or taste.

228. **etiam atque etiam**='I insist': cf. ll. 576, 691.

231—257. *The soul is a compound substance, made up of four different ingredients: these are wind, warmth, air, and a fourth which has no name. The last is made of even smaller and smoother atoms than the other three: sensation begins with it and is passed on in order to the elements of warmth, wind, and air. Next the body is affected, the blood first, and the bones and marrow last. But sensation does not often reach the bones and marrow, or death would follow.*

The summary definition of the soul given above (l. 128) is now expanded; and we are told that it contains not only wind and warmth but air and a fourth nameless substance, the most subtle and important of all. For the *quarta natura*, see Introd. pp. xiii, xiv. So Epic. also defined the soul (Usener *l. l.* p. 218) as κρᾶμα ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου.

231. **haec natura,** 'this substance,' i.e. ψυχή including both *animus* and *anima*.

232. **aura**=*ventus*: see n. to l. 122. Epicurus does not say that this element of the soul is wind, but that it is very like wind (προσεμφερέστατον πνεύματι).

233. **vapor** and **calor** are exact synonyms in Lucr., both meaning 'heat.'

234. **quisquam** is often used as an adj. by Lucr.

236. **inter,** 'through' heat.

237. **triplex**: it is formed of (1) *aura* or *ventus* (πνεῦμα), the source of fear; (2) *vapor* (θερμότης), the source of anger; (3) *aer* (ἀήρ), the source of tranquillity: see ll. 288 foll.

aer differs from *ventus* in being at rest: cf. l. 292 and vi 685 *ventus enim fit, ubi est agitando percitus aer*: Epicurus added this element to account for tranquillity (ἠρεμία) of the soul. Another difference seems to be of temperature, *ventus* being cold and *aer* lukewarm.

238. **haec cuncta,** 'the combination of all these': *cuncta* has its strict sense and is not merely an equivalent of *omnia*.

239, 240. 'Since the mind does not allow that any of these substances can produce the motions that cause sensation, far less the thoughts which it ponders in itself': i.e. warmth, wind, and air cannot be supposed to produce sensation, and much less to produce thought.

The expression is peculiar and seems to be ironical: the mind is represented as debating its own composition, much as the atoms (ii 978) are imagined as discussing theirs. The text of l. 240 is uncertain: *quaedam* of MSS. has probably intruded from the next l.: for *mens* Munro reads *res*, 'the facts of the case do not admit....'

mente = *secum*.

242. By saying that this substance was nameless, Epic. meant that we know no substance so fine that we can suppose it made of atoms as fine as those of the *quarta natura*.

245. **didit**, 'distributes.' Every sensation of pleasure or pain, and every mental process, originates in this substance.

246. **figuris**, 'atoms': cf. l. 190. In each stage of the transmission of feeling, the substance which receives the feeling is made of larger atoms than the substance which imparts it: the *quarta natura* is at one end of the process, the *ossa* and *medullae* at the other.

247. **motus**: acc. plur. **caeca**, 'invisible': the epithet might have been applied with equal truth to each of the other three components.

248. **omnia**, 'all things,' i.e. the body as well as the soul.

249. **viscera—omnia**, 'every part of the flesh thrills with sensation.' In Lucr. *viscera* never means 'entrails' but always 'flesh,' all that comes between the skin and bone: and this meaning is common in old Latin: cf. Plaut. *Mil. Glor.* 30 *per corium, per viscera,* | *perque os elephanti transmineret bracchium.*

250. The marrow is the last to feel, because it is shut up in the bones, and the sensation must reach them first.

251. **ardor**, 'excitement,' 'emotion.'

252. **huc**, i.e. *in medullas*, a vital part, hence called *αἰών*. Lucr. notes how seldom sensation reaches the marrow; such a hurt must prove mortal.

(This is Heinze's explanation. Munro and others explain *huc* as = *ad quartam naturam*; but the context shows clearly that every sensation, even the slightest, affects the *quarta natura* first.)

acre malum, 'sharp distress.'

255. **partes** *are not the* four elements of the soul, but 'fragments' *of the soul, which is rent in* pieces (*scinditur* l. 531) at death: cf. l. 669.

caulas = *cavulas*, 'little holes,' i.e. pores.

256. **in summo quasi corpore,** 'near the surface of the body': *quasi* is used in the sense of *paene.*

258—287. *The next point is the way in which these four elements are combined so as to produce sensation; but owing to the poverty of the Latin language, I can only explain this in outline. The atoms of the different elements are inextricably mixed up so as to form a single substance. As the soul is unseen and permeates the whole body, so the nameless element, because formed of smaller atoms, is more remote from view than the other three, and permeates the whole soul; it may therefore be regarded as the soul of the soul. So the other three elements are mixed up with one another; any separation of them would destroy sensation.*

259. **compta,** 'united': the word suggests, more than *mixta* does, that the combination is regulated by fixed laws.

260. **patrii sermonis egestas**: at the beginning of the poem (i 139) Lucr. makes the same complaint and excuses himself on that ground for inventing new terminology; it comes again (i 832) when he cannot find a Latin equivalent for ὁμοιομέρεια. Why he repeats it here, we do not know. Epic. may have used some technical term in this connexion, which Lucr. would like to translate but cannot.

261. **summatim,** in spite of its position, seems to belong to *tangam.*

262. **principiorum** is a genitive of *primordia* in Lucr.: hence *princ. motibus* is a more emphatic form of *suis motibus.* The atoms of each element, being perpetually in motion, run in and out of the atoms of all the other elements, so that no local separation (cf. *spatio divisa*) of any one element is possible.

263. **unum** is predicate, not subject: 'separately.'

264. **potestas** = δύναμις, 'function.'

265. **vis,** 'powers': this plur. is used also ii 586.

extant: the subject is not *primordia* but the four elements that compose the soul.

266. **viscere,** 'flesh': see n. to l. 249.

268. **corporis augmen,** 'bulk of body.'

272. The antecedent to **unde** is *mobilis illa vis,* not *ollis.*

273, 274. **latet, subest,** and **infra est** all express the same thing: *that, supposing* a piece of soul could be examined, the *quarta natura, owing to the* excessive smallness of its atoms, would be the last to *be reached* by analysis. Lucr. does not mean that it is more remote *than the other* substances from the surface of the body. For th

sense of *infra* cf. iv 112, where it is said of atoms generally, *sunt infra nostros sensus*.

276—281. These lines explain the phrase *anima est animae*: they completely upset the theory, adopted by many, that the *quarta natura* is confined to the *animus*. As, says Lucr., the soul permeates the whole body but, being made of small atoms, is elusive, so the *quarta natura* permeates the whole soul (and therefore the body), but is elusive for the same reason: thus it is to the soul what the soul is to the body.

281. **dominatur corpore toto**, 'is of paramount importance throughout the whole body.' The same phrase was used (l. 138) of the *animus*; and for this reason the erroneous inference has been drawn that the *quarta natura* is confined to the *animus*.

The *dominium* of the *anima* is an effective occupation of the whole body; the *dominium* of the *animus* is rule carried on from a central position.

282. **consimili ratione**: just in the same way the three other substances are inextricably mixed up with one another.

283. **commixta**: neut. plur.: see n. to l. 66: the emphasis falls on this word, not on *vigeant*.

284. 'And that one should be (continually) more concealed or more prominent than another': i.e. all are equally concealed and equally prominent. Lucr. is trying to express a very difficult notion. He seems to mean: as the *quarta natura* hides behind the other three, owing to its composition, so each of them is constantly hiding behind the others, with the result that no one is more prominent than any other.

aliis may be either dat. after *subsit* or abl. after *magis*.

(Munro gives a different explanation of the l., i.e. *aliud aliis magis subsit in hac re, magis emineat in illa re*. To this there seem two objections: (1) that a change of text in l. 288 (*etenim* for *etiam*) is required; (2) that *ut* must then have the limiting or restricting sense which is confined to *ita ut*.)

285. **unum**, 'a single substance.'

286. **ni** has here the sense of *ne*: so *nive* ii 734.

seorsum implies hostility: the word is scanned as a dissyllable.

287. **diducta**, 'by their separation from one another.'

288—322. *The first three component parts of the soul may be seen in (1) states of mind, (2) temperaments: anger is the sign of the warmth, fear of the wind, tranquillity of the air. As the lion is fierce, the stag frightened, and the ox placid, so there are differences*

of temperament in men, which are all due to different shapes of soul-atoms; but no man's temperament is such that philosophy will not make him good and happy.

288. As a new topic begins here, I have marked a fresh paragraph. The connexion seems to be this: though the atoms of the three substances are absolutely intermingled, yet there are times when the state of a man's mind shows that the atoms of one substance preponderate; and there are men (and other animals) in whom one of the three substances is normally preponderant.

etiam, i.e. as well as the *calor* necessary for the generation of *sensus*.

calor ille: i.e. not the normal *vapor* of the soul, but a special manifestation of warmth.

sumit, 'displays': the subject is *animus*. We are dealing now with the mind, the seat of passion, not with the soul.

289. **acribus**, 'eager.'

290. **est**, sc. *animo*.

The essential characteristics of *ventus* (or *aura*) are cold and motion: cf. l. 299 foll.

291. **horrorem**, 'shuddering.'

concitat artus = makes them run away.

292. **etiam quoque**: for this pleonasm, common in Lucr., cf. l. 208.

The essential characteristic of *aer* is stillness or tranquillity. Epic. is quoted by Stobaeus as saying of these three elements of the soul (Usener *l. l.* p. 218) *τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἠρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος ἐμποιεῖν*. But Lucr. here goes further and attributes to them, not merely physical but mental phenomena.

298. **irarum fluctus**: the metaphor is from a boiling kettle.

299. **ventosa est**, 'is full of wind,' *ventus* being used in its technical sense.

306. **cervos** and **leones** are acc. in apposition with *utrosque*.

307. **sic**: i.e. there are differences of temperament among men also. But in men natural instinct is modified by will and training.

doctrina is 'education' generally, which makes civilised men superficially alike.

308. **illa**: neut. plur.: it is nearly = *prima*.

309. **vestigia** governs *naturae*.

310. Perhaps this is said in refutation of the Stoic dogma that the *sapiens* is entirely virtuous.

311. **proclivius**, 'more readily': Lucr. has in his mind the original meaning of the word, 'down-hill,' as the verb *decurrat* shows.

313. **clementius aequo**, 'more meekly than is right': this man is wanting in proper pride.

315. **sequacis**, 'clinging': it is proverbially difficult for a man to change his character: cf. *curae sequaces* (ii 48).

316. **caecas**, 'invisible.' The differences of character all depend upon the different shapes of atoms which form the soul.

317. **quot**: supply *figurae*, not *nomina*.

319. **illud**=τόδε; 'one thing.'

firmare, 'to assert': *confirmare* is commoner in this sense.

320. **naturarum**=of natural defects.

321. **ratio**, 'philosophy': of course the Epicurean philosophy alone is credited with this power.

322. So Epicurus ends his letter to Menoeceus (Usener *l. l.* p. 66) with the promise that by studying this philosophy he shall be free from disquietude by night and by day, and shall live as a god among men.

323—349. *Soul and body are in intimate union with each other: on the one hand, the body keeps the soul together; on the other hand, the soul imparts life to the body. The relation between the two is so close that the soul cannot be withdrawn from the body without the destruction of both. Sensation is produced by their union. The body cannot exist apart from the soul. Their close union is proved by the fact that they cannot exist separately.*

This argument would be clearer if Lucr. had not omitted to prove one half of it, i.e. that the existence of the soul depends upon the body: he only proves that the existence of the body depends upon the soul. But there is a reason for the omission: for the second part of the book (ll. 417—829) consists entirely of arguments to show that the soul cannot exist without the body.

323. **haec natura**=this thing, i.e. the soul, comprising the *animus* and the *anima*.

tenetur, 'is sheltered,' represents στεγάζεται which Epicurus uses in the same connexion: see n. to l. 569.

324. **ipsa**, 'in turn.'

salutis, 'existence': so *salvus* often=*vivus*.

326. **pernicie**, 'destruction to both.'

non posse videntur, 'they clearly cannot be': cf. ll. 333, 338, and *see n. to l. 164*.

328. **haud facile est**='it is impossible.'

natura eius, i.e. the frankincense itself. The illustration would be more exact, if Lucr. had said that both the scent and the stuff itself would be destroyed: the soul is to the body as the scent is to the bit of frankincense.

330. **omnia**, i.e. both soul and body.

331. **inplexis** goes with *inter se*, 'interlaced.' The relation between soul and body is like that between the different elements of the soul.

principiis, 'atoms': cf. l. 262: *primordiis*, like *primordiorum*, is excluded by the metre.

332. **consorti—vita**, 'possessing life as joint partners': the metaphor is commercial: life is a *sors* or patrimony which they hold jointly.

333. **quaeque** is used, where we should expect *altera*, because of its affinity for *sibi*.

335. The way in which sensation begins with the *quarta natura* of the soul, and is transmitted step by step to the body, was described ll. 246—251: it is by the combined atomic motions of soul and body that sensation is 'kindled and blown into flame throughout our flesh.' See Introd. p. xiii.

Lucr. here speaks as if sensation were produced by the mere juxtaposition of body and soul, just as water is produced by the juxtaposition of oxygen and hydrogen. But this is not so: sensation is inherent in the soul, and is communicated by the soul to the body (cf. l. 357).

337. Now comes an argument from experience to prove the fact stated in l. 324, i.e. that the body cannot exist apart from the soul, in fact that the soul is *causa salutis* of the body. It begins with **praeterea** which implies that the fact stated in l. 323 has already been proved: but, as a matter of fact, no argument has preceded it, but only a statement that body and soul are indispensable to each other, then an illustration of that statement, and then a repetition of it.

339. **enim**: there is a similar elision of *quidem* l. 904; but elision of either an iambic or a cretic (–⏑–) before a short vowel is rare in dactylic verse.

ut, 'in the way that....'

340. **qui datus est**: i.e. the heat is not inherent in the water but comes from without, and has been added to the water to make it boil.

convellitur, 'is torn in pieces.'

341. **penitus** qualifies *convulsi*.

342. **conque putrescunt**: the tmesis is a device to introduce an unmetrical word: cf. *inque pediri* (l. 484).

344. This is equivalent to: *corpus atque anima mutuis contagiis discunt vitalis motus.*

348. **coniunctast causa salutis,** 'the cause of their existence depends on their reciprocal action': for *coniuncta*, cf. *contagia* (l. 345): they are equivalents for *συμπάσχειν* and *συμπάθεια*: see n. to l. 153.

349. **naturam eorum**=*ea*, i.e. the body and the soul: see n. to l. 130.

350—369. *The view that sensation is confined to the soul and not shared by the body, is refuted by experience. It is true that the body loses sensation at death; but sensation was not during life inherent in the body. The eyes have sensation and see: it is not the mind that does the seeing: experience proves this.*

I think Giussani is clearly right in not marking a new paragraph at l. 359. There is no new argument but only an illustration of what goes before.

350. **refutat,** 'tries to disprove.'

352. **nominitare** is used for *nominare* for metrical reasons; and so *imperitare* for *imperare* (l. 1028).

353. 'He is fighting against certain facts which are actually (*vel*) plain to the senses.' Epicurus insists that all that our senses tell us is *ἐναργές* (*manifestum*, 'clearly true'): cf. Usener *l. l.* p. 5 *κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν*: Cic. *De Fin.* i 22 (of Epicurus) *iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit.* See Introd. p. ix.

354. 'For who will ever explain what sensation of the body is, if that, which our experience (**res**) has made clear and taught us, does not explain it?': i.e. our senses themselves tell us that the body feels, and there is no other explanation possible.

corpus sentire=*τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα*, and is used as the nom. of a noun. The phrase must stand for 'the *apparent* sensation of the body,' as Lucr. cannot expect his opponents to explain what they deny to be the case.

adferet, sc. *rationem*: so Lucr. (i 566) uses *reddere* for *reddere rationem*, 'to explain.'

355. **si non**: supply *id adferet.*

palam dedit=*palam fecit, dare* often having this meaning in old Latin: so *dat stragem* (i 288), and *turbas dare* (often in Plautus).

356. **at** introduces an objection: viz. the fact that the body loses sensation at death, proves that it did not enjoy sensation during life.

undique, 'altogether.'

357. **enim**, 'yes: for...': Lucr. admits the fact but denies the inference. Sensation is inherent (*proprium*) in the soul but not in the body, not even during life (*in aevo*): see n. to l. 335 and cf. Epic. (Usener *l. l.* p. 20) διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν (τὸ σῶμα)· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ (*proprium*) ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν.

358. **praeterea**='other things': the body loses not only sensation but heat, motion, etc.

expellitur aevo, 'it is driven forth from life': this is said of the body, though it would be more appropriately said of the man himself.

(The chief objection to Munro's reading is that it requires a difficult change of subject.)

359. Sight, as one of the senses, is now considered. The view, here disputed, that the mind sees and that the eyes are merely windows through which the mind looks, was common in antiquity and held both by Peripatetics and Stoics: cf. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i 46 *nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quae videmus; neque est enim ullus sensus in corpore, sed...viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris a sede animi perforatae....ut facile intellegi possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis, quae quasi fenestrae sint animi.*

360. **foribus**: Cic. *l. l.* has *fenestrae*, and the Greek statements of the argument generally have θυρίδες, which is more appropriate: and probably *fores* here is a translation of θυρίδες.

361. **difficilest**, 'is impossible': cf. l. 328: it is of course possible to hold the view but impossible to make it good. The view is contradicted by the feeling we have that our eyes see: such a feeling is *manifestum* and over-rides all argument.

362. 'For our sensation draws and drives us to the eyes themselves': i.e. at the moment of seeing, our sensation conclusively points (*detrudit*) to the eyes, not the mind, as the organs which see. The object to be supplied with the verbs is *nos* or *mentem nostram*.

363. This is especially obvious when the eyes are dazzled and blinded by a brilliant light: in such a case the eyes would see all the better, if the mind did the seeing.

364. **lumina**, 'the eyes': **luminibus**, 'by the light': such a play on words is very attractive to Lucr.: cf. i 336 *officium...officere*; i 875 *latitandi...latitare.*

365. *But no* excess of light would prevent a window from giving *light to a room.*

quod=*praepediri.*

quia cernimus ipsi, 'because it is we ourselves that do the seeing,' not the window or door.

366. **laborem**, 'distress,' caused by excess of light.

367. The last argument is ironical: if the eyes are windows, then put them out, in order to see better; for a room will receive more light, if you remove the windows, sashes and all.

368. **iam**, 'in that case': cf. l. 428.

370—395. *You must not adopt the opinion of Democritus that in our body there is an atom of soul for every atom of body. This is not so; the atoms of soul are fewer. This is shown by the fact that very small and very light substances may touch our body without causing sensation: in such a case atoms of the body have been touched but not atoms of the soul. Many atoms of the body must be touched before one atom of the soul is touched and so produces sensation.*

370. **illud** = 'one view': cf. l. 319.

371. **Democriti—sententia**, 'the opinion of the revered sage, Democritus': *sancta* belongs properly to *viri*: Lucr. would not apply the epithet to an opinion which he proceeds to refute. The l. is repeated (v 622) of a *sententia* which Lucr. approves.

372, 373. 'That each single atom of the body is placed next to a single atom of the soul, and that the two come time about and so make up the fabric of our limbs.'

privis is used for the unmetrical *singulis*. Lucr. often uses *singula*, but *privo*, *privas*, *privos*, and *privis*.

alternis is an adv.

variare is used intransitively.

374. **animae elementa**: for the hiatus, cf. vi 755 *loci ope*.

375. **quibus e**: for the order of words, cf. ll. 839, 858.

377. **dumtaxat ut**... explains *rara*: 'they are thinly scattered, in so far at least that you can guarantee' etc.

378—380. 'That the atoms of soul keep spaces between them proportionate to (**tanta**) the size of the small (**quantula**) bodies which, if thrown upon us, are first (**prima**) able to excite sensation in the body': i.e. if a particle of dust touch the skin, without being felt, then the distance between two atoms of the soul must be greater than this particle.

prima *goes with* *ciere*, not with *corpora*, which are not atoms but *xternal bodies*, e.g. dust.

exordia prima = *primordia.*

Giussani acutely points out that most of the following examples seem not to agree with the rule given. A spider's web, for instance, must, owing to its length, touch many atoms of soul: it is much larger than the point of a needle, to which atoms of the soul respond readily enough. In this case the important element is lightness (cf. l. 387), not smallness. It seems likely that, according to Epicurus, there are no atoms of soul on the absolute surface of the body, so that a very light object, even if of some length, touches atoms of the body only, whereas a heavier object, by carrying its impression deeper, does reach atoms of the soul. And I think Lucr. may have intended to express this here: in fact, the *intervalla* are not of superficies, but of profundity.

382. **incussam cretam** has generally been explained by the use of *creta* as a cosmetic. Giussani thinks that there is a reference to a practical joke of street-boys (see n. to l. 196) who, unperceived, strike people on the back with an object marked with chalk; but surely *vestibus* would be needed then, not *membris.*

383. **aranei**: the last two syllables coalesce: *aranea* is the common form of the word. The 'withered garment' of the spider is her web: cf. Prop. iv 6, 33 *putris aranea.*

386. **pappos**, 'thistle-down.'

387. **gravatim**, 'not lightly,' i.e. 'with difficulty,' is said in playful contrast with *levitate.*

389. **priva**, 'separate,' = *singula* : cf. l. 372.

390. **et cetera** is an euphemism: cf. l. 481: Lucr. declines to mention *pulices*, *cimices* and even more disgusting little creatures; but he hints at them.

391—393. 'So many things must be stirred up within us, before the atoms of the soul, scattered throughout the frame in our bodies, perceive that atoms (of the body) have been struck': i.e. the shock, that a touch imparts to atoms of the body, must be considerable, before it can reach atoms of the soul and so produce sensation.

391. **multa** certainly refers to atoms of the body; but it is doubtful whether it is necessary to make it agree with *primordia* (so Munro) in the next l.

392. **primordia** is acc., **semina** is nom. and subject to *sentiscant.*

394. **quam in his**: for the hiatus, cf. l. 1082.

in his intervallis, 'being separate as I have said' in l. 380.

tuditantia: a true frequentative: the atoms strike and strike again ~ainst each other.

possint: the subject is *animae semina*.

395. The *motus sensiferi* are in this way initiated by the atoms of the soul.

396—416. *In the soul, the* animus *is the part which is essential to life: large parts of the* anima *may be withdrawn from the body without life ceasing; but the withdrawal of the* animus *is followed at once by death. The eye affords an example: the least injury to the pupil results in blindness; but much of the rest of the eye-ball may be cut away without injury to the power of seeing.*

The last three paragraphs dealt with relations between the soul and body: we now return to relations between the two parts of the soul.

396. **vitai claustra**: life is entrenched against the siege of death, and the chief 'defender of the fortress' is the *animus*.

est...coercens, 'has power to keep close': the phrase denotes a permanent characteristic, whereas *coercet* would denote a single action: the corresponding idiom is common in Greek.

397. **ad vitam** = 'to retain life.'

398. **mens** and **animus** are synonyms: cf. l. 94.

400. **comes** = 'going with it.'

403. A limb or two may be removed from the body, and the *anima* included in these limbs may be removed also; yet the man may go on living.

quamvis est: for the mood, cf. l. 705. Of this constr. there are only two instances in Lucr., one each in Cicero (but this is disputed) and Livy. The Augustan poets use it often: Tacitus, Juvenal, and Martial never have it.

404. **truncus** is a noun, 'the trunk.'

membris here is the remaining part of the body, i.e. the trunk; in l. 403 it refers to the severed limbs. The repetition is not happy.

406. **si non...**, **at magna parte**: this is the Latin idiom for 'the greater part, if not all': cf. ii 1017 *si non omnia sunt, at multo maxima pars est | consimilis*; Cic. *pro Sest.* 7 *si non omnem, at aliquam partem maeroris sui.*

omnimodis = *omnino*. The loss of all the *anima* would be fatal; cp. l. 410.

409. **vivata potestas**, 'the living power': again l. 558.

410. **orbis** is the outer circle of the eye, **acies** below is 'the pupil.' The negative force of *ne* is carried on to the next line.

412. **eorum**, i.e. of the pupil and of the ball. So, if all the *anima* be removed, there will be an end of both *anima* and *animus*.

415. **alioqui**, 'otherwise,' though a rare word in poetry, is perfectly appropriate here; to reject the verse (so Lachmann) on that ground seems unreasonable, and to emend it unnecessary. The addition of *est* seems necessary, as Lucr. would hardly omit the verb in such a sentence.

416. **vincti**: *vincta* would be more normal: cf. l. 136: the masc. plur. is regular when the nouns are names of persons: e.g. *Orgetorix et filia capti sunt.*

417—444. *I shall now set forth proofs of the mortality of the soul. (Whether I use the word* animus *or* anima, *you will understand that I denote the soul by either, indifferently.) First then, I have shown that the atoms of the soul are smaller and have less cohesion than the atoms of water. But water pours away and disappears, when the vessel that contains it is broken. Therefore the soul is at once dissolved into atoms, when withdrawn from the body which contains it.*

The first subject of the book is now ended, and the second begins after a preface of eight lines. This is the kernel of the whole poem, for the supreme object of φυσιολογία is to demonstrate that there is no future life, and therefore no possibility of future suffering, for the soul.

417. **nunc age**, 'now mark me': the phrase generally marks the beginning of a new and important theme: cf. i 265 and 921.

nativos et mortalis esse, 'were born and must die': the one fact implies the other, so that Lucr. often uses *nativus* as a synonym of *mortalis*. Yet both epithets are needed here: for the ancient champions of the immortality of the soul, chiefly the Platonists and Pythagoreans, held that the life of the soul 'extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future' (Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* p. 19); while the modern popular belief is that the soul was born, or created, but will never die. Lucr. argues first against the immortality of the soul (ll. 425—669), then against its pre-existence (ll. 670—783).

418. **levis**: the epithet adds poetry to the passage and also indicates some of the arguments which are to follow.

419. Here again the language does not suggest that Lucr. is simply *translating* a popular hand-book of Epicureanism. See n. to l. 10. *Munro* believes that all the arguments are taken from one of the *37 volumina* of Epicurus περὶ φύσεως.

420. **cura**: some edd. keep *vita* of the MSS. and say that *vita*= *moribus*, or that the words mean 'worthy to be your rule of life.' I cannot think either interpretation possible.

422. **verbi causa**, 'for example,' refers to *animam*: *animum* would have done as well, he means.

dicere pergam, 'I shall in future speak of....'

423. **dicere**: the subject *me* is understood.

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quatenus: see n. to l. 218.

est: the verb is attracted into the sing. by the predicate *unum*.

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Smoke and mist are chosen because of their *tenuitas*; the imago of

of temperament in men, which are all due to different shapes of soul-atoms; but no man's temperament is such that philosophy will not make him good and happy.

288. As a new topic begins here, I have marked a fresh paragraph. The connexion seems to be this: though the atoms of the three substances are absolutely intermingled, yet there are times when the state of a man's mind shows that the atoms of one substance preponderate; and there are men (and other animals) in whom one of the three substances is normally preponderant.

etiam, i.e. as well as the *calor* necessary for the generation of *sensus*.

calor ille: i.e. not the normal *vapor* of the soul, but a special manifestation of warmth.

sumit, 'displays': the subject is *animus*. We are dealing now with the mind, the seat of passion, not with the soul.

289. **acribus**, 'eager.'

290. **est**, sc. *animo*.

The essential characteristics of *ventus* (or *aura*) are cold and motion: cf. l. 299 foll.

291. **horrorem**, 'shuddering.'

concitat artus = makes them run away.

292. **etiam quoque**: for this pleonasm, common in Lucr., cf. l. 208.

The essential characteristic of *aer* is stillness or tranquillity. Epic. is quoted by Stobaeus as saying of these three elements of the soul (Usener *l. l.* p. 218) *τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἠρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος ἐμποιεῖν*. But Lucr. here goes further and attributes to them, not merely physical but mental phenomena.

298. **irarum fluctus**: the metaphor is from a boiling kettle.

299. **ventosa est**, 'is full of wind,' *ventus* being used in its technical sense.

306. **cervos** and **leones** are acc. in apposition with *utrosque*.

307. **sic**: i.e. there are differences of temperament among men also. But in men natural instinct is modified by will and training.

doctrina is 'education' generally, which makes civilised men superficially alike.

308. **illa**: neut. plur.: it is nearly = *prima*.

309. **vestigia** governs *naturae*.

310. Perhaps this is said in refutation of the Stoic dogma that the *sapiens* is entirely virtuous.

311. **proclivius**, 'more readily': Lucr. has in his mind the original meaning of the word, 'down-hill,' as the verb *decurrat* shows.

313. **clementius aequo**, 'more meekly than is right': this man is wanting in proper pride.

315. **sequacis**, 'clinging': it is proverbially difficult for a man to change his character: cf. *curae sequaces* (ii 48).

316. **caecas**, 'invisible.' The differences of character all depend upon the different shapes of atoms which form the soul.

317. **quot**: supply *figurae*, not *nomina*.

319. **illud** = τόδε; 'one thing.'

firmare, 'to assert': *confirmare* is commoner in this sense.

320. **naturarum** = of natural defects.

321. **ratio**, 'philosophy': of course the Epicurean philosophy alone is credited with this power.

322. So Epicurus ends his letter to Menoeceus (Usener *l. l.* p. 66) with the promise that by studying this philosophy he shall be free from disquietude by night and by day, and shall live as a god among men.

323—349. *Soul and body are in intimate union with each other: on the one hand, the body keeps the soul together; on the other hand, the soul imparts life to the body. The relation between the two is so close that the soul cannot be withdrawn from the body without the destruction of both. Sensation is produced by their union. The body cannot exist apart from the soul. Their close union is proved by the fact that they cannot exist separately.*

This argument would be clearer if Lucr. had not omitted to prove one half of it, i.e. that the existence of the soul depends upon the body: he only proves that the existence of the body depends upon the soul. But there is a reason for the omission: for the second part of the book (ll. 417—829) consists entirely of arguments to show that the soul cannot exist without the body.

323. **haec natura** = this thing, i.e. the soul, comprising the *animus* and the *anima*.

tenetur, 'is sheltered,' represents στεγάζεται which Epicurus uses in the same connexion: see n. to l. 569.

324. **ipsa**, 'in turn.'

salutis, 'existence': so *salvus* often = *vivus*.

326. **pernicie**, 'destruction to both.'

non posse videntur, 'they clearly cannot be': cf. ll. 333, 338, and see n. to l. 164.

328. **haud facile est** = 'it is impossible.'

natura eius, i.e. the frankincense itself. The illustration would be more exact, if Lucr. had said that both the scent and the stuff itself would be destroyed: the soul is to the body as the scent is to the bit of frankincense.

330. **omnia**, i.e. both soul and body.

331. **inplexis** goes with *inter se*, 'interlaced.' The relation between soul and body is like that between the different elements of the soul.

principiis, 'atoms': cf. l. 262: *primordiis*, like *primordiorum*, is excluded by the metre.

332. **consorti—vita**, 'possessing life as joint partners': the metaphor is commercial: life is a *sors* or patrimony which they hold jointly.

333. **quaeque** is used, where we should expect *altera*, because of its affinity for *sibi*.

335. The way in which sensation begins with the *quarta natura* of the soul, and is transmitted step by step to the body, was described ll. 246—251: it is by the combined atomic motions of soul and body that sensation is 'kindled and blown into flame throughout our flesh.' See Introd. p. xiii.

Lucr. here speaks as if sensation were produced by the mere juxtaposition of body and soul, just as water is produced by the juxtaposition of oxygen and hydrogen. But this is not so: sensation is inherent in the soul, and is communicated by the soul to the body (cf. l. 357).

337. Now comes an argument from experience to prove the fact stated in l. 324, i.e. that the body cannot exist apart from the soul, in fact that the soul is *causa salutis* of the body. It begins with **praeterea** which implies that the fact stated in l. 323 has already been proved: but, as a matter of fact, no argument has preceded it, but only a statement that body and soul are indispensable to each other, then an illustration of that statement, and then a repetition of it.

339. **enim**: there is a similar elision of *quidem* l. 904; but elision of either an iambic or a cretic (–⏑–) before a short vowel is rare in dactylic verse.

ut, 'in the way that....'

340. **qui datus est**: i.e. the heat is not inherent in the water but comes from without, and has been added to the water to make it boil.

convellitur, 'is torn in pieces.'

343. **penitus** qualifies *convulsi*.

conque putrescunt: the tmesis is a device to introduce an unmetrical word: cf. *inque pediri* (l. 484).

344. This is equivalent to: *corpus atque anima mutuis contagiis discunt vitalis motus.*

348. **coniunctast causa salutis,** 'the cause of their existence depends on their reciprocal action': for *coniuncta*, cf. *contagia* (l. 345): they are equivalents for *συμπάσχειν* and *συμπάθεια*: see n. to l. 153.

349. **naturam eorum**=*ea*, i.e. the body and the soul: see n. to l. 130.

350—369. *The view that sensation is confined to the soul and not shared by the body, is refuted by experience. It is true that the body loses sensation at death; but sensation was not during life inherent in the body. The eyes have sensation and see: it is not the mind that does the seeing: experience proves this.*

I think Giussani is clearly right in not marking a new paragraph at l. 359. There is no new argument but only an illustration of what goes before.

350. **refutat,** 'tries to disprove.'

352. **nominitare** is used for *nominare* for metrical reasons; and so *imperitare* for *imperare* (l. 1028).

353. 'He is fighting against certain facts which are actually (*vel*) plain to the senses.' Epicurus insists that all that our senses tell us is *ἐναργές* (*manifestum*, 'clearly true'): cf. Usener *l. l.* p. 5 *κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν*: Cic. *De Fin.* i 22 (of Epicurus) *iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit.* See Introd. p. ix.

354. 'For who will ever explain what sensation of the body is, if that, which our experience (**res**) has made clear and taught us, does not explain it?': i.e. our senses themselves tell us that the body feels, and there is no other explanation possible.

corpus sentire=*τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα*, and is used as the nom. of a noun. The phrase must stand for 'the *apparent* sensation of the body,' as Lucr. cannot expect his opponents to explain what they deny to be the case.

adferet, sc. *rationem*: so Lucr. (i 566) uses *reddere* for *reddere rationem*, 'to explain.'

355. **si non**: supply *id adferet.*

palam dedit=*palam fecit, dare* often having this meaning in old Latin: so *dat stragem* (i 288), and *turbas dare* (often in Plautus).

356. **at** introduces an objection: viz. the fact that the body loses sensation at death, proves that it did not enjoy sensation during life.

undique, 'altogether.'

357. **enim**, 'yes: for...': Lucr. admits the fact but denies the inference. Sensation is inherent (*proprium*) in the soul but not in the body, not even during life (*in aevo*): see n. to l. 335 and cf. Epic. (Usener *l. l.* p. 20) διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν (τὸ σῶμα)· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ (*proprium*) ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν.

358. **praeterea**='other things': the body loses not only sensation but heat, motion, etc.

expellitur aevo, 'it is driven forth from life': this is said of the body, though it would be more appropriately said of the man himself.

(The chief objection to Munro's reading is that it requires a difficult change of subject.)

359. Sight, as one of the senses, is now considered. The view, here disputed, that the mind sees and that the eyes are merely windows through which the mind looks, was common in antiquity and held both by Peripatetics and Stoics: cf. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i 46 *nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quae videmus; neque est enim ullus sensus in corpore, sed...viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris a sede animi perforatae....ut facile intellegi possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis, quae quasi fenestrae sint animi.*

360. **foribus**: Cic. *l. l.* has *fenestrae*, and the Greek statements of the argument generally have θυρίδες, which is more appropriate: and probably *fores* here is a translation of θυρίδες.

361. **difficilest**, 'is impossible': cf. l. 328: it is of course possible to hold the view but impossible to make it good. The view is contradicted by the feeling we have that our eyes see: such a feeling is *manifestum* and over-rides all argument.

362. 'For our sensation draws and drives us to the eyes themselves': i.e. at the moment of seeing, our sensation conclusively points (*detrudit*) to the eyes, not the mind, as the organs which see. The object to be supplied with the verbs is *nos* or *mentem nostram*.

363. This is especially obvious when the eyes are dazzled and blinded by a brilliant light: in such a case the eyes would see all the better, if the mind did the seeing.

364. **lumina**, 'the eyes': **luminibus**, 'by the light': such a play on words is very attractive to Lucr.: cf. i 336 *officium...officere*; i 875 *latitandi...latitare*.

365. *But no* excess of light would prevent a window from giving *light to a room.*

quod=*praepediri.*

quia cernimus ipsi, 'because it is we ourselves that do the seeing,' not the window or door.

366. **laborem**, 'distress,' caused by excess of light.

367. The last argument is ironical: if the eyes are windows, then put them out, in order to see better; for a room will receive more light, if you remove the windows, sashes and all.

368. **iam**, 'in that case': cf. l. 428.

370—395. *You must not adopt the opinion of Democritus that in our body there is an atom of soul for every atom of body. This is not so; the atoms of soul are fewer. This is shown by the fact that very small and very light substances may touch our body without causing sensation: in such a case atoms of the body have been touched but not atoms of the soul. Many atoms of the body must be touched before one atom of the soul is touched and so produces sensation.*

370. **illud** = 'one view': cf. l. 319.

371. **Democriti—sententia**, 'the opinion of the revered sage, Democritus': *sancta* belongs properly to *viri*: Lucr. would not apply the epithet to an opinion which he proceeds to refute. The l. is repeated (v 622) of a *sententia* which Lucr. approves.

372, 373. 'That each single atom of the body is placed next to a single atom of the soul, and that the two come time about and so make up the fabric of our limbs.'

privis is used for the unmetrical *singulis*. Lucr. often uses *singula*, but *privo*, *privas*, *privos*, and *privis*.

alternis is an adv.

variare is used intransitively.

374. **animae elementa**: for the hiatus, cf. vi 755 *loci ope*.

375. **quibus e**: for the order of words, cf. ll. 839, 858.

377. **dumtaxat ut**... explains *rara*: 'they are thinly scattered, in so far at least that you can guarantee' etc.

378—380. 'That the atoms of soul keep spaces between them proportionate to (**tanta**) the size of the small (**quantula**) bodies which, if thrown upon us, are first (**prima**) able to excite sensation in the body': i.e. if a particle of dust touch the skin, without being felt, then the distance between two atoms of the soul must be greater than this particle.

prima goes with *ciere*, not with *corpora*, which are not atoms but external bodies, e.g. dust.

exordia prima = *primordia.*

Giussani acutely points out that most of the following examples seem not to agree with the rule given. A spider's web, for instance, must, owing to its length, touch many atoms of soul: it is much larger than the point of a needle, to which atoms of the soul respond readily enough. In this case the important element is lightness (cf. l. 387), not smallness. It seems likely that, according to Epicurus, there are no atoms of soul on the absolute surface of the body, so that a very light object, even if of some length, touches atoms of the body only, whereas a heavier object, by carrying its impression deeper, does reach atoms of the soul. And I think Lucr. may have intended to express this here: in fact, the *intervalla* are not of superficies, but of profundity.

382. **incussam cretam** has generally been explained by the use of *creta* as a cosmetic. Giussani thinks that there is a reference to a practical joke of street-boys (see n. to l. 196) who, unperceived, strike people on the back with an object marked with chalk; but surely *vestibus* would be needed then, not *membris.*

383. **aranei**: the last two syllables coalesce: *aranea* is the common form of the word. The 'withered garment' of the spider is her web: cf. Prop. iv 6, 33 *putris aranea.*

386. **pappos**, 'thistle-down.'

387. **gravatim**, 'not lightly,' i.e. 'with difficulty,' is said in playful contrast with *levitate.*

389. **priva**, 'separate,' = *singula*: cf. l. 372.

390. **et cetera** is an euphemism: cf. l. 481: Lucr. declines to mention *pulices, cimices* and even more disgusting little creatures; but he hints at them.

391—393. 'So many things must be stirred up within us, before the atoms of the soul, scattered throughout the frame in our bodies, perceive that atoms (of the body) have been struck': i.e. the shock, that a touch imparts to atoms of the body, must be considerable, before it can reach atoms of the soul and so produce sensation.

391. **multa** certainly refers to atoms of the body; but it is doubtful whether it is necessary to make it agree with *primordia* (so Munro) in the next l.

392. **primordia** is acc., **semina** is nom. and subject to *sentiscant.*

394. **quam in his**: for the hiatus, cf. l. 1082.

in his **intervallis**, 'being separate as I have said' in l. 380.

tuditantia: a true frequentative: the atoms strike and strike again *against each other.*

possint: the subject is *animae semina.*

395. The *motus sensiferi* are in this way initiated by the atoms of the soul.

396—416. *In the soul, the* animus *is the part which is essential to life: large parts of the* anima *may be withdrawn from the body without life ceasing; but the withdrawal of the* animus *is followed at once by death. The eye affords an example: the least injury to the pupil results in blindness; but much of the rest of the eye-ball may be cut away without injury to the power of seeing.*

The last three paragraphs dealt with relations between the soul and body: we now return to relations between the two parts of the soul.

396. **vitai claustra**: life is entrenched against the siege of death, and the chief 'defender of the fortress' is the *animus.*

est...coercens, 'has power to keep close': the phrase denotes a permanent characteristic, whereas *coercet* would denote a single action: the corresponding idiom is common in Greek.

397. **ad vitam**='to retain life.'

398. **mens** and **animus** are synonyms: cf. l. 94.

400. **comes**='going with it.'

403. A limb or two may be removed from the body, and the *anima* included in these limbs may be removed also; yet the man may go on living.

quamvis est: for the mood, cf. l. 705. Of this constr. there are only two instances in Lucr., one each in Cicero (but this is disputed) and Livy. The Augustan poets use it often: Tacitus, Juvenal, and Martial never have it.

404. **truncus** is a noun, 'the trunk.'

membris here is the remaining part of the body, i.e. the trunk; in l. 403 it refers to the severed limbs. The repetition is not happy.

406. **si non...**, **at magna parte**: this is the Latin idiom for 'the greater part, if not all': cf. ii 1017 *si non omnia sunt, at multo maxima pars est | consimilis*; Cic. *pro Sest.* 7 *si non omnem, at aliquam partem maeroris sui.*

omnimodis=*omnino.* The loss of all the *anima* would be fatal; cp. l. 410.

409. **vivata potestas**, 'the living power': again l. 558.

410. **orbis** is the outer circle of the eye, **acies** below is 'the pupil.' The negative force of *ne* is carried on to the next line.

412. **eorum**, i.e. of the pupil and of the ball. So, if all the *anima* be removed, there will be an end of both *anima* and *animus*.

415. **alioqui**, 'otherwise,' though a rare word in poetry, is perfectly appropriate here; to reject the verse (so Lachmann) on that ground seems unreasonable, and to emend it unnecessary. The addition of *est* seems necessary, as Lucr. would hardly omit the verb in such a sentence.

416. **vincti**: *vincta* would be more normal: cf. l. 136: the masc. plur. is regular when the nouns are names of persons: e.g. *Orgetorix et filia capti sunt.*

417—444. *I shall now set forth proofs of the mortality of the soul. (Whether I use the word* animus *or* anima, *you will understand that I denote the soul by either, indifferently.) First then, I have shown that the atoms of the soul are smaller and have less cohesion than the atoms of water. But water pours away and disappears, when the vessel that contains it is broken. Therefore the soul is at once dissolved into atoms, when withdrawn from the body which contains it.*

The first subject of the book is now ended, and the second begins after a preface of eight lines. This is the kernel of the whole poem, for the supreme object of φυσιολογία is to demonstrate that there is no future life, and therefore no possibility of future suffering, for the soul.

417. **nunc age**, 'now mark me': the phrase generally marks the beginning of a new and important theme: cf. i 265 and 921.

nativos et mortalis esse, 'were born and must die': the one fact implies the other, so that Lucr. often uses *nativus* as a synonym of *mortalis*. Yet both epithets are needed here: for the ancient champions of the immortality of the soul, chiefly the Platonists and Pythagoreans, held that the life of the soul 'extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future' (Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* p. 19); while the modern popular belief is that the soul was born, or created, but will never die. Lucr. argues first against the immortality of the soul (ll. 425—669), then against its pre-existence (ll. 670—783).

418. **levis**: the epithet adds poetry to the passage and also indicates some of the arguments which are to follow.

419. Here again the language does not suggest that Lucr. is simply translating a popular hand-book of Epicureanism. See n. to l. 10. Munro believes that all the arguments are taken from one of the 37 *volumina* of Epicurus περὶ φύσεως.

420. **cura**: some edd. keep *vita* of the MSS. and say that *vita*= *moribus*, or that the words mean 'worthy to be your rule of life.' I cannot think either interpretation possible.

422. **verbi causa**, 'for example,' refers to *animam*: *animum* would have done as well, he means.

dicere pergam, 'I shall in future speak of....'

423. **dicere**: the subject *me* is understood.

424. He reasserts here the gist of ll. 136—160, the close connexion and actual identity of the *animus* and *anima*: 'they are a single thing and one united substance.'

quatenus: see n. to l. 218.

est: the verb is attracted into the sing. by the predicate *unum*.

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430. **imaginibus**: Lucr. uses this word (and *simulacra*) to represent the εἴδωλα by which Epicurus accounted for sensation and thought. These are exceedingly fine films which are constantly being discharged from the surface of all bodies, bearing the exact likeness of the body itself. When we are awake, a succession of these images strikes the atoms of *anima* in our eyes and causes sensation there, so that we see the thing; but when we are asleep, they penetrate to the *animus* and the sensation takes place in it, so that we dream of seeing the object.

Smoke and mist are chosen because of their *tenuitas*; the imago of

an elephant would be of infinite thinness; how much thinner must the *imagines* of smoke and mist be! And the images which strike the soul in sleep are even finer than those which strike the waking eyes: cf. iv 756. Yet they move the soul.

431. **quod genus est**=*velut*: cf. l. 597.

432. **exhalare vaporem**, 'steam forth their heat,' Munro: Lucr. seems never to use *vapor* in any other sense than this.

433. Lucr. is conscious that he has not yet explained the theory of images, and therefore inserts a line to this effect: 'you must not suppose these images seen in sleep are a spontaneous production of the mind: they do really come from external objects.'

procul governs *dubio*.

hinc=*ab his rebus*.

434. **undique** goes with *diffluere*.

440. **vas**: a term often applied to the body as the receptacle of the soul: cf. l. 555; Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i 52 *corpus quidem quasi vas est aut aliquod animi receptaculum*.

441. **cum...nequit**: for the mood, see n. to l. 646: for the ellipse of the pronoun (*eam*), cf. ll. 21—23.

conquassatum: nom.: cf. l. 434.

442. The body loses solidity by the loss of blood from the veins (which modern science calls arteries), and so cannot prevent the soul from escaping through the pores.

443. **qui**: abl.

444. **cohibessit** has the sense of *cohibuerit*: similar forms are *habessit*, *licessit*, and *prohibessit*, all found in Plautus: they are perfect subjunctives of an archaic form, and may be compared with the archaic future in *-so* (e.g. *faxo*, *capso*, *levasso*): the forms are rare after Plautus, but *faxo*, *faxim*, and *ausim* were retained in the classical period.

445—458. *Again, we feel that the soul keeps pace with the body in all stages of its development: it is born, and gains strength, and then loses strength, with it; therefore it also dies with it.*

446. **sentimus**: another appeal to the ἐνάργεια τῆς αἰσθήσεως: see n. to l. 353.

447. **vagantur**, 'walk unsteadily': Martial uses the word of the jerking gait of domestic fowls (iii 58, 12) *vagatur omnis turba sordidae chortis*.

448. **sequitur** is metaphorical, and does not imply sequence in point of place or time: they have little wit 'to match' their feeble gait

449. **inde**, 'later.'

aetas, 'their life.'

450. **auctior**: cf. *dominantior* l. 397: the participle is compared like an adj.

454. **omnia**, 'all the faculties': cf. *As You Like It* II 7 'Sans teeth, sans taste, sans eyes, sans everything.'

455. **convenit**, 'it is suitable' and therefore probable.

animai naturam = *animam*: see n. to l. 130.

456. **ceu fumus**: for the nom., cf. ll. 427, 614.

So Cebes (*Phaedo* 70 A) expresses the fear that the soul, in quitting the body, ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη.

458. **fessa** is neut. plur., agreeing with *animam et animum* understood.

459—525. *Again, as the body is liable to disease, so the mind can feel grief and fear, and must therefore die too. And the mind is affected also by the diseases of the body: the poison of alcohol and the poison of epilepsy affect both mind and body, and both recover when the poison has spent its force. The very fact that the sick mind, like the sick body, can be healed by medicine, is a proof of its mortality: for healing implies change, and an immortal thing will not submit to any change. Therefore the sickness of the mind, and the fact that it can be cured, alike prove its mortality.*

459. **huc accedit uti** is used, like *porro, praeterea, denique*, to bring forward a new argument: transl. 'besides, we see.'

472, 473. I accept Giussani's transposition of this couplet. Lucr. says in effect: 'death is produced by mental disturbance (*dolor*) as well as by physical (*morbus*): we have known people die from intense fear or grief.' But the position of this statement in the MSS. is inappropriate: for Lucr. has there begun a fresh argument, which deals with the effect of *morbus* only, and not *dolor*, upon the soul: there is no *dolor* in lethargy.

There is certainly harshness in the double use of *dolor* for bodily suffering (l. 460) and for mental suffering (l. 472); but Lucr. is not careful to avoid this: cf. the double sense of *membris* ll. 403, 404.

463. There is more than mere analogy: the mind is actually affected by bodily sickness.

466. **aeternum** = 'lifelong': for *soporem* is not 'death' but '*coma*.'

nutu...cadenti, 'with drooping head.'

467. **unde**, 'from which,' is more expressive of remoteness than *ubi*, 'in which,' would be.

471. **quandoquidem** explains *quare* here, as *nam* explains it l. 472.

474, 475 of the MSS. are a senseless interpolation, first struck out of the text by Naugerius in his edition of 1515 A.D.

476. Lucr. regards drunkenness and epilepsy as affecting the soul primarily, though they are attended by physical symptoms.

479. **madet mens**, 'his mind is besotted': *madere*, in this sense, is generally said of the man himself.

480. **singultus** seems to denote the maudlin stage of inebriety. as **clamor** and **iurgia** denote the noisy and quarrelsome stages respectively.

gliscunt, 'run high': cf. iv 1069 *gliscit furor*; v 1061 *gaudia gliscunt.*

481. **et iam cetera**: see n. to l. 390. There are other results of intoxication (cf. Cic. *Phil.* ii 63), which Lucr. declines to specify.

483. **corpore in ipso**, '*within* the body': *ipso* throws emphasis on *in*: the phrase recurs several times below: see n. to l. 506.

484. **inque pediri**: see n. to *conque putrescunt* l. 343.

486. **aevo** = *vita.*

487. He next describes the symptoms of epilepsy, *morbus comitialis*, so called because an epileptic seizure occurring during the *comitia* was taken as an evil omen, so that the meeting came forthwith to an end.

489. **artus**: the acc. of reference, common in all Latin poetry.

492. Lucr. now begins to explain the symptoms: the symptom, which really concerns his present argument, begins with l. 499.

quia vis morbi cet., 'because the force of the disease, spread (?) through his frame, disorders him, he foams at the mouth....'

But it seems probable that at least one l. is lost after this verse, as **distracta** is often in the immediate sequel applied to the soul (cf. ll. 501, 507, 590, 799), but has no meaning when applied to *vis morbi. distracta* cannot be corrupt, because of the reference to it below (l. 500). If the lacuna be granted, Brieger's *vi morbi* is a probable emendation.

493. **agens animam**, 'trying to eject his soul': cf. l. 505. *animam agere* generally means 'to breathe one's last,' but cannot mean quite *this here.*

The subject of **spumat** is the sick man.

495. **exprimitur**, 'is wrung from him.'

496. **omnino**, 'apart from that,' i.e. from the reason just given.

497. In health we produce words at will, and they are properly shaped (*articulata*) by the organs of speech: cf. iv 549 foll.: but in epilepsy the atoms of sound come forth in a confused mass (*glomerata*), though they take their accustomed way, through the mouth.

498. **consuerunt**, sc. *ferri*.

sunt munita viai, 'there is a road ready-made': the metaphor occurs again v 102. Lucr. has also *strata viarum* (iv 415) which does not mean 'the paved parts of the streets' but simply 'the paved streets,' all partitive idea having disappeared from the genitive in these cases.

500. **ut docui**, i.e. in l. 492 and the lost words. But it must be noted that, unless some words are lost there, the reference is not borne out.

The extreme disorder of the soul-atoms is represented by the thrice repeated *dis-*.

501. **veneno** is the same as *vis morbi* in l. 492: cf. i 759.

502. **reflexit** is intrans.: 'has turned back its course.'

503. **umor**: ancient medicine attributed epilepsy either to phlegm or to bile.

504. **vaccillans** was spelt with one *c* l. 479: some ancient authorities derive the word from the waddling gait of the cow. The subject to the verbs is 'the patient.'

omnis, acc. plur.

505. **animam receptat**, 'gets back his soul,' part of which had quitted the body during the fit.

506. **haec**: neut. plur.: i.e. the *animus* and *anima*.

corpore in ipso: see n. to l. 483: if even *within* the body, the soul is liable to such dangers, how much worse its case, when it is no longer *hospes corporis*.

509. **aetatem degere**, 'to go on existing.'

510. The case of cure just mentioned suggests a new argument.

512. **mortalem vivere**, 'lives under sentence of death': there is a kind of play upon words.

513. **aequumst** cet., 'It is only natural that he who tries and attempts to change the mind, should add...': i.e. healing must be effected either by adding to the organism, or subtracting from it, or shifting the order of its parts.

The subj. of *addere* is *eum* understood as antecedent of quicunque.

514. **prorsum** is used like *omnino*, 'in short.'

hilum, common in negative sentences (cf. l. 518), is very rare in an affirmative sentence. Lucr. has only one other instance (iv 515).

515. **quicumque adoritur** refers to the physician.

adorĭtur: cf. Ennius *seu mortuu' sive morĭtur*: *adorĭtur* is never found.

516. **naturam**, 'organism.'

519, 520. 'Whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which was before': i.e. a thing is what it is in virtue of certain characteristics (*fines*) which make it what it is: if it loses these characteristics, it ceases to exist. In the present case, sickness of the soul implies change and therefore death; but exactly the same is true of healing.

Lucr. states this dogma twice elsewhere (i 670, ii 753) and evidently attaches much importance to it. No doubt he found it in Epicurus. It states the main result of the Eleatic philosophy, and denies the transformation theories of the Ionic philosophers, who believed that the ἀρχή (or primary substance of matter) could be transformed: e.g. that water might be the ἀρχή and yet could, by transformation, produce fire. The Eleatics asserted the immutability of substance.

521—525. This is the summing-up of all the five arguments contained in the paragraph.

524. **occurrere**, 'to confront.' The false theory can neither advance nor retreat with safety, as the disproof has two sides, one bearing on the sickness of the soul, the other on its cure.

eunti is=*abeunti*: cf. l. 526.

526—547 are placed in the text after 669: see n. there.

548—557. *The mind is an organ of sensation, like the eye, ear, or hand; and just as these, when separated from the body, lose their powers and decay, so the mind cannot exist apart from the body.*

We have here, and shall have again, the argument which Lucr. only hinted at in ll. 323—349, that the body is *causa salutis* to the soul.

548. The special location of the mind within the body is not of importance to the present argument: the argument founded upon this fact comes l. 615 foll.

550. **sensus**, 'organs of sense': see n. to l. 626.

551. **manus** is the organ of touch: Lucr. is not speaking merely of parts of the body (or he might have instanced crus or pes) but of organs of sensation.

nares is to be noticed: Lucr. substitutes it for *aures* (l. 549), because the removal of the external ear does not prevent hearing.

552. **secreta**: neut. plur.: see n. to *semota* l. 66.

553. **tamen**, 'at any rate': i.e. the parts may exist for a time, but the time will be short.

liquuntur tabe, 'waste away in putrefaction.'

555. **quod** refers to *corpore*, of which *ipso homine* is an explanation.

556, 557. Lucr. says in effect: 'the image of the *vas* is not really satisfactory because a vessel is not united with its contents, whereas the body is 'closely united' with the mind: therefore invent, if you can, a better illustration.'

558—575: 592—606: 576—579. *The same is true of the whole soul. Both the* animus *and the* anima *need the shelter of the body to perform their functions; and when the bodily form is dissolved by death, life and thought come to an end. Even in cases where death does not follow, as in a fainting-fit, the fabric of the soul suffers so much that we must infer that it cannot continue to exist outside the body.*

558. **vivata potestas**, 'the vital energy.'

559. **coniuncta**, 'owing to their combination,' is emphatic: cf. l. 579: neut. plur., as though *corpus atque animus* were the subject.

561. **animi natura** = *animus*: see n. to l. 130.

nec autem, 'nor on the other hand.'

564. **ipse**, 'by itself.'

seorsum governs *corpore*: elsewhere *ab* is added.

565. **anima**: this seems the gist of the paragraph: this, no less than the *animus*, depends on the body for existence.

videtur: see n. to l. 164.

567. **tenentur**: the subject is *primordia* l. 568.

568. 'And the atoms of soul and mind cannot get free and spring apart, leaving wide spaces between them': if they could do this, the whole *concilium*, or assemblage of atoms, would be dissolved into its atoms and cease to exist.

magnis intervallis: abl. of attendant circumstances.

569. **moventur...motus** is an imitation of *κινοῦνται κινήσεις*: cf. Epic. (Usener *l. l.* p. 21) *οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε νοεῖν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, μὴ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συστήματι καὶ ταῖς κινήσεσι ταύταις χρώμενον, ὅταν τὰ στεγάζοντα καὶ περιέχοντα μὴ τοιαῦτα ᾖ, ἐν οἷς νῦν οὖσα* (i.e. ἡ ψυχή) *ἔχει ταύτας τὰς κινήσεις.*

573. *If* the soul, without help from the body, can hold together

and give life to, whatever surrounds it, then the air, into which the disembodied soul passes, will get life from the soul and be a body to it; which is absurd.

animans=*animal*: the latter word is used only once (v 823) by Lucr.

574. **eo**, i.e. *aere*.

concludere, 'inclose': a translation of περιέχειν: see n. to l. 569.

592—606 are inserted here by Munro. As placed in the MSS. they certainly interrupt the argument; but editors are not agreed as to their right place: Christ placed them after 579, Giussani after 612.

Munro's arrangement seems to me the most suitable. There is this objection to it, that the paragraph then ends with a double conclusion, each of four lines and each to the same effect (603—606 and 576—579). This is not like Lucr.

593. **videtur**, 'is seen': see n. to l. 164.

594. **ire**, 'to depart.'

595. **quasi supremo tempore**, 'as if the last hour were come.'

596. **trunco**, abl. of place.

cadere, 'to lose strength': cf. l. 452 *ceciderunt artus*.

597. **quod genus est**, 'so it is'; lit. 'of this kind it is.' We have here two phrases for 'fainting': for *animo male fit*, cf. Plaut. *Mil. Glor.* 1331 *animo male | factumst huic repente*; *Curcul.* 312 *animo male est*; *Rudens* 510 *animo male fit*; Ter. *Ad.* 655 *animo male est*: for the other, which seems to be preferred by later writers, cf. Suet. *Iul.* 45 *repente animo linqui solebat*; Sen. *Epp.* 57, 5 *quidam...succidunt ac linquuntur animo*; *ibid.* 77, 9 *nobis quos aliquando liquit animus*; *id. Nat. Qu.* iv 13, 7 *animo relictos aqua frigida spargimus.*

The exx. show that *liquisse* has an object, *aliquem*, understood.

598. **trepidatur**, 'all is confusion.' This allusion to the anxiety of the bystanders gives vividness to the description and adds a human interest to the bare facts. Cf. ll. 467—469.

599. **reprehendere**, 'to keep from parting.'

601. **haec**: nom. plur. fem.: the only form in Lucr. as in Plautus.

576. **etiam atque etiam**: see n. to l. 228.

577. **tegmine** represents τὰ στεγάζοντα of Epicurus quoted above.

vitalibus auris is a periphrasis for *anima*, as *sensus animi* below is a periphrasis for *animus*.

579. *Cf. ll. 559*, and 348 (of the body and soul) coniunctast causa *salutis*: **causa** here also means 'cause of existence': the life of both body and soul (*duobus*) depends upon their union.

580—591: 607—614. *On the departure of the soul the body rots and falls to pieces: this is because its foundations have been thoroughly broken up by the soul oozing out from every pore and opening of the body. This shows that even the mere process of death rends the soul to pieces. It is certain from experience that the soul does not leave the body as a whole but that it is torn in pieces by death while still in the body.*

582. **ex imo penitusque**, 'from the inmost depths of the body': i.e. you are not to suppose that the last breath of a dying man is his soul: the soul is divided and scattered abroad over all the limbs.

coorta does not contradict this: the particles of soul begin their departure at the same time but not in one mass.

583. **fumus** implies that the particles of soul, once outside the body, have no power of cohesion.

584. The metaphor is from a falling house: hence *ruina*, *conciderit*, *fundamenta*: 'the reason why the body falls down with such hideous change and ruin, is because its foundations are thoroughly shaken.'

587. **viarum flexus**, 'winding ways.'

589. 'That the soul was parted asunder throughout the frame before leaving it': the emphasis falls on *dispertitam*, which therefore begins the l.

590. **sibi**: this is in contrast with the winds which will scatter it more completely when it leaves the body.

607. **sentire**: an appeal to αἴσθησις as the certain source of truth.

608. **incolumem** = 'undivided.'

609. **supera succedere**, 'moving on and up.'

610. The subject is *omnis* understood out of *quisquam* above.

611. **alios**, 'separate,' for the unmetrical *singulos*: this illustrates the previous l.: thus when a dying man feels his sight, for example, growing less, it is in the eyes that he feels life fail.

614. There seems to be a zeugma here, some word like *gauderet*, or perhaps *sentiret*, being understood from *conquereretur*: Heinze quotes Livy xlv 20, 9 *orantes ne nova crimina plus obesse Rhodiis aequum censerent quam antiqua merita*, where *prodesse* must be supplied.

ut anguis: for the nom., cf. l. 456.

615—623. *The fact that the mind has a particular fixed place in the body, shows that it is fitted to exist there and nowhere else, because it is a natural law that each thing must be born in its own environment, and, if an organism, must have a regular arrangement of parts.*

412. **eorum**, i.e. of the pupil and of the ball. So, if all the *anima* be removed, there will be an end of both *anima* and *animus*.

415. **alioqui**, 'otherwise,' though a rare word in poetry, is perfectly appropriate here; to reject the verse (so Lachmann) on that ground seems unreasonable, and to emend it unnecessary. The addition of *est* seems necessary, as Lucr. would hardly omit the verb in such a sentence.

416. **vincti**: *vincta* would be more normal: cf. l. 136: the masc. plur. is regular when the nouns are names of persons: e.g. *Orgetorix et filia capti sunt.*

417—444. *I shall now set forth proofs of the mortality of the soul. (Whether I use the word* animus *or* anima, *you will understand that I denote the soul by either, indifferently.) First then, I have shown that the atoms of the soul are smaller and have less cohesion than the atoms of water. But water pours away and disappears, when the vessel that contains it is broken. Therefore the soul is at once dissolved into atoms, when withdrawn from the body which contains it.*

The first subject of the book is now ended, and the second begins after a preface of eight lines. This is the kernel of the whole poem, for the supreme object of φυσιολογία is to demonstrate that there is no future life, and therefore no possibility of future suffering, for the soul.

417. **nunc age**, 'now mark me': the phrase generally marks the beginning of a new and important theme: cf. i 265 and 921.

nativos et mortalis esse, 'were born and must die': the one fact implies the other, so that Lucr. often uses *nativus* as a synonym of *mortalis*. Yet both epithets are needed here: for the ancient champions of the immortality of the soul, chiefly the Platonists and Pythagoreans, held that the life of the soul 'extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future' (Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* p. 19); while the modern popular belief is that the soul was born, or created, but will never die. Lucr. argues first against the immortality of the soul (ll. 425—669), then against its pre-existence (ll. 670—783).

418. **levis**: the epithet adds poetry to the passage and also indicates some of the arguments which are to follow.

419. Here again the language does not suggest that Lucr. is simply translating a popular hand-book of Epicureanism. See n. to l. 10. Munro believes that all the arguments are taken from one of the 37 *volumina* of Epicurus περὶ φύσεως.

420. **cura**: some edd. keep *vita* of the MSS. and say that *vita*= *moribus*, or that the words mean 'worthy to be your rule of life.' I cannot think either interpretation possible.

422. **verbi causa**, 'for example,' refers to *animam*: *animum* would have done as well, he means.

dicere pergam, 'I shall in future speak of....'

423. **dicere**: the subject *me* is understood.

424. He reasserts here the gist of ll. 136—160, the close connexion and actual identity of the *animus* and *anima*: 'they are a single thing and one united substance.'

quatenus: see n. to l. 218.

est: the verb is attracted into the sing. by the predicate *unum*.

426. **docui**, 'I have proved': cf. ll. 179 foll.

animam must be supplied as subject of *constare*.

corporibus and **principiis** (427) are both 'atoms.'

428. **iam**, 'it follows at once that,' is Lachmann's emendation of *nam*. If *nam* is kept, there is a long parenthesis from it to the end of l. 433, after which the argument is resumed with *nunc igitur quoniam*.

At first sight *nam* appears to be right: for Lucr. before (ll. 179 foll.) proved the *tenuitas* of the soul-atoms by their *mobilitas*; and *nam* makes him do so here also. Yet in his atomic theory these two qualities are so related that it seems possible he could prove each by means of the other. And the reasoning of this passage seems to require *iam*. The point on which Lucr. is here insisting, is not the *tenuitas*, but the *mobilitas*, of the atoms, because this implies a want of cohesion which causes them to be easily scattered. If *nam* be read, the cardinal point of the *mobilitas* is put in parenthetically and only as a proof of the *tenuitas*. Another objection to the parenthesis is that after *nunc igitur quoniam*, the original statement, i.e. the *tenuitas*, should be repeated; but it is not.

429. **magis** goes with *tenui*.

430. **imaginibus**: Lucr. uses this word (and *simulacra*) to represent the εἴδωλα by which Epicurus accounted for sensation and thought. These are exceedingly fine films which are constantly being discharged from the surface of all bodies, bearing the exact likeness of the body itself. When we are awake, a succession of these images strikes the atoms of *anima* in our eyes and causes sensation there, so that we see the thing; but when we are asleep, they penetrate to the *animus* and the sensation takes place in it, so that we dream of seeing the object.

Smoke and mist are chosen because of their *tenuitas*; the imago of

of temperament in men, which are all due to different shapes of soul-atoms; but no man's temperament is such that philosophy will not make him good and happy.

288. As a new topic begins here, I have marked a fresh paragraph. The connexion seems to be this: though the atoms of the three substances are absolutely intermingled, yet there are times when the state of a man's mind shows that the atoms of one substance preponderate; and there are men (and other animals) in whom one of the three substances is normally preponderant.

etiam, i.e. as well as the *calor* necessary for the generation of *sensus*.

calor ille: i.e. not the normal *vapor* of the soul, but a special manifestation of warmth.

sumit, 'displays': the subject is *animus*. We are dealing now with the mind, the seat of passion, not with the soul.

289. **acribus**, 'eager.'

290. **est**, sc. *animo*.

The essential characteristics of *ventus* (or *aura*) are cold and motion: cf. l. 299 foll.

291. **horrorem**, 'shuddering.'

concitat artus = makes them run away.

292. **etiam quoque**: for this pleonasm, common in Lucr., cf. l. 208.

The essential characteristic of *aer* is stillness or tranquillity. Epic. is quoted by Stobaeus as saying of these three elements of the soul (Usener *l. l.* p. 218) *τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἠρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος ἐμποιεῖν*. But Lucr. here goes further and attributes to them, not merely physical but mental phenomena.

298. **irarum fluctus**: the metaphor is from a boiling kettle.

299. **ventosa est**, 'is full of wind,' *ventus* being used in its technical sense.

306. **cervos** and **leones** are acc. in apposition with *utrosque*.

307. **sic**: i.e. there are differences of temperament among men also. But in men natural instinct is modified by will and training.

doctrina is 'education' generally, which makes civilised men superficially alike.

308. ***illa***: neut. plur.: it is nearly = *prima*.

309. **vestigia** governs *naturae*.

310. Perhaps this is said in refutation of the Stoic dogma that the *sapiens* is entirely virtuous.

311. **proclivius**, 'more readily': Lucr. has in his mind the original meaning of the word, 'down-hill,' as the verb *decurrat* shows.

313. **clementius aequo**, 'more meekly than is right': this man is wanting in proper pride.

315. **sequacis**, 'clinging': it is proverbially difficult for a man to change his character: cf. *curae sequaces* (ii 48).

316. **caecas**, 'invisible.' The differences of character all depend upon the different shapes of atoms which form the soul.

317. **quot**: supply *figurae*, not *nomina*.

319. **illud** = τόδε; 'one thing.'

firmare, 'to assert': *confirmare* is commoner in this sense.

320. **naturarum** = of natural defects.

321. **ratio**, 'philosophy': of course the Epicurean philosophy alone is credited with this power.

322. So Epicurus ends his letter to Menoeceus (Usener *l. l.* p. 66) with the promise that by studying this philosophy he shall be free from disquietude by night and by day, and shall live as a god among men.

323—349. *Soul and body are in intimate union with each other: on the one hand, the body keeps the soul together; on the other hand, the soul imparts life to the body. The relation between the two is so close that the soul cannot be withdrawn from the body without the destruction of both. Sensation is produced by their union. The body cannot exist apart from the soul. Their close union is proved by the fact that they cannot exist separately.*

This argument would be clearer if Lucr. had not omitted to prove one half of it, i.e. that the existence of the soul depends upon the body: he only proves that the existence of the body depends upon the soul. But there is a reason for the omission: for the second part of the book (ll. 417—829) consists entirely of arguments to show that the soul cannot exist without the body.

323. **haec natura** = this thing, i.e. the soul, comprising the *animus* and the *anima*.

tenetur, 'is sheltered,' represents στεγάζεται which Epicurus uses in the same connexion: see n. to l. 569.

324. **ipsa**, 'in turn.'

salutis, 'existence': so *salvus* often = *vivus*.

326. **pernicie**, 'destruction to both.'

***non posse* videntur**, 'they clearly cannot be': cf. ll. 333, 338, and see n. to l. 164.

328. **haud facile est** = 'it is impossible.'

natura eius, i.e. the frankincense itself. The illustration would more exact, if Lucr. had said that both the scent and the stuff itself wo be destroyed: the soul is to the body as the scent is to the bit of fra incense.

330. **omnia**, i.e. both soul and body.

331. **inplexis** goes with *inter se*, 'interlaced.' The relation betw soul and body is like that between the different elements of the soul.

principiis, 'atoms': cf. l. 262: *primordiis*, like *primordiorum*, excluded by the metre.

332. **consorti—vita**, 'possessing life as joint partners': the metapl is commercial: life is a *sors* or patrimony which they hold jointly.

333. **quaeque** is used, where we should expect *altera*, because of affinity for *sibi*.

335. The way in which sensation begins with the *quarta natura* the soul, and is transmitted step by step to the body, was describ ll. 246—251: it is by the combined atomic motions of soul and bo that sensation is 'kindled and blown into flame throughout our fles See Introd. p. xiii.

Lucr. here speaks as if sensation were produced by the mere jux position of body and soul, just as water is produced by the juxtaposit of oxygen and hydrogen. But this is not so: sensation is inherent the soul, and is communicated by the soul to the body (cf. l. 357).

337. Now comes an argument from experience to prove the f stated in l. 324, i.e. that the body cannot exist apart from the so in fact that the soul is *causa salutis* of the body. It begins w **praeterea** which implies that the fact stated in l. 323 has already b proved: but, as a matter of fact, no argument has preceded it, but o a statement that body and soul are indispensable to each other, t an illustration of that statement, and then a repetition of it.

339. **enim**: there is a similar elision of *quidem* l. 904; but elis of either an iambic or a cretic (–⏑–) before a short vowel is rare dactylic verse.

ut, 'in the way that....'

340. **qui datus est**: i.e. the heat is not inherent in the water l comes from without, and has been added to the water to make it boil

convellitur, 'is torn in pieces.'

343. **penitus** qualifies *convulsi*.

conque putrescunt: the tmesis is a device to introduce an unmet word: cf. *inque pediri* (l. 484).

344. This is equivalent to: *corpus atque anima mutuis contagiis discunt vitalis motus.*

348. **coniunctast causa salutis,** 'the cause of their existence depends on their reciprocal action': for *coniuncta*, cf. *contagia* (l. 345): they are equivalents for *συμπάσχειν* and *συμπάθεια*: see n. to l. 153.

349. **naturam eorum**=*ea*, i.e. the body and the soul: see n. to l. 130.

350—369. *The view that sensation is confined to the soul and not shared by the body, is refuted by experience. It is true that the body loses sensation at death; but sensation was not during life inherent in the body. The eyes have sensation and see: it is not the mind that does the seeing: experience proves this.*

I think Giussani is clearly right in not marking a new paragraph at l. 359. There is no new argument but only an illustration of what goes before.

350. **refutat,** 'tries to disprove.'

352. **nominitare** is used for *nominare* for metrical reasons; and so *imperitare* for *imperare* (l. 1028).

353. 'He is fighting against certain facts which are actually (*vel*) plain to the senses.' Epicurus insists that all that our senses tell us is *ἐναργές* (*manifestum*, 'clearly true'): cf. Usener *l. l.* p. 5 *κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν*: Cic. *De Fin.* i 22 (of Epicurus) *iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit.* See Introd. p. ix.

354. 'For who will ever explain what sensation of the body is, if that, which our experience (**res**) has made clear and taught us, does not explain it?': i.e. our senses themselves tell us that the body feels, and there is no other explanation possible.

corpus sentire=*τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα*, and is used as the nom. of a noun. The phrase must stand for 'the *apparent* sensation of the body,' as Lucr. cannot expect his opponents to explain what they deny to be the case.

adferet, sc. *rationem*: so Lucr. (i 566) uses *reddere* for *reddere rationem*, 'to explain.'

355. **si non**: supply *id adferet.*

palam dedit=*palam fecit, dare* often having this meaning in old Latin: so *dat stragem* (i 288), and *turbas dare* (often in Plautus).

356. **at** introduces an objection: viz. the fact that the body loses sensation at death, proves that it did not enjoy sensation during life.

undique, 'altogether.'

357. **enim**, 'yes: for...': Lucr. admits the fact but denies the inference. Sensation is inherent (*proprium*) in the soul but not in the body, not even during life (*in aevo*): see n. to l. 335 and cf. Epic. (Usener *l. l.* p. 20) διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν (τὸ σῶμα)· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ (*proprium*) ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν.

358. **praeterea**='other things': the body loses not only sensation but heat, motion, etc.

expellitur aevo, 'it is driven forth from life': this is said of the body, though it would be more appropriately said of the man himself.

(The chief objection to Munro's reading is that it requires a difficult change of subject.)

359. Sight, as one of the senses, is now considered. The view, here disputed, that the mind sees and that the eyes are merely windows through which the mind looks, was common in antiquity and held both by Peripatetics and Stoics: cf. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i 46 *nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quae videmus; neque est enim ullus sensus in corpore, sed...viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris a sede animi perforatae....ut facile intellegi possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis, quae quasi fenestrae sint animi.*

360. **foribus**: Cic. *l. l.* has *fenestrae*, and the Greek statements of the argument generally have θυρίδες, which is more appropriate: and probably *fores* here is a translation of θυρίδες.

361. **difficilest**, 'is impossible': cf. l. 328: it is of course possible to hold the view but impossible to make it good. The view is contradicted by the feeling we have that our eyes see: such a feeling is *manifestum* and over-rides all argument.

362. 'For our sensation draws and drives us to the eyes themselves': i.e. at the moment of seeing, our sensation conclusively points (*detrudit*) to the eyes, not the mind, as the organs which see. The object to be supplied with the verbs is *nos* or *mentem nostram*.

363. This is especially obvious when the eyes are dazzled and blinded by a brilliant light: in such a case the eyes would see all the better, if the mind did the seeing.

364. **lumina**, 'the eyes': **luminibus**, 'by the light': such a play on words is very attractive to Lucr.: cf. i 336 *officium...officere*; i 875 *latitandi...latitare.*

365. But no excess of light would prevent a window from giving light to a room.

quod=*praepediri.*

quia cernimus ipsi, 'because it is we ourselves that do the seeing,' not the window or door.

366. **laborem**, 'distress,' caused by excess of light.

367. The last argument is ironical: if the eyes are windows, then put them out, in order to see better; for a room will receive more light, if you remove the windows, sashes and all.

368. **iam**, 'in that case': cf. l. 428.

370—395. *You must not adopt the opinion of Democritus that in our body there is an atom of soul for every atom of body. This is not so; the atoms of soul are fewer. This is shown by the fact that very small and very light substances may touch our body without causing sensation: in such a case atoms of the body have been touched but not atoms of the soul. Many atoms of the body must be touched before one atom of the soul is touched and so produces sensation.*

370. **illud** = 'one view': cf. l. 319.

371. **Democriti—sententia**, 'the opinion of the revered sage, Democritus': *sancta* belongs properly to *viri*: Lucr. would not apply the epithet to an opinion which he proceeds to refute. The l. is repeated (v 622) of a *sententia* which Lucr. approves.

372, 373. 'That each single atom of the body is placed next to a single atom of the soul, and that the two come time about and so make up the fabric of our limbs.'

privis is used for the unmetrical *singulis*. Lucr. often uses *singula*, but *privo*, *privas*, *privos*, and *privis*.

alternis is an adv.

variare is used intransitively.

374. **animae elementa**: for the hiatus, cf. vi 755 *loci ope*.

375. **quibus e**: for the order of words, cf. ll. 839, 858.

377. **dumtaxat ut**... explains *rara*: 'they are thinly scattered, in so far at least that you can guarantee' etc.

378—380. 'That the atoms of soul keep spaces between them proportionate to (**tanta**) the size of the small (**quantula**) bodies which, if thrown upon us, are first (**prima**) able to excite sensation in the body': i.e. if a particle of dust touch the skin, without being felt, then the distance between two atoms of the soul must be greater than this particle.

prima** goes with **ciere, not with *corpora*, which are not atoms but external bodies, e.g. dust.

exordia prima = *primordia.*

Giussani acutely points out that most of the following examples seem not to agree with the rule given. A spider's web, for instance, must, owing to its length, touch many atoms of soul: it is much larger than the point of a needle, to which atoms of the soul respond readily enough. In this case the important element is lightness (cf. l. 387), not smallness. It seems likely that, according to Epicurus, there are no atoms of soul on the absolute surface of the body, so that a very light object, even if of some length, touches atoms of the body only, whereas a heavier object, by carrying its impression deeper, does reach atoms of the soul. And I think Lucr. may have intended to express this here: in fact, the *intervalla* are not of superficies, but of profundity.

382. **incussam cretam** has generally been explained by the use of *creta* as a cosmetic. Giussani thinks that there is a reference to a practical joke of street-boys (see n. to l. 196) who, unperceived, strike people on the back with an object marked with chalk; but surely *vestibus* would be needed then, not *membris.*

383. **aranei**: the last two syllables coalesce: *aranea* is the common form of the word. The 'withered garment' of the spider is her web: cf. Prop. iv 6, 33 *putris aranea.*

386. **pappos**, 'thistle-down.'

387. **gravatim**, 'not lightly,' i.e. 'with difficulty,' is said in playful contrast with *levitate.*

389. **priva**, 'separate,' = *singula*: cf. l. 372.

390. **et cetera** is an euphemism: cf. l. 481: Lucr. declines to mention *pulices, cimices* and even more disgusting little creatures; but he hints at them.

391—393. 'So many things must be stirred up within us, before the atoms of the soul, scattered throughout the frame in our bodies, perceive that atoms (of the body) have been struck': i.e. the shock, that a touch imparts to atoms of the body, must be considerable, before it can reach atoms of the soul and so produce sensation.

391. **multa** certainly refers to atoms of the body; but it is doubtful whether it is necessary to make it agree with *primordia* (so Munro) in the next l.

392. **primordia** is acc., **semina** is nom. and subject to *sentiscant.*

394. **quam in his**: for the hiatus, cf. l. 1082.

in his intervallis, 'being separate as I have said' in l. 380.

tuditantia: a true frequentative: the atoms strike and strike again against each other.

possint: the subject is *animae semina*.

395. The *motus sensiferi* are in this way initiated by the atoms of the soul.

396—416. *In the soul, the* animus *is the part which is essential to life: large parts of the* anima *may be withdrawn from the body without life ceasing; but the withdrawal of the* animus *is followed at once by death. The eye affords an example: the least injury to the pupil results in blindness; but much of the rest of the eye-ball may be cut away without injury to the power of seeing.*

The last three paragraphs dealt with relations between the soul and body: we now return to relations between the two parts of the soul.

396. **vitai claustra**: life is entrenched against the siege of death, and the chief 'defender of the fortress' is the *animus*.

est...coercens, 'has power to keep close': the phrase denotes a permanent characteristic, whereas *coercet* would denote a single action: the corresponding idiom is common in Greek.

397. **ad vitam**='to retain life.'

398. **mens** and **animus** are synonyms: cf. l. 94.

400. **comes**='going with it.'

403. A limb or two may be removed from the body, and the *anima* included in these limbs may be removed also; yet the man may go on living.

quamvis est: for the mood, cf. l. 705. Of this constr. there are only two instances in Lucr., one each in Cicero (but this is disputed) and Livy. The Augustan poets use it often: Tacitus, Juvenal, and Martial never have it.

404. **truncus** is a noun, 'the trunk.'

membris here is the remaining part of the body, i.e. the trunk; in l. 403 it refers to the severed limbs. The repetition is not happy.

406. **si non...**, **at magna parte**: this is the Latin idiom for 'the greater part, if not all': cf. ii 1017 *si non omnia sunt, at multo maxima pars est | consimilis*; Cic. *pro Sest.* 7 *si non omnem, at aliquam partem maeroris sui.*

omnimodis=*omnino*. The loss of all the *anima* would be fatal; cp. l. 410.

409. **vivata potestas**, 'the living power': again l. 558.

410. **orbis** is the outer circle of the eye, **acies** below is 'the pupil.' The negative force of *ne* is carried on to the next line.

412. **eorum**, i.e. of the pupil and of the ball. So, if all the *animi* be removed, there will be an end of both *anima* and *animus*.

415. **alioqui**, 'otherwise,' though a rare word in poetry, is perfectly appropriate here; to reject the verse (so Lachmann) on that ground seems unreasonable, and to emend it unnecessary. The addition of *est* seems necessary, as Lucr. would hardly omit the verb in such a sentence.

416. **vincti**: *vincta* would be more normal: cf. l. 136: the masc. plur. is regular when the nouns are names of persons: e.g. *Orgetorix et filia capti sunt.*

417—444. *I shall now set forth proofs of the mortality of the soul. (Whether I use the word* animus *or* anima, *you will understand that I denote the soul by either, indifferently.) First then, I have shown that the atoms of the soul are smaller and have less cohesion than the atoms of water. But water pours away and disappears, when the vessel that contains it is broken. Therefore the soul is at once dissolved into atoms, when withdrawn from the body which contains it.*

The first subject of the book is now ended, and the second begins after a preface of eight lines. This is the kernel of the whole poem, for the supreme object of φυσιολογία is to demonstrate that there is no future life, and therefore no possibility of future suffering, for the soul.

417. **nunc age**, 'now mark me': the phrase generally marks the beginning of a new and important theme: cf. i 265 and 921.

nativos et mortalis esse, 'were born and must die': the one fact implies the other, so that Lucr. often uses *nativus* as a synonym of *mortalis*. Yet both epithets are needed here: for the ancient champions of the immortality of the soul, chiefly the Platonists and Pythagoreans, held that the life of the soul 'extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future' (Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* p. 19); while the modern popular belief is that the soul was born, or created, but will never die. Lucr. argues first against the immortality of the soul (ll. 425—669), then against its pre-existence (ll. 670—783).

418. **levis**: the epithet adds poetry to the passage and also indicates some of the arguments which are to follow.

419. Here again the language does not suggest that Lucr. is simply translating a popular hand-book of Epicureanism. See n. to l. 10. Munro believes that all the arguments are taken from one of the 7 *volumina* of Epicurus περὶ φύσεως.

420. **cura**: some edd. keep *vita* of the MSS. and say that *vita*= *moribus*, or that the words mean 'worthy to be your rule of life.' I cannot think either interpretation possible.

422. **verbi causa**, 'for example,' refers to *animam*: *animum* would have done as well, he means.

dicere pergam, 'I shall in future speak of....'

423. **dicere**: the subject *me* is understood.

424. He reasserts here the gist of ll. 136—160, the close connexion and actual identity of the *animus* and *anima*: 'they are a single thing and one united substance.'

quatenus: see n. to l. 218.

est: the verb is attracted into the sing. by the predicate *unum*.

426. **docui**, 'I have proved': cf. ll. 179 foll.

animam must be supplied as subject of *constare*.

corporibus and **principiis** (427) are both 'atoms.'

428. **iam**, 'it follows at once that,' is Lachmann's emendation of *nam*. If *nam* is kept, there is a long parenthesis from it to the end of l. 433, after which the argument is resumed with *nunc igitur quoniam*.

At first sight *nam* appears to be right: for Lucr. before (ll. 179 foll.) proved the *tenuitas* of the soul-atoms by their *mobilitas*; and *nam* makes him do so here also. Yet in his atomic theory these two qualities are so related that it seems possible he could prove each by means of the other. And the reasoning of this passage seems to require *iam*. The point on which Lucr. is here insisting, is not the *tenuitas*, but the *mobilitas*, of the atoms, because this implies a want of cohesion which causes them to be easily scattered. If *nam* be read, the cardinal point of the *mobilitas* is put in parenthetically and only as a proof of the *tenuitas*. Another objection to the parenthesis is that after *nunc igitur quoniam*, the original statement, i.e. the *tenuitas*, should be repeated; but it is not.

429. **magis** goes with *tenui*.

430. **imaginibus**: Lucr. uses this word (and *simulacra*) to represent the εἴδωλα by which Epicurus accounted for sensation and thought. These are exceedingly fine films which are constantly being discharged from the surface of all bodies, bearing the exact likeness of the body itself. When we are awake, a succession of these images strikes the atoms of *anima* in our eyes and causes sensation there, so that we see the thing; but when we are asleep, they penetrate to the *animus* and the sensation takes place in it, so that we dream of seeing the object.

Smoke and mist are chosen because of their *tenuitas*; the imago of

Lucr. now resumes and develops the argument which he first touched on at ll. 615—623. The first 14 ll. of the paragraph are repeated almost exactly v 128—141.

784. **in aethere**: i.e. the tree cannot *root* in the air but only *in arvis*.

787. **quicquid**=*quidque*: cf. l. 619.

790. **quod si posset enim** is most unusual for *hoc si* cet.: *enim* in a relative clause seems an undoubted solecism. Madvig, who discusses the passage (*Adv.* II p. 23), seems to consider it as possible: he says that *enim* connects the whole argument with what goes before: is this possible? Munro's punctuation (see critical notes) is ingenious and gets rid of this difficulty, and of the awkward asyndeton after *soleret*; but it is open to the grave objection, that what ought to be the conclusion, is thus stated in the protasis.

Lucr. means this: 'if it were possible for the *animus* to exist outside the body, it could *a fortiori* exist in the head or heels: but in fact it can exist only in the breast.' This argument is obscured by Munro's punctuation.

793. **tandem**, '*and* at all events.' *tandem* here approaches in meaning to *saltem*: cf. Ter. *Eun.* 1054 *perfice hoc | precibus pretio ut haeream in parte aliqua tandem apud Thaidem.* The word is originally deictic, *tamdem* meaning 'so much as that': cf. the Homeric τοῖον: later it was restricted to a temporal sense, 'so long as that.'

in eodem homine, 'in its native man': cf. Tac. *Ann.* xi 16 *neminem isdem in terris ortum* ('no native of this country').

atque='that is.' Cf. l. 555.

794. **quod**, 'but,' as in *quod si*. *quod quoniam* does not occur again in Lucr.

796. **anima** is used in its restricted sense, for the irrational part of the soul: this is diffused through the whole body.

797. **durare genique**: the natural order is inverted: cf. *crescat et insit* l. 787.

801. **consentire**=συμπάσχειν, 'feel in unison': see n. to l. 153.

fungi mutua, 'be reciprocally acted upon': for *fungi*, cf. l. 168.

mutua is used as an adv.: Virgil has *per mutua* in the same sense.

802—805. Soul and body are so closely blended as to form a single thing (**iunctum in concilio**): it is therefore inconceivable that one should be exposed to the disintegrating forces here called *procellae*, if the other is not. For then the combination of body and soul would be both vulnerable and invulnerable, both mortal and immortal, which is

absurd. (To Lucr. 'invulnerable' and 'immortal' are synonymous terms.)

There is no connexion between this argument, so understood, and that which begins at l. 819. Lucr. here objects that the union of a vulnerable and an invulnerable is absurd; it is no answer to say, what is there said, that the invulnerable may remain invulnerable.

803. **discrepitans**, 'incongruous': cf. the use of *discrepat* = *μάχεται* i 582.

806—829. *Anything that is eternal must satisfy one of three conditions. Either it must be impenetrable to blows, as atoms are; or it must be untouched by them, as void is; or there must be no room outside of it into which it can pass, as is the case with the universe as a whole. [But the soul does not satisfy any of these conditions and must therefore perish.] There is yet another way in which the soul might be immortal: it might be protected from harm by its constitution, as the gods are. But this is not so: for the soul suffers remorse for the past and anxiety for the future; it is affected by diseases of the body and is exposed also to diseases of its own.*

The first 13 lines of the paragraph are repeated exactly v 351—363. Till recently, editors have rejected them here as a marginal quotation added by some early reader. But Giussani's arguments for retaining them are, in my opinion, conclusive. (1) They do not, as Lachmann supposed, interrupt an argument: see nn. to ll. 802, 819. (2) The repetition in the fifth book is not in itself suspicious; we have just had 14 ll. (784—796) which are repeated in the fifth book. (3) As the end of his long series of arguments, it is eminently natural that Lucr. should draw a final argument from the first principles of his philosophy: if the argument is naturally used in the fifth book to prove the mortality of this world, it is still more in place here: indeed it is difficult to believe that Lucr. could have omitted it. The argument, as it stands, is imperfect: some supplement such as is given in brackets above is necessary. But it is quite possible that some ll. have been lost after l. 818: it is generally agreed that something is lost after l. 823.

807. **solido**: this is a technical term in Lucr., meaning 'without void.' That atoms contain no void, was proved i 503 foll.

respuere, 'defy,' 'laugh at.'

808. **sibi**, 'into themselves': dat. of local relation.

809. **intus partes** = *partes quae sunt intus*: atoms have parts, but *are indivisible.*

materiai corpora is one of his many names for 'atoms.'

810. **ante**, i.e. in his first book.

812. **inane**, τὸ κενόν, 'void,' is the second factor of the universe: it is not merely the negation of body: it exists as truly as body: but it is intangible substance (ἀναφὴς φύσις, *intactilis natura*), so that blows of atoms cannot touch it.

813. **neque ab ictu fungitur hilum**, 'and is not affected in the least in consequence of a blow.'

For **ab ictu**, cf. *ab rebus* l. 820: for **fungitur** (the passive of *facit*), see n. to l. 168.

814. **nulla loci copia**, 'no abundance of room': *locus* (τόπος) is 'void' considered as the medium in which bodies are placed.

816. **summarum summa** is the universe (τὸ πᾶν): *haec rerum summa* is 'this world,' lit. the aggregate of matter which we see.

817. **qui**=*aliqui*: *ullus* would be more usual.

diffugiant, sc. *res*.

818. After this l. something is lost: see the analysis above: another indication of this is the absence of the subject (*anima*) to *habendast*.

819. It now occurs to Lucr. that there is a fourth thing in the Epicurean system which is immortal, i.e. the gods. Can the soul be immortal for the same reason as the gods? They are immortal because of their composition: their bodies are formed by a perpetual succession of atoms in the *intermundia* where they live: these atoms by their confluence form the divine being for a moment and then stream away, and their place is taken by others. The divine substance is thus constantly changing and as constantly being renewed. In fact, an eternal water-fall will give an illustration of the composition and continued existence of these gods.

(Giussani was the first to give this interpretation of the passage. His view is strongly supported by a text of Stobaeus (Usener *l. l.* p. 239 n.) which says that Epicurus recognised *four* immortal substances, τὰ ἄτομα, τὸ κενὸν, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὰς ὁμοιότητας (which refers to the gods, as made of a succession of *similar* combinations of atoms). Lucr. takes these four in exactly the same order.)

ideo magis, 'for the reason that follows rather' than for those which precede and account for the eternity of atoms, void, and the universe.

The subject **anima** has to be supplied.

820. **vitalibus ab rebus**, 'by the forces that maintain life': cf. ii 575 *nunc hic, nunc illic superant vitalia rerum* \ et superantur item.

Epicurus taught that there was a perpetual war between the preserving and destroying forces of nature: their power is exactly equal, so that for everything that is dissolved into atoms, a new thing is made, and the sum of matter in the universe remains constant.

munita ab is unusual for the simple abl.: but Lucr. uses this *ab* of things, as well as persons, with some freedom: cf. l. 813.

821. **aut,** 'either': there are two ways in which the preserving forces may work. **veniunt:** see n. to l. 752.

aliena salutis='causes of destruction': according to Epicurus all things are destroyed either by violent assault from without or by disintegration from within (ll. 807, 808); but in the latter case also the destructive force first comes from without and then works from within.

823. **sentire queamus,** 'before we,' i.e. our souls, 'can feel.'

The l. printed below the text was suggested by Lachmann to supply the missing apodosis of the sentence.

824. **praeter quam** make one word.

cum is the preposition.

The soul suffers (1) bodily pain in the present, (2) fear for the future, (3) sorrow for the past. But the two last are most prominent here: for Lucr. is comparing the state of the human soul with the gods; and what seems to him the most striking difference is the presence in the former, and the absence in the latter, of the two main causes of unhappiness, anxiety for the past and anxiety for the future.

825. **advenit id** answers to *veniunt* of l. 821.

826. **male habet,** 'plagues it.'

827. **praeteritis male admissis** is abl. absol.

828. **furorem animi proprium,** 'madness peculiar to the mind,' is opposed to the delirium caused by bodily sickness: cf. l. 464. The same epithet must be supplied with *oblivia rerum.*

830—869. *Since the soul is mortal, death is nothing to us. Just as events which happened before we were born were nothing to us, so whatever may happen after our death cannot affect us at all. (If it were possible for our soul to feel after leaving the body, that would not concern us; for our individuality consists of the union of body and soul. Further, if the atoms, which form our body and soul, should in the future re-unite—and this is a most probable supposition, when one considers the infinite duration of time and the endless activity of atoms—even that would not concern us, as the*

former separation of soul and body snapped the chain of our consciousness.) A man cannot suffer in the future, unless he exists in the future, and death cuts him off from such existence. When he is once dead, he is in the same position as if he had never been born.

Lucr. now begins to draw the practical inferences from the preceding arguments.

830. Other philosophers had said: 'Death is not an evil'; Epicurus said more: he said (Usener *l.l.* p. 71) ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς: and (*l.l.* p. 61) τὸ φρικωδέστατον τῶν κακῶν, ὁ θάνατος, οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδή περ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν, ὅταν δ' ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τόθ' ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμεν. Lucr. reproduces both these arguments in this paragraph.

831. **habetur**, 'is considered': cp. l. 819: Lucr. assumes that his arguments have carried conviction.

832. He takes the most stirring event in all the past history of Rome, the Second Punic War.

aegri is partitive, after *nil*.

835. **horrida contremuere**, 'shuddered and quaked.'

836. **fuere**: the subject is *omnes humani* (cf. l. 80) which appears first in the relative clause: see n. to l. 133.

utrorum: the Carthaginians have been mentioned; the Romans it is unnecessary to mention. Cf. Livy xxix 17, 6 (from an ambassador's speech in the Senate) *in discrimine est nunc humanum omne genus, utrum vos an Carthaginienses principes terrarum videat.*

839. **uniter apti**, 'formed into a single being': cf. ll. 805, 845: our identity and personality depend upon the organic union of body and soul.

842. The phrase is often figuratively used: see n. to Juv. 6, 283. But here Lucr. means literally that a much more frightful catastrophe than the Punic wars, the actual destruction of the world, would be nothing to a dead man.

843—861 contains a digression, in which Lucr. makes two suppositions, the first of which he has repeatedly proved impossible (e.g. ll. 624—633); but the second he admits to be probable, or even more than probable.

(Though the device of a bracket has been used in the text, it is probable that these lines are not really a digression but a kind of note, which Lucr., on revision, added to his text. If so, the note was never properly incorporated with the context. For, though the connexion

with what precedes is natural and satisfactory, the entire absence of any indication at l. 862 that the former theme is now resumed, would be impossible in a finished work. If the lines are omitted, the argument of the whole paragraph is simple and straightforward.

Munro, following Lachmann, supposed that ll. 862—869 were connected with what immediately precedes. If this were so, the words would have to bear this meaning: 'if any man *now living* is to suffer in some future re-incarnation of his present self, his personal identity must persist in that future life. Since death makes this impossible, and destroys *the identity* of him, on whom suffering can be inflicted, we may be sure that there is nothing for us to fear after death, and that, as he *who exists now is not identical with him who will exist then*, he cannot suffer then.' But it will be seen that the words in italics, which are essential to the argument, are not really contained in the Latin.

A further objection to this interpretation is found in l. 868, where the MS. reading *an nullo* is meaningless, if Lucr. is here speaking of the supposed re-incarnation of a man now living. Lachmann accordingly read *ante ullo*, Munro *anne ullo*.

But if Lucr. has now gone back to the original subject of the paragraph, i.e. that what happens after our death does not concern us, then ll. 868, 869 are quite to the point, without any change of reading. He says in effect: 'our little life is rounded by a sleep: it is a mere speck in the midst of two infinities, during both of which we are not living; so that, when the brief episode of his life is over, the dead man is in the same position as if he had never been born.'

This explanation of the passage is adapted from Giussani's commentary. Brieger was the first to dismiss Lachmann's interpretation.)

843. The natural order of the words is: *et si iam animi natura sentit, postquam de corpore nostro distracta est.* Lucr. might have written *sentit nostro*; but he seems to have a liking for such inversions of the natural order. Ovid has many such: e.g. *si quis in hoc artem populo non novit amandi.*

iam, 'for the sake of argument': see n. to l. 540.

845. **comptu coniugioque**, 'by the binding tie of marriage between....'

Lucr. means: 'my soul is not me, my body is not me, my body and soul together are me; but (ll. 847—853) if they come together again, they are a different me.'

847. **materiem**, 'atoms' both of body and of soul.

850. **id quoque factum**, 'even that result.'

851. **repetentia nostri**, 'the chain of our consciousness,' i.e. the power of retracing our past and recognising our identity at each stage.

852, 853. 'So, in fact, we are not concerned about the personality (**nobis**), which we have been before, nor do we now feel any distress about that personality.' Lucr. is now showing that what he had suggested as a hypothesis (l. 847), is a reality.

853. **illis**, sc. *nobis*, 'our former selves.'

854. **nam** refers to a suppressed thought, i.e. 'and there must have been such previous combinations of our atoms: *for* etc.'

cum respicias, 'when one considers': when the second person has this general sense, the subj. is regularly used: cf. ll. 213, 856.

In the Epicurean view, time never had a beginning.

855. **materiai**, 'of atoms.'

856. **multimodis quam sint**, lit. 'of how many methods are...,' i.e. 'how manifold are the results of the movements....'

857. **semina**, 'atoms.'

saepe: it follows from this that in the infinite future also the same will often happen.

posta: for metrical convenience: so *repostus*.

So Lucr. here affirms of man what M. Arnold denies of his dog, Geist:

'not the course
Of all the centuries yet to come,
And not the infinite resource
Of Nature, with her countless sum

Of figures, with her fulness vast
Of new creation evermore,
Can ever quite repeat the past,
Or just thy little self restore.'

859. **memori mente** = *memoria*.

id, 'the fact' of our previous existence.

860. **inter** belongs to *iecta*.

vitai pausa, 'a stoppage of life,' i.e. death: cf. l. 930.

861. 'The motions have strayed from sensations' means: the atomic motions have ceased to produce sensation. Cf. l. 924 *longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant*: the meaning is the same here, though the expression is peculiar: the atoms which produce sensation are still in motion during the stoppage of life, but, as they are no longer shut up in the body, they are not *sensiferi*.

862. Lucr. now resumes where he left off at l. 842: cf. *accidere* l. 841 with *accidere* l. 864. What follows has no reference to the possibility of future combinations of the same atoms, so as to reproduce the same individual.

863. **esse**, 'exist.'

864. **eximit**, 'precludes.'

prōbet is a contracted form of *prohibet*, like *debere* and *praebere* from *dehibere* and *praehibere*.

865. **illum**, i.e. the dead man.

conciliare is much more often used of good things, e.g. *gratiam*, *amorem* etc., than of bad things.

866. **in morte**='after death.'

868. **an nullo** cet.: the first of the two alternatives (*utrum aliquo tempore*) has to be supplied: the meaning is that for a dead man it is the same as if he had never been born.

869. **mors inmortalis**: our state of non-existence will last for ever after our death; and so the period of our non-existence was infinite before our birth; our little life counts for nothing between the two infinities.

mors=*τὸ τεθνάναι*, not *τὸ ἀποθανεῖν*.

870—893. *Yet so persistent is this false view of death, that even some men who profess to believe that death ends sensation, are yet distressed at the thought that their dead body may rot or be burned or devoured by beasts. This shows that they do not really believe what they profess to believe, but unconsciously imagine themselves to survive their own death, so as to feel what happens to their dead body; which is, in fact, impossible. Whatever may be the fate of our body after death, it is a matter of indifference to us.*

870. **videas**: see n. to l. 854.

se ipsum indignarier, 'cry out against his lot': a personal acc. after *indignari* is very rare in place of *suam vicem*; but Lucr. wishes to emphasise the words, because the mistake he points out is just that of identifying self with the corpse.

871. **posto**, 'laid in the grave.'

872. **interflat**, 'be destroyed': a passive of *interficere*.

873. **non sincerum sonere**, 'that he does not ring true': a common metaphor from earthenware vessels which ring dull if there is a flaw in them: cf. Plato *Theaet.* 179 D σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν, διακρούοντα εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται.

For *sonere*, cf. l. 156.

874. **caecum stimulum**, 'hidden sting.'

876. **non dat** cet., 'he does not really grant what he professes to grant, or the fact on which he professes to grant it': i.e. he says he believes he will have no sensation after death on the ground that the soul dies with the body; but he has not really a perfect conviction of either fact.

unde=*id ex quo*, with *promittit* understood again.

877. **eicit** is a dissyllable: cf. Virg. *Ecl.* 3, 96 *a flumine reice capellas.*

878. **facit** cet., 'he supposes that something of himself survives': *esse* and *super* form one word.

879. **enim** cet.: the train of thought is as follows: 'for, (though most men acquiesce in the thought of familiar modes of burial), when anyone suggests to himself that his body will be mangled, the thought of this abnormal treatment stimulates his imagination, and he fancies himself present at the scene, which is a mere delusion.'

881. **miseret** is generally impersonal, *misereri* being used with a personal subject.

illim=*ab illo*, sc. *corpore.*

882. **illum se fingit**, 'conjures up that other self': cf. *alium se* below. The self has really been destroyed by death, but the man invents a surviving self which grieves for the dead body.

883. **contaminat**, 'impregnates': the word is neutral here and does not imply that *sensus* is either a good thing or a bad thing.

Cf. Hazlitt's *Table-Talk*, p. 446 (ed. of 1901) 'in reflecting on death generally, we mix up the idea of life with it, and thus make it the ghastly monster it is. We think how we should feel, not how the dead feel.'

885. **vera morte** is opposed to the death which he, while still living, imagines for himself (l. 879).

886. 'Who can remain alive and lament to self that he himself has met death.'

Though there is no self left, imagination goes so far as to picture two surviving selves, of which one is torn by beasts while the other stands by and feels pity.

888. **nam** cet.: the argument seems to be this: 'I speak of burning *(uri)* as well as mangling (*lacerari*): *for*, though men dread the latter *worse, the* ordinary forms of burial would be as distressing to anyone *who could feel them.*'

malis morsuque, 'by the devouring jaws.'

889. **tractari**, a true frequentative of *trahi*. **qui**: abl.

890. Three methods of sepulture are mentioned: (1) burning, (2) embalming the body and placing it in a sarcophagus, (3) burying. The last was the most ancient method in Italy, and was practised at all times by poor people.

891. The body of Alexander the Great was embalmed in honey: cf. Stat. *Silv.* iii 2, 117 *ubi belliger urbis* (Alexandria) | *conditor Hyblaeo perfusus nectare durat*; Herod. i 198 ταφαὶ δέ σφι ἐν μέλιτι.

892. **aequor** is the smooth surface of the stone slab on which the embalmed body is placed in the sarcophagus.

893. The sound of the verse itself suggests the heavy load of earth.

894—911: 919—930. *Men say of a dead man that he is deprived of all pleasures: they forget to add that he is also deprived of all desire for them. Or they profess eternal grief for the loss of the dead, while congratulating him on his release from pain and trouble: but why this endless sorrow, when eternal sleep and rest are his portion? In sleep we feel no desire for our waking life and should be willing to sleep for ever. Much more is this so in death, which is followed by no awakening.*

894—899 are spoken by a mourner. Lucr. pictures a scene beside the pyre on which the dead man has just been burned: some friend or relative speaks.

894. **iam iam non**, 'no longer': the repeated *iam* is rare in this phrase.

uxor is subject to *accipiet*: the children, but not the wife, 'run to lisp their sire's return.'

895. **optima** may be rendered by 'good.'

896. **praeripere**, 'to be the first to snatch': the inf. of purpose after a verb of motion is not uncommon in the poets.

tacita, 'heartfelt.'

897. **factis florentibus esse**, lit. 'to be of prosperous doings': the abl. of quality, which generally denotes a moral or physical characteristic, here denotes an external, concrete fact.

899. **praemia vitae**, 'precious things of life,' i.e. household happiness, love of wife and children, prosperity, and power to guard your dear ones.

900. **illud in his rebus**: cf. l. 370: 'in this lament there is one thing they do not say.'

901. **super**, 'also': cf. l. 672.

tibi insidet, 'is in thy heart.'

una: the meaning is apparently that *together with* the joys of life, all desire for them is gone. But this is strangely expressed; and Giussani may be right in reading *ullum*.

902. **dictisque sequantur**, 'and make their words (of mourning) correspond to it.'

904—908 are either an inconsistent addition to the former lament, or the words of another mourner who takes quite a different view from the first, i.e. that the dead man is happy and enviable but has left eternal grief to those who survive.

904. **quidem ut**: for the elision, cf. l. 339.

aevi quod superest, 'for all remaining time.'

906. The body has been reduced to ashes on the pyre amid the tears of the mourners, before this lament is spoken.

cinefactum seems to have the sense of *cinificatum*, and to be formed by false analogy from such words as *tumefactum* and *madefactum*.

prope = 'standing by': lit. 'from close at hand.'

907. **insatiabiliter** is imitated by Horace *Epp.* i 14, 7 *rapto de fratre dolentis* | *insolabiliter*. The rhythm of this verse, composed of three words, is unusual.

909. **ab hoc**: *hic* is the second mourner who has just spoken. The mention of the person serves for inverted commas here, as *addunt* (l. 900) does after the first speech.

910. **res redit ad**, 'the result is': *redit* is idiomatic and has no sense of 'returning': cf. v 1141 *res ad faecem...redibat*.

somnum refers back to *sopitus*, l. 904.

911. **cur** = *ut ob eam rem*.

919—930 were transposed to this place by Susemihl. It is obvious that they come in well here, whereas after l. 918 the connexion is hard to see. It might be possible to make a connexion thus: the dead man feels desire for nothing: for in sleep we desire nothing: therefore still less in death. But I believe the transposition to be necessary and right.

919, 920. Lucr. argues: 'You admit that death is a sleep: well, in sleep we feel no sense of distress or privation.'

919. **se vitamque**: when sound asleep, we are dead to self and life but do not miss them.

920. **mens**: the mind may wake when the body sleeps (cf. ll. 112—116); but in the present case the sleep is very sound, and the mind shares it. **sopita** refers to real sleep.

921. **licet per nos**, 'we should not complain if...': *per nos*, 'as far as we are concerned.'

922. **nostri**, 'for ourselves.'

923. **tunc** is answered by *cum* below: the correspondence is not quite exact, as *tunc* denotes the time of sleep and *cum* the moment of waking.

924. See n. to l. 861. Consciousness is produced by, or rather, is, the motions of the atoms of soul and body.

925. **correptus** = *corripit se*, 'starts up.'

928. **turbae disiectus materiai**, 'displacement of the disordered atoms': *turba* suggests confusion as well as number.

929. **leto** = *in leto*, 'after death.'

930. **vitai pausa**: cf. l. 860.

secuta, 'overtaken.'

912—918. *Take a different scene, not a funeral this time but a banquet: here too you will find the same false view of death, as if the dead were thirsty but could not drink. There is no thirst in death nor any other desire.*

The saying 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,' so common in the mouth of Horace, would generally be considered to sum up the philosophy of Epicurus; but it is expressly repudiated by this Epicurean. It may be that Lucr. is gently reproving the less noble and less austere view of life taken by contemporary adherents of the school.

912. **discubuere**, 'they sit at table': the word is also used of a single person: see n. to Juv. 5, 12.

914. **ex animo**, 'from the heart': the wine makes them reveal their secret feeling. **hic** is the pronoun.

homullus, like *homuncio* and *homunculus*, conveys the notion that man's days are few and evil: cf. Servius *ap.* Cic. *Epp.* iv 5, 4 *heu! nos homunculi indignamur, si quis nostrum interiit aut occisus est, quorum vita brevior esse debet, cum uno loco tot oppidorum cadavera proiecta iacent?*

915. **iam fuerit**, 'soon will it be in the past,' i.e. 'it will soon be over': for the fut. perf., see n. to Juv. 1, 3.

916. 'As if after death this affliction is to be the chief of their afflictions': **mali** is partitive gen. after *hoc*.

eorum is a possessive gen. and refers to the feasters.

917. **torres**, 'drought.'

918. **aliae**: this form of the gen. is common in early Latin.

rei is here a monosyll., but a spondee ii 112: the latter is the original form: Plautus has both scansions and also *rĕi* which Juvenal has 8, 81. The dat. is always a monosyll. in Plautus but a spondee twice in Lucr. (i 688; ii 236).

931—971. *To those who lament to see themselves more or less near the end of life, Nature might address her stern reproof and say: 'if your past life has been lived well and wisely, you should be willing to leave the banquet, of which you have had enough, and sleep in peace; but if you have failed to reap the happiness life offers, why do you care to repeat the same old stale routine? In the latter case either you are young or old: if young, reflect that life can offer you nothing new; if you are old and have had your share of life's pleasures and lost your physical vigour, your discontent is still more inexcusable and is due to your own folly. You must make place for others: I must remove one generation to make room for another.'*

In this paragraph Lucr. censures insatiability, the *vitae cupido* (l. 1077) of mankind.

931. **si**: the apodosis begins at l. 950.

rerum natura, 'Nature': not here the external universe but the invisible power which pervades and governs it: for the personification of this power, cf. i 199, 216, 224, 263, 328, 551, 1009 etc. Here it is supposed actually to have a voice: cf. Mart. ix 41, 9 *ipsam crede tibi naturam dicere rerum.*

933. **quid tibi tanto operest**, 'what ails thee so greatly?'

935. **si** = *εἰ μέν*: the alternative begins with *sin* l. 940.

936. **pertusum...vas**: cf. l. 1009: so the insatiate soul is compared by Plato (*Gorg.* 493 B) to a *τετρημένος πίθος*: cf. Shakespeare *Cymbeline* i 7 'The cloyed will, That satiate yet unsatisfied desire, That tub both filled and running.' Heinze quotes Sen. *Epp.* 99, 5 *adquiescamus iis quae iam hausimus, si modo non perforato animo hauriebamus et transmittente quicquid acceperat.*

938. **plenus vitae conviva**, 'one who has eaten enough of life's banquet': another figure which constantly recurs: cf. Hor. *Sat.* i 1, 117 *qui se vixisse beatum | dicat, et exacto contentus tempore vita | cedat uti conviva satur.*

939. **quietem** is the sleep which should follow the meal.

940. **quae**: *fruor* here, as *fungor* l. 956, governs the acc.: see n. to l. 734.

profusa keeps up the metaphor of l. 936. Epicurus taught that

happiness was due mainly to the recollection, and therefore permanence, of past pleasures. But in this case they have passed away leaving no trace behind. The philosopher Attalus (cf. Sen. *Epp.* 72, 8) compared such a man to a dog which instantly gulps down each bit thrown to it by its master and gives all its attention to the next bit which it expects, showing no enjoyment of what it has actually got. See n. to l. 1084.

941. **in offensust**: the common phrase is *in offensa esse alicui*, but Lucr. has a marked partiality for forms in *-us*: he uses *offensus* elsewhere only of physical contact.

942. **male**, 'to no purpose': *pereat* itself has this sense, but *male* strengthens it.

943. **cur** is to be supplied from l. 938 at the beginning of the clause. There is no reference to suicide: Lucr. means: 'why are you not content to die?'

944, 945. Cf. Ecclesiastes i 9 'the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.'

946. A second dilemma begins here: 'you, who have wasted your life, are either young or old: in either case, be content to die.' The second horn of the dilemma is not included in Nature's speech and begins l. 952.

948. **saecla** is constantly used by Lucr. as a plural of *genus*, meaning 'kinds' of living things. Thrice only (here, l. 1090, and i 202) it means 'generations,' and denotes a period of time.

vincere, 'to outlast.'

950. **quid respondemus**, 'what answer are we to make?' The indic. is used in a deliberative question when the question does not expect an answer: see n. to Juv. 3, 296: here *quid=nihil.*

951. **causam**, 'indictment.'

952. **hic** is the masc. pronoun.

vero, 'but.'

954. **inclamet**: the subject *natura* is understood.

magis is to be taken with *merito.*

955. **abhinc**=*hinc*, 'from here.' It is generally used of time, not place; but the latter meaning is required here: cf. Plautus *Men.* 607 *aufer hinc palpationes*; *Poen.* 1035 *maledicta hinc aufer: linguam contescas face.* The second quotation seems to be conclusive as to the meaning of *abhinc* here: 'from this time forth' (so Munro) is weak, and also a strange meaning for the word, which is regularly used with an acc. of time with the sense of 'ago.'

956. **marces** refers here to physical decay only: cf. l. 946.

957. A regular reproach of ancient moralists: cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 3, 20 ἤρατο τῶν ἀπεόντων, οἷα καὶ πολλοὶ πάθον: Thuc. vi 13 δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων.

958. **tibi elapsast**, 'has slipped from your grasp.'

960. **plenus rerum**, 'filled with good things': cf. l. 1004.

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gnatis: so Bernays for *magnis* of MSS.: *concede* seems to require a dat.: a new generation pushes out the old; and the old must make a virtue of necessity.

Another likely emendation is *magnus*, 'like a man,' for which Munro quotes Sen. *Epp.* 110, 18 *illam vocem magnus atque animosus exclama.*

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No dead man goes down to a world below: he is dissolved into his atoms here on earth; for Nature needs these atoms to make something new out of them.

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haec is obscure: it cannot refer to *postera saecla*, as the tense of *cecidere* is unsuitable: it seems to stand for *saecla* generally, as if *postera* had been forgotten.

971. 'Life is given to no man in perpetuity but to all men to enjoy for a time.'

usu is probably a predicative dat., 'for use': if so, *mancipio* is the same case: some regard both as ablatives of manner.

mancipium, 'absolute ownership,' is often opposed to *usus*, 'temporary enjoyment': cf. Hor. *Epp.* ii 2, 158 *proprium est quod quis libra mercatus et aerest*, | *quaedam, si credis consultis, mancipat usus,*

i.e. what you get by *mancipium* is yours for ever; in the case of certain things, *usus* gives you as good a title.

972—977. *Our state after death will be as it was before our birth: thus Nature shows us that there is nothing to fear.*

Giussani seems right in marking a new paragraph here, as there is a change of topic.

Cf. ll. 830—867 for a similar argument.

973. **quam...ante** for *ante quam*: again iv 884.

975. **exponit**, 'holds up.'

976. **ibi**, i.e. in our state of non-existence in the past, and consequently also in the future.

977. **omni**, 'any': so often after a comparative: cf. Juv. 8, 209 *ignominiam graviorem pertulit omni | vulnere.*

978—1023. *There is no Tantalus, or Sisyphus, or Tityus in the world below, though legends tell of their torments there. But here on earth there are real torments, just as terrible, suffered by fools through their folly. Cerberus, the Furies,* [*and Ixion*] *are creations of fancy; but they have their counterparts on earth in the punishments suffered by criminals and in the scourge of a guilty conscience.*

978. **ea**, 'these torments.'

nimirum, 'assuredly': see n. to l. 226.

980. **nec**=οὔτε and is answered by *nec* l. 984. One form of the legend assigns this punishment to Tantalus, so that he suffers like Damocles under the sword: in the Homeric account (*Od.* xi 582 foll.) he is tormented by the sight of food and drink which he cannot touch: hence our 'tantalise.'

inpendens, neut., is to be taken with *aere.*

983. **casum**, 'chance': but there is also a reference to the 'fall' of Tantalus' stone: transl. therefore, 'the fall they fear is that which....'

984. **volucres**, two vultures, according to Homer *l.l.* 578.

ineunt, 'eat into.'

986. **perpetuam aetatem**, 'for ever and ever.'

987. 'However huge be the expanse of his prostrate body, so that he....'

exstet=*sit.*

988. **novem iugera**: cf. Homer *l.l.* 577 ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κεῖτο πέλεθρα: the *iugerum* is really about $\frac{5}{8}$ of an acre, while the πλέθρον is less than

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usu is probably a predicative dat., 'for use': if so, *mancipio* is the same case: some regard both as ablatives of manner.

mancipium, 'absolute ownership,' is often opposed to *usus*, 'temporary enjoyment': cf. Hor. *Epp.* ii 2, 158 proprium est quod quis libra mercatus et aerest, | quaedam, si credis consultis, mancipat usu,

i.e. what you get by *mancipium* is yours for ever; in the case of certain things, *usus* gives you as good a title.

972—977. *Our state after death will be as it was before our birth: thus Nature shows us that there is nothing to fear.*

Giussani seems right in marking a new paragraph here, as there is a change of topic.

Cf. ll. 830—867 for a similar argument.

973. **quam...ante** for *ante quam*: again iv 884.

975. **exponit**, 'holds up.'

976. **ibi**, i.e. in our state of non-existence in the past, and consequently also in the future.

977. **omni**, 'any': so often after a comparative: cf. Juv. 8, 209 *ignominiam graviorem pertulit omni | vulnere.*

978—1023. *There is no Tantalus, or Sisyphus, or Tityus in the world below, though legends tell of their torments there. But here on earth there are real torments, just as terrible, suffered by fools through their folly. Cerberus, the Furies, [and Ixion] are creations of fancy; but they have their counterparts on earth in the punishments suffered by criminals and in the scourge of a guilty conscience.*

978. **ea**, 'these torments.'

nimirum, 'assuredly': see n. to l. 226.

980. **nec**=οὔτε and is answered by *nec* l. 984. One form of the legend assigns this punishment to Tantalus, so that he suffers like Damocles under the sword: in the Homeric account (*Od.* xi 582 foll.) he is tormented by the sight of food and drink which he cannot touch: hence our 'tantalise.'

inpendens, neut., is to be taken with *aere.*

983. **casum**, 'chance': but there is also a reference to the 'fall' of Tantalus' stone: transl. therefore, 'the fall they fear is that which....'

984. **volucres**, two vultures, according to Homer *l.l.* 578.

ineunt, 'eat into.'

986. **perpetuam aetatem**, 'for ever and ever.'

987. 'However huge be the expanse of his prostrate body, so that he....'

exstet=*sit.*

988. **novem iugera**: cf. Homer *l.l.* 577 ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κεῖτο πλέθρα: *the iugerum* is really about $\frac{5}{8}$ of an acre, while the πλέθρον is less th

¼ of an acre. We may translate by 'roods,' remembering Milton, *P. L.* i 'his other parts besides Prone on the flood, extended long and large, Lay floating many a rood.'

992. **nobis**, 'for us.'

hic either = *in vita* (l. 982), or is the masc. pronoun, 'the man we see.'

993. **volucres** is explained by *anxius angor, atque* being = 'that is': cf. l. 793, and the use of *et* ii 615. But the mention of *volucres* is very unpleasing here, where Lucr. is undertaking to explain away the vultures as a mere allegory.

anxius angor is an assonance such as Lucr. loves: see n. to l. 364.

994. The slave of any passion is a Tityus, torn by the sad thoughts caused by the passion. Kingsley uses Ixion to denote the same thing: 'For ever doom'd, Ixion-like, to reel On mine own passions' ever-burning wheel.'

995. The punishment of Sisyphus was to roll a stone for ever up a mountain: cf. Homer *Od.* xi 593 foll.

998. **nec datur umquam** seems to refer to the successful candidates as well as the defeated, so that Pompey and Caesar are Sisyphuses too. Lucr. says: 'power is a delusion and is never really given to any.' Here he follows Epicurus who taught that men seek power for the sake of safety but do not get safety thereby: see n. to l. 59. Lucr. had seen many striking examples of this fact in the public life of his own time.

1001. **tamen**, 'after all.'

1002. The rhythm of the verse expresses the rapid fall of the stone: cf. *Od.* xi 598 *αὖτις ἔπειτα πέδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής.*

1003—1010. The Danaids had to pour water for ever into a sieve in Hades. We should expect Lucr. to say that discontented mortals suffer the torments of the Danaids: but he gives another turn to his interpretation, comparing the Seasons, which ever bring to man delightful gifts, to the Danaids, and the dissatisfied soul to their sieve.

1003. **animi naturam** = *animum*: see n. to l. 130.

1005. **quod** is the relative.

The Horae were kindly goddesses, represented in art as blooming maidens (cf. l. 1008): they come back each year and come in a regular order (*circum*).

1006. **lepores** refers especially to flowers.

1008. **hoc...id est...quod memorant**, 'this is the meaning of the tale they tell, that...': for the expression, cf. l. 754 and i 1052.

1010. **expleri...potestur**: cf. i 1045 *suppleri...queatur*: in each case the passive is due to the passive inf. which precedes: so, with a passive inf., *coeptus sum* and *desitus sum* are regularly used for *coepi* and *desii*.

1011. After this l. Munro marks a lacuna for two reasons: (1) the subjects have no verb; (2) it is strange that Ixion's wheel should be omitted in an enumeration of this kind; and we know from Servius (on Virg. *Aen.* vi 596) that he did find Ixion mentioned in this passage, and compared to traders who risk their lives at sea. Consequently some verses have been lost.

(Logically, Ixion ought to come after the Danaids and before Cerberus and the Furies, as he is a type and not merely a terror. It is possible that there is a lacuna of several ll. after 1010, and of one l. after 1011: so Giussani.)

1012. **aestus**, 'fires': hell is represented as a sort of volcano in popular belief.

1013. **qui**: the antecedent is not *aestus* but Tartarus and other legendary terrors mentioned in the lost verses.

1014. **in vita**: cf. ll. 979, 982.

1015. **insignis** may have a bad meaning as well as a good.

1016. **carcer** is the Mamertine prison, **robur** the dungeon added to it by Servius Tullius and known as *Tullianum*, **saxum** the Tarpeian rock from which criminals were thrown.

1017. The pitch, the metal plates, the fire-brands, are all instruments of torture.

1018. **sibi** is to be taken both with *conscia* and with *adhibet*.

1021. **quae**: *finis* is always fem. in Lucr.

1023. 'Here, on earth, in short, the life of fools becomes a hell': for this meaning of **hic**, cf. l. 992.

1024—1052. *Think how many great men and heroes of old have died: would you then claim to escape death, you whose life is little more than a living death, like sleep or drunkenness, and is made unhappy by causes you do not understand?*

The names that follow reach a climax in the mention of Epicurus: first come kings and generals, then poets and philosophers, then Democritus and last the greatest of all philosophers.

1024. **tute**: the suffix seems to be used with no other pronoun: the plur. is *vosmet*. Lucr. also uses *tutemet*.

1025. The line comes from Ennius.

sis = *suis*: so *suo* is a monosyll. i 1022. The case seems to be abl. of instrument: 'he left the light with his eyes' means 'he lost the light by closing his eyes in death'; but the expression is strange.

1026. Perhaps a recollection of Homer *Il.* xxi 107 κάτθανε καὶ Πάτροκλος ὅ περ σέο πολλὸν ἀμείνων, the words of Achilles to Lycaon.

improbe, 'unconscionable man,' applied to those who expect too much.

1028. **imperitarunt**: this form is used by the poets where the metre excludes the simple verb.

1029. **ille**: Xerxes.

magnum is a regular epithet of the sea in Lucr.; it does not refer specially to the Hellespont which Xerxes bridged.

1031. **lucunas**: this form of *lacuna* is found in MSS. of Virgil as well as of Lucr.

1032. **insultans** is to be understood both literally and metaphorically: cf. *casum* l. 983.

1033. **corpore**, 'from his body.'

1034. **Scipiadas**, 'the son of the Scipios,' i.e. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major, the conqueror of Zama, B.C. 202. Or Lucr. may mean the younger Africanus, a son of Aemilius Paulus who was adopted by a Scipio and took Carthage B.C. 146. Both are called *fulmina belli* by Virgil (*Aen.* vi 842).

Scipiadas is a Greek patronymic irregularly formed, the stem of the name being *Scipion-*: cf. *Memmiadae* i 26. It is a more sounding title than the real name, and also more convenient metrically, as Lucr. could not scan *Scipio* as a dactyl.

belli fulmen: this phrase is constantly used of the Scipios: as their name means 'staff,' and a thunderbolt was conventionally represented as a kind of staff, it was probably used first with a direct reference to their name.

1036. Next to the kings and captains, and above them, come thinkers, artists, and poets.

1037. **unus**, 'preeminently': commonly used with a superlative in this sense: and *sceptra potitus* is a kind of superlative, being = *potentissimus*.

1038. **eadem aliis** = τῇ αὐτῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις, the dat. being governed by *eadem*: cf. Hor. *Ars* 467 *invitum qui servat idem facit occidenti.*

1039. Democritus of Abdera died at a great age about B.C. 357. His relation to the system of Epicurus makes it natural that he should be mentioned here as the fore-runner of the Epicurean gospel. Whether

he committed suicide, as here stated, is uncertain: there are several different traditions of the manner of his death. But Lucr. is likely to have known what there was to be known about a man he admired so much. He certainly speaks with approval of this suicide; and there is some ground for believing that he imitated the example.

1042. **Epicurus**: see n. to l. 3. The name occurs again in the MSS. ii 42; but the text is certainly corrupt there.

obit: perfect.

decurso lumine vitae, 'when his light of life had run its course': a mixture of two metaphors, *decurso vitae spatio* and *extincto vitae lumine*.

1047. Unlike Democritus and Epicurus, who devoted their lives to study.

1050 introduces the subject of the next paragraph.

1051. **ebrius**, 'stupefied,' is metaphorical. Such a life is not merely useless but also unsettled and wretched.

1053—1075. *Men are made unhappy and restless by a sense of misery which they cannot explain: they seek to escape from themselves by constant change of place and occupation. But this desire is vain; the only remedy for their trouble is the study of philosophy.*

1053. **sentire videntur**, 'they plainly feel': see n. to l. 164.

1055. According to Lucr., the cause of this restlessness and misery is the fear of death: men would cease to feel it, if from philosophy they learnt the true destiny of the soul.

1056. **mali moles**, 'weight of woe.'

1060. **foras**, i.e. into the streets: he does not in this case leave the city.

magnis aedibus: he is a rich man and lives in a fine house, with a country-house too and horses and carriages: yet he is not content. The passage is imitated by M. Arnold in *Obermann Once More*:

'In his cool hall, with haggard eyes,
The Roman noble lay;
He drove abroad in furious guise,
Along the Appian way.

He made a feast, drank fierce and fast,
And crown'd his hair with flowers—
No easier nor no quicker pass'd
The impracticable hours.'

1066. **gravis**, 'wearily.'

1068. **fugit**, 'tries to escape from.'

at quem cet., 'but to that self, which, of course, invariably he cannot escape from, he remains bound against his will, and hates it...': *quem* is the object of *effugere*: the ellipse of *ei* after *haeret* is harsh, but *haeret et odit* is treated as a single phrase, governing an acc.

Madvig's *fugitat* (for *fugit at*) is attractive: but (1) Seneca, who quotes part of the verse, seems to have read *fugit, at*; (2) the asyndeton after *potis est* is unpleasing.

For the contrast between *fugit* and *effugere*, cf. Cic. *ad Att.* vii 24 *non dubito quin Gnaeus in fuga sit, modo effugiat.*

1069. **ingratis** is an adv., of which Plautus always uses an older form *ingratiis*, and also *gratiis* = προῖκα.

1071. **rebus relictis** = *ceteris rebus relictis*: often in comedy.

1072. **naturam rerum** here = φυσιολογίαν, 'the laws of the universe.'

1074. **ambigitur**, 'is in question.'

The man, who has studied and believed the philosophy of Epicurus, has no fear of suffering pain or privation during the infinite space of time which will follow his death. And therefore he will be contented during life also. Such seems to be the argument, whether convincing or not.

1075. **aetas**, 'time'; not, 'their life.'

restat manenda, 'remains for them to expect': *manenda* might have been omitted; but it serves to bring out the notion of the infinite duration of time.

1076—1094. *This craving for life is a source of danger and distress; and it is useless, for death is the certain doom of all mortals. The prolongation of life can devise no new pleasures for us; long life may bring misfortunes; and, however long a man lives, the period of non-existence, which follows his death, will still be infinite.*

The paragraph deals with *vitae cupido*, which is not quite the same as *timor mortis*. It is most akin to the remonstrance of Nature (l. 931 foll.) and repeats several arguments there used: cf. 1080, 1081 with 944, 945; 1082—1084 with 957.

1076. **dubiis periclis**, 'anxiety and peril.'

1078. **certa** does not mean that the time of our death is fixed by fate, for Epicurus would deny this, but that there is no appeal against the sentence of death.

1079. **pote** is not a neuter of *potis*, but a weakened form of it: Lucr. has *quid potis est* (v 560): cf. *mage* and *magis*, *amabere* and *amaberis*.

1080. **ibidem**, 'in the same pursuits.'

1081. **vivendo** = διὰ τὸ ζῆν ἡμᾶς.

procuditur, 'is struck out': the word is originally used of forging metal: Lucr. often uses it metaphorically.

1082. **dum abest**: for the hiatus, cf. l. 394, and ii 681 *reddita sunt cum odore*.

1084. **aequa** = 'undiminished.'

hiantis: cf. Sen. *Epp.* 72, 8 *solebat Attalus hac imagine uti: 'vidisti aliquando canem missa a domino frusta panis aut carnis aperto ore captantem? quicquid excepit, protinus integrum devorat et semper ad spem venturi hiat. idem evenit nobis: quicquid exspectantibus fortuna proiecit, id sine ulla voluptate demittimus* (we swallow) *statim, ad rapinam alterius erecti et attoniti.'*

1085, 1086. A sermon upon this text is preached by Juvenal 10, 188—288.

1087. **prorsum...hilum**, 'anything at all,' 'a single minute.'

1088. **tempore mortis** is 'the time during which we must be dead.'

1089. **minus** to be taken with *diu*, **esse** with *perempti*.

1090. **condere**, 'to complete'; lit. 'to put by, as done with.'

saecla: see n. to l. 948.

1091. **mors aeterna**: see n. to *mors immortalis* l. 869.

1092. **iam**, 'in future.'

non erit is practically one word: the period of future non-existence will be as long for the man who died to-day as for the man who died a hundred years ago: for both it will be infinite.

ex, 'dating from.'

1093. **et**, 'than,' after the comp. *minus*: this use of *et* seems very rare, though it is analogous to the use of *atque* after *alius* and comparatives: cf. Plaut. *Merc.* 897 *amicior mihi nullus vivit atque is est.*

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